A lame duck session of Congress occurs when legislators meet after an election has been held but before the next Congress has taken office. Lame duck sessions are often criticized by the victorious party in the election, and a common critique is that the lame duck members—undisciplined by electoral constraints—vote irresponsibly. There are subtle but statistically significant differences between voting patterns in regular and lame duck sessions, as revealed by analysis of over 50,000 House and Senate roll call votes.

During a lame duck session, members are slightly less likely to side with their own parties and less likely to vote at all. These patterns persist in very lame duck sessions—those that take place following the loss of majority status within a single house. In these sessions, however, a new pattern emerges: House members become more likely to cast bipartisan votes and Senators become less likely to do so. Beyond these voting patterns, it is difficult to say whether members vote more or less “responsibly” during lame duck sessions of Congress. Our analysis supports the primary findings of the existing literature on lame ducks. Past studies have found lame duck legislators to be less likely to indulge most special interests, but others suggest they may be more likely to indulge one particular special interest: their next employers. In this study, we explain how incentives change for lame duck legislators, briefly review past research on lame ducks, and present our statistical findings that support and add to the existing literature.

WHAT MAKES A LAME DUCK SESSION SPECIAL?
Lame duck sessions differ from regular legislative sessions in that some members will have lost their
reelection bids and others will be on the brink of retirement.

For many, the mere presence of members who will not be returning is prima facie evidence that lame duck sessions are undesirable. As Yale Law professor Bruce Ackerman says, “It is utterly undemocratic for repudiated representatives to legislate in the name of the American people.” Indeed, John Nagle of Notre Dame has demonstrated that these sorts of concerns animated the push for the 20th Amendment, which, after 1933, eliminated the long and mandatory lame duck session that had followed each election since the founding of the Republic.

The force of this critique is blunted by the fact that the vast majority of members win their re-elections: Since 1962, just 6 percent of congressmen and 13 percent of senators have lost re-election. And in the average session, only about 5 percent of members retire. So most legislators who sit during a lame duck session will have just passed an electoral test. A large body of literature examines the reasons that incumbents are unlikely to lose their seats. These factors include name-recognition, a fundraising advantage, and uncompetitive, gerrymandered districts. Current estimates suggest the incumbent advantage is between eight and ten percentage points.

Among those members who do retire or lose their re-election bids, lame duck sessions might be expected to alter incentives for a number of reasons:

1. Nonreturning members may feel less of an obligation to serve the interests of their constituents since they no longer need their approval for reelection. Depending on your point of view, this may result in more “ideological” votes or more “principled” votes. It’s also likely to result in diminished work effort.

2. Nonreturning legislators are also free to ignore whatever political bargains (commonly called “logrolls”) they have struck with their fellow members, especially party leaders. This has an ambiguous effect on public welfare because, on the one hand, logrolls tend to facilitate policies that favor parochial interests, but on the other hand, logrolls can also help minority interests register intense preferences.

3. These members may feel less pressure to cater to special interests whose financial and organizational support is often needed for political success. This may make lame ducks more likely to serve the general population.

4. There is an important caveat to the previous factor: nonreturning members may be more likely to cater to the interests of one particular special interest—their next employers. And for many ex-members, this next employer is a lobbyist or a client of a lobbyist.

On balance, it is not clear whether these altered incentives are likely to produce better or worse public policy. Empirical evaluation of lame duck sessions is complicated by the fact these sessions occur at the end of the year, when more complex and controversial bills are likely to come up for a vote. This is because large, complex pieces of legislation take longer to assemble and controversial legislation takes longer to whip. It is possible, therefore, that votes cast near the end of the year will tend to be more momentous and more controversial, whether they take place during an election year or not. For this reason we believe it important to control for any confounding “time of year” effect when assessing the influence of lame duck sessions on voting patterns.

WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT LAME DUCK VOTING PATTERNS?

In recent years, a number of researchers have documented differences in voting patterns between regular and lame duck sessions of the House of Representatives. These authors have found House members less likely to participate in roll call votes and more likely to cast votes that are inconsistent with the ideological wishes of their party leaders. There is also some evidence that members who do not face electoral constraints are more likely to ignore the ideological wishes of their constituents.

We build on this research, extending it to the Senate and introducing controls to account for different voting patterns that might emerge at the end of the year, whether members are voting in a lame duck session or not. We also assess the effect of a “very lame duck” session, i.e., one that takes place following the loss of majority status in the chamber.

