

CERTIFICATE-OF-NEED LAWS



Certificate-of-need (CON) laws require healthcare providers to obtain permission before they open or expand their practices or purchase certain devices or new technologies. Applicants must prove that the community "needs" the new or expanded service, and existing providers are invited to challenge would-be competitors' applications. CON laws have persisted in spite of mounting evidence from health economists, regulatory economists, and antitrust lawyers showing that these laws fail to achieve their intended goals. The following charts are based on studies comparing outcomes in states that have CON laws with outcomes in those that do not. These comparisons account for socioeconomic differences and differences in the underlying health of the populations across states. The studies give some insight into what is likely to happen in a Louisiana without CON laws.



HEALTHCARE SERVICES THAT REQUIRE A CON IN LOUISIANA

Assisted Living/Residential Care Facilities Intermediate Care Facilities for Individuals with Intellectual Disability (ICF/IDs) Nursing Home Beds/ Long-Term Care Beds

SPENDING

Research finds that CON laws are associated with higher healthcare spending per capita and higher physician spending per capita.

Estimated changes in annual per capita healthcare spending patterns in Louisiana without CON




ACCESS

Comparing rural areas in CON states with rural areas in non-CON states, research finds that the presence of a CON program is associated with fewer rural hospitals. A subset of CON states specifically regulate the entry of ambulatory surgical centers (ASCs), which provide healthcare services and compete with traditional hospitals. These states have fewer rural ASCs.

Research also finds that states with CON programs have fewer hospitals in general (in rural and nonrural areas alike), and states with ASC-specific CON regulations have fewer ASCs in general.

Estimated changes in access to healthcare facilities in Louisiana without CON



TOTAL HOSPITALS



RURAL HOSPITALS

MERCATUS CENTER George Mason University Arlington, VA, 2016); Thomas Stratmann and Christopher Koopman, "Entry Regulation and Rural Health Care: Certificate-of-Need Laws" (Mercatus Working Paper, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, 2016); Thomas Stratmann and Christopher Koopman, "Entry Regulation and Rural Health Care: Certificate-of-Need Laws, Ambulatory Surgical Centers, and Community Hospitals" (Mercatus Working Paper, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, 2016);

LOUISIANA CERTIFICATE-OF-NEED LAWS

QUALITY

Supporters of CON suggest that these regulations positively impact healthcare quality, but research finds that the quality of hospital care in CON states is not systematically higher than the quality in non-CON states. In fact, mortality rates for pneumonia, heart failure, and heart attacks, as well as patient deaths from serious complications after surgery, are statistically significantly higher in hospitals in states with at least one CON regulation.

Estimated changes in Louisiana healthcare quality indicators



MERCATUS CENTER George Mason University

This study uses an identification strategy that exploits the fact that, on occasion, a local healthcare market is divided between two states, one with a CON law and the other without. Four is the median number of CON laws for CON states in this subsample.

Some states have added CON requirements for particular services since these analyses were conducted; the states with such new requirements are not visualized. For the latest information on which states regulate which procedures through CON, see Christopher Koopman and Anne Philpot, "The State of Certificate-of-Need Laws in 2016," Mercatus Center at George Mason University, September 27, 2016.

Source: Thomas Stratmann and David Wille, "Certificate-of-Need Laws and Hospital Quality" (Mercatus Working Paper, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, 2016).