Mercatus Center at George Mason University

Publications

Antony Davies:

	Midnight Regulations and the Cinderella Effect October 1, 2009 Journal Articles Antony Davies, Veronique de Rugy
	Recent studies have shown preliminary evidence of a tendency for outgoing administrations to generate a flurry of last-minute regulatory activity. This so-called Cinderella effect is described as resulting from the combination of an administration being in power yet, because it is out-going, not being subject to political ramifications from its actions. In this paper, we look at monthly regulatory activity over the past 30 years and compare the baseline growth in regulations (measured using the proxy of pages in the Federal Register) to the growth immediately following a Presidential election when the sitting President is re-elected, not re-elected, and when the party in control of the White House changes. We find significant evidence supporting the existence of a Cinderella effect.
	Do Federal Matching Funds Inhibit State Growth? August 22, 2008 Working Papers Antony Davies, Rossen Valchev
	Employing data for the state of Texas from 1963 through 2006, this workding paper concludes that increases in FMFs lead to lower state economic growth.
	Midnight Regulations: An Update March 17, 2008 Working Papers Antony Davies, Veronique de Rugy
	In 2001, former Mercatus Center scholar Jay Cochran examined the number of pages in the Federal Register, as a proxy for regulatory activity. He found that when the occupation of the White House switches to the party formerly out of power, the volume of regulation in the outgoing administration's final quarter-year averaged 17 percent higher than the volume of rules issued during the same period in non-election years. This working paper takes a second look at the existence of the midnight regulation phenomenon by improving on Cochran's original work.
	Implications of Foreign Investment Patterns for Federal, State, and Local Bond Financing October 5, 2007 Working Papers Antony Davies
	While standard economic theory suggests that the untaxed yields on municipal bonds should roughly equal the after-tax yields on Treasury bonds, actual yield data show that the untaxed yields on municipal bonds are much higher. Scholars refer to this phenomenon as the municipal bond puzzle. The authors find that changes in the relationship between municipal and Treasury bond yields correspond to changes in corporate income tax rates, personal income tax rates, the liquidity of municipal bonds relative to Treasury bonds, and the supply of municipal and Treasury bonds issued by the federal and municipal governments.
	Proposed Reforms to Federal Reserve Regulation Z ('Truth in Lending') March 28, 2005 Public Interest Comments Antony Davies
	This comment is an analysis of the Federal Reserve's proposed reforms to "Regulation Z," which implements provisions of the "Truth in Lending" Act.