Our analysis is based on more than 28,000 House and
22,000 Senate roll call votes from 1939 through 2013. A roll call vote is a recorded, chamber-wide vote on any measure. It could be a vote on the final passage of a bill, an amendment, or a procedural vote.

To test whether lame duck and very lame duck sessions are associated with altered legislative behavior, we focus on three main voting patterns: share of missing votes, party unity, and bipartisan votes. The share of missing votes is simply the number of members who fail to vote on a roll call vote divided by the total number of members in the chamber. Party unity is the share of members who vote with their party on each roll call vote calculated in terms of Republican unity, Democratic unity, majority party unity, and minority party unity. Finally, a bipartisan vote is a roll call vote that garners majority support from both major parties. We hypothesize that during lame duck sessions, members will be less likely to vote, and, when they do, they will be less likely to vote in line with their party leadership.

Figure 1 shows how lame duck voting patterns differ from regular session patterns. These estimates control for the idiosyncratic patterns of particular congresses and for the time of the year. Except where indicated by an asterisk, the estimated effects are statistically significant. In most cases, the effect is relatively modest and larger in the House than in the Senate.

Viewed in light of typical voting patterns, the largest effect of a lame duck session is to reduce member participation: typically about 9 percent of congressmen and 10 percent of senators skip roll call votes, but during a lame duck session, an additional 4.67 percent of congressmen and 3.10 percent of senators miss votes. In other words, representatives are 50 percent more likely and senators 30 percent more likely to miss a vote if it happens during a lame duck session.

Lame duck sessions persistently reduce party unity, but not by much. Typically, about 82 percent of house members and 81 percent of senators vote with their party; but during a lame duck session, party unity is reduced by about 3 percentage points. The pattern persists across all party categories but is not statistically significant among senate republicans or among the senate minority party (which are typically one and the same).

There is some evidence that bipartisan votes are more common during a lame duck session of either the House or the Senate, but the effect is not statistically significant.

Figure 2 shows how voting patterns during very lame duck
sessions differ from those of regular sessions. Unlike lame duck sessions, the effects of a very lame duck are typically stronger in the Senate than in the House. As with lame duck sessions, very lame duck sessions are associated with a greater tendency to skip votes. Very lame duck sessions are also associated with less party unity, though the effect does not always hold and is not statistically significant among either the Republican Party or the minority party. Interestingly, a very lame duck session increases the odds of a bipartisan House vote by about 9 percent, but reduces the odds of a bipartisan Senate vote by about 12 percent.

WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT HOW LAME DUCKS AFFECT LEGISLATION?

Beyond the voting patterns, the effect of lame duck sessions on policy is a more difficult question to tackle and has accordingly received less attention. Table 1 lists major pieces of legislation passed during lame duck sessions. No discernable ideological pattern is obvious. The diverse list includes the impeachment of President Clinton, the adoption of major trade deals such as the landmark 1994 expansion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.

As we note above, theory predicts that nonreturning members will be more likely to ignore the ideological preferences of their constituents and their party. Indeed, empirical tests suggest that members are more likely to depart from their typical ideological voting patterns during lame duck sessions.

Theory also predicts that vacating members will be less responsive to (most) special interests. And there is some evidence for this as well. One study examined individual votes on a protectionist measure adopted during the 1982 lame duck session of the House of Representatives. The researchers found that 66 percent of nonreturning members opposed the measure while 57 percent of returnees supported it. A more recent study examined an auto bailout bill that passed the House during the 2008 lame duck session and later died in the Senate. The author found that—unlike returning members—retiring representatives were not responsive to industry campaign contributions.
This does not, however, mean that lame duck sessions cause members to ignore the entreaties of all special interests. President Harding’s controversial proposal to subsidize the construction of US merchant ships is illustrative. The bill was ultimately taken up in a lame duck session of the 67th Congress, where defeated Republicans overwhelmingly supported the measure. When it came time to seek post-congressional work, a “grateful president” saw to it that these members were “disproportionately rewarded [with administration positions] . . . for their unpopular stand.”23

TABLE 1: MAJOR LEGISLATION PASSED DURING A LAME DUCK SESSION OF CONGRESS, 1970–2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>BILL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Agricultural Act of 1970</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>OSHA Act of 1970</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>Clean Air Amendments of 1970</td>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>Food Stamp Act of 1970</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>FOI Act Amendments of 1974</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>Trade Act of 1974</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, Liability (Superfund)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Surface Transportation Assistance Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Implementation Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Clinton impeachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Five appropriations bills</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Creation of Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Nine appropriations bills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Fiscal cliff deal</td>
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</tbody>
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CONCLUSION

Under normal circumstances, members of Congress face a number of perverse incentives. They are under constant pressure to indulge the desires of special interests because these groups are well-organized, well-informed, and often well-heeled. They are also encouraged to favor the priorities of party leadership, for leadership controls both the agenda and committee assignments, which affect everything from legislative to fundraising success. And, of course, members are incentivized to favor the often-parochial priorities of other colleagues because the reciprocal support of other members is necessary for legislative success.

The political process as a whole permits small, concentrated interests to wield disproportionate power.24 It allows agenda setters to manipulate the outcome of votes.25 And it permits winning coalitions to foist their costs on others outside the coalition.26 Even though voters themselves sometimes reward bad policy choices, regular elections are typically thought to be the best bulwark against these pressures.27

Ironically, a lame duck session of Congress mitigates some of these perverse incentives at the same time that it diminishes the discipline of electoral accountability. Lame duck sessions seem to make members more independent. During a lame duck, members are less likely to vote at all, and when they do vote, they are less inclined to follow the wishes of their party or their constituents. Lame duck members may be less inclined to indulge special interests, but they may make an important exception for their next employers. Given the fact that 80 to 90 percent of members win their reelection bids, these effects are unsurprisingly small.

Acknowledgement

The authors thank Anne Hobson, Mohamad Elbarasee, and Candace McTeer for excellent research assistance. We also thank Patrick McLaughlin, Veronique de Rugy, and Thomas Stratmann for helpful comments and suggestions. We are responsible for any errors or omissions that remain.
1. This is not the only way the term is used. Some apply it to any politician unlikely to seek or unable to stand for reelection. See, for example, Alt, Bueno de Mesquita, and Rose, “Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits,” *The Journal of Politics* 73, no. 01 (January 2011): 171–86, doi:10.1017/S0022381610000940. Others use it to refer to a regular session of Congress in which partisan control flips following the next election. See, for example, Roger Congleton, “The Politics of Government Growth,” in The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, ed. William F. Shughart and Laura Razzolini (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001).


12. Data are drawn from Keith Poole, “VoteView.com,” Database, Department of Political Science at the University of Georgia, (October 14, 2013), http://voteview.com/downloads.asp.

13. In each of the three types of tests, the unit of observation is the chamber-wide roll call vote. In each case, we estimate Dependent Variable $= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Lame Duck} + \Phi_i + \epsilon$. The share of missing votes and the share of members voting with their party are both continuous dependent variables, so we estimate these equations with ordinary least squares. The bipartisan vote is a dichotomous dependent variable, taking the value 1 if majorities of both parties vote yea and 0 otherwise. In this case, we estimate the equation using a probit model and report the marginal effect. $\Phi_i$ is a vector of indicator variables for each Congress from the 77th through the 112th, with the 76th Congress serving as the reference. $\Phi_i$ is a vector of indicator variables for each month, with January serving as the reference. All tests use heteroscedasticity-consistent estimators.

14. In most cases, the estimated coefficients on Congress and month-indicator variables are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in two-tailed tests. The estimated effects of lame and very lame duck sessions are typically robust to the inclusion/exclusion of these controls. In some cases, however, inclusion of these controls caused the estimated effects of lame and very lame duck sessions to lose statistical significance. As a further check of robustness, we also ran tests on only November and December roll call votes, essentially comparing end-of-year votes in election and nonelection years. These results were also statistically significant and similar in magnitude to those reported in figure 1.

15. Except where indicated, all lame duck regressions are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

16. This may be entirely driven by departing members. In an analysis of pre-1933 lame ducks, Jenkins and Nokken found that departing members were less likely to vote, but returning members were more likely to vote during a lame duck session. Jeffery A. Jenkins and Timothy P. Nokken, “Institutional Context and Party Power: Member Participation and Leadership Strategy in the Lame-Duck Congressional Era,” *American Politics Research* 39, no. 4 (July 1, 2011): 724–53, doi:10.1177/1532673X10390447.

17. In other words, we cannot rule out the possibility that the observed effect of a lame duck session on Senate Republicans and the minority party of the Senate is due to random chance.

18. The estimated effects of a very lame duck session on bipartisan House votes and Senate Democratic unity are both significant at the 10 percent level, while the estimated effect of a very lame duck session on bipartisan Senate votes is significant at the 5 percent level. All other statistically significant results are significant at the 1 percent level.

19. In the House, this effect is statistically significant at the 10 percent level, and in the Senate it is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
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