EVIDENCE-FREE POLICYMAKING AT THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

JAMES BROUGHEL
Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University

Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely; Proposal to Withdraw or Repeal
Agency: US Department of Health and Human Services
Comment Period Opens: October 29, 2021
Comment Period Closes: December 28, 2021
Comment Submitted: December 15, 2021
Docket No. HHS-OS-2020-0012
RIN: 0991-AC24

The US Department of Health and Humans Services (HHS) has proposed a rule that, if enacted, would rescind the Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely (SUNSET) rule finalized in January of 2021. The SUNSET rule attaches sunset provisions—i.e., expiration dates—to HHS regulations such that if HHS does not conduct assessments and reviews of regulations in accordance with Section 610 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) on a timely basis, then those regulations expire. Section 610 of the RFA requires agencies to develop and execute plans to periodically review regulations for their impact on small businesses.

In the proposed rule, HHS argues that it is unreasonable for the department to be expected to conduct the periodic reviews of HHS rules; it would be too costly and time consuming for the staff, according to the agency, diverting attention away from other department priorities. However, the proposed rule suffers from certain deficiencies:

1. The proposed rule fails to address the problem the final SUNSET rule was intended to address, namely a failure of HHS to consistently comply with Section 610 of the RFA and to conduct retrospective reviews of its regulations.

2. The proposed rule fails to seriously consider alternative ways of complying with Section 610 of the RFA, which is troubling, given the wide array of options between the opposite approaches of attaching sunset provisions to 18,000 department regulations and returning to the pre-SUNSET-rule status quo (whereby reviews were ad hoc and relatively rare).


For more information, contact
Mercatus Outreach, 703-993-4930, mercatusoutreach@mercatus.gmu.edu
Mercatus Center at George Mason University
3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor, Arlington, VA 22201

The ideas presented in this document do not represent official positions of the Mercatus Center or George Mason University.
3. HHS provides almost no evidence from the academic literature on retrospective review or sunset provisions or on the experiences of other jurisdictions with sunset provisions to justify its proposed action, instead relying on assertions from commenters.

4. The economic analysis for the proposed rule has serious deficiencies, including neglected benefits to small businesses, overstated costs, confusion about the role of baselines in economic analysis, and conflating of accounting costs and opportunity costs.

The RFA and numerous executive orders aimed at retrospective review intend for an evidence-based approach to regulation. What Americans are instead receiving from HHS is policy based on faith. HHS readily admits that many of its rules “have remained untouched for years” but confidently asserts without evidence that this is fine because rules “work as intended.” The great irony of HHS’s assertion that too much of a burden is imposed on the department if it is required to review its own regulations is that HHS fully expects members of the public to comply with all of its regulations, on pain of penalties that include fines and even imprisonment.

I appreciate the opportunity to submit this public comment on the proposed rule. The Fourth Branch project at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University is dedicated to advancing knowledge about the effects of regulation on society. As part of its mission, scholars conduct careful and independent analysis that employs contemporary economic scholarship to assess regulations and their effects on economic opportunities and societal well-being.

HHS IGNORES THE PROBLEM THE SUNSET RULE WAS INTENDED TO ADDRESS

The first principle of Executive Order 12866 is “Each agency shall identify the problem that it intends to address (including, where applicable, the failures of private markets or public institutions that warrant new agency action) as well as assess the significance of that problem.” Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-4 similarly states that “an agency must demonstrate that the proposed action is necessary.” And HHS’s own guidelines on regulatory impact analysis state that “agencies must first describe the market failure or other social purpose that leads to the need for regulatory action.”

The SUNSET rule was intended to address two all-too-common government failures: the failure to systematically review regulations and, in this case, the failure also to meet statutory obligations under the RFA. When it finalized the SUNSET rule in early 2021, HHS identified just three final actions resulting from Section 610 reviews since 2011. This represents about 0.7 percent of HHS rulemakings. The RFA was amended in 1996 in part to give the law stronger enforcement mechanisms, including judicial review, because Section 610 reviews were not being conducted systematically across the government. However, as is evident from HHS’s small number

---

8. According to HHS in the SUNSET rule, the average rulemaking amends five sections of the US Code of Federal Regulations. Thus, HHS’s 18,000 regulations equate to about 3,600 rulemakings. The three actions amended as part of Section 610 reviews over the past decade amend about 150 sections of the US Code of Federal Regulations, or 26 rulemakings. Twenty-six rulemakings of 3,600 is about 0.7 percent. Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely, 86 Fed. Reg. 5737.
of reviews over the past decade, the enforcement mechanism remains weak, which is why alternatives are needed.10

The SUNSET rule offers a theory for how a sunset provision would work to spur more review and compliance with the RFA: “Sunset provisions change the default from rules staying on the books indefinitely to rules being eliminated after some predetermined amount of time unless evidence is presented for why rules should continue. When a default rule is changed, the choice architecture confronting decision makers is altered and can spur changes in behavior.”11

The approach makes sense because the academic literature identifies the need for enforcement mechanisms to spur more periodic reviews, and sunset provisions are one such enforcement mechanism mentioned.12 By contrast, the proposed rule contains no corresponding theory for how the department will address the problem the SUNSET rule sought to correct, namely, that HHS is not meeting its obligations under current law. Indeed, HHS does not even acknowledge this problem in the proposed rule.

HHS’s failure to take seriously its obligations to periodically evaluate regulations is all the more troubling, given the overall lack of an evidentiary basis for many of its regulations. On a test of the quality and use of agencies’ regulatory impact analysis, for example, HHS received an average score of 1.6 out of 10.0 on retrospective review, the worst of any agency considered.13 On the question, “How well does the analysis identify and demonstrate the existence of a market failure or other systemic problem the regulation is supposed to solve?,” HHS received a score of 2.1 out of 5.0, also a poor score, but basically about average for executive agencies.14

Although HHS acknowledges that 85 percent of its regulations enacted before 1990 have never been edited, it would have people believe, on the basis of the comments it has received, that these rules “work as intended.”15 However, “many rules, even those with significant effects, are often not on the public’s radar once adopted.”16 In other words, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.17 Just because HHS is not hearing from a regulated community that regulations are creating problems does not mean that all is well with its rulemakings.

In fact, “work as intended” may not be a good thing, even if it occurs. If HHS works with special interest groups to enact regulations that protect industry incumbents at the expense of smaller rivals, then the “intended effect” of regulations is to bestow benefits on special interests at the public’s expense. This could explain why some members of the regulated communities HHS is hearing from are not clamoring for HHS to implement the SUNSET rule. Once companies have complied with regulations, the private costs to them are often sunk. Meanwhile, regulations continue to act as a barrier to entry into the industry, shielding incumbent businesses from

10. According to a report from the Congressional Research Service, an “unintended effect” of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, was that it may have resulted in fewer Section 610 reviews. Curtis W. Copeland, Reexamining Rules: Section 610 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), 9.
Two potential problems HHS appears to be trying to address with the proposed rule are that uncertainty is created by the SUNSET reviews and that rules might accidentally expire if the SUNSET rule goes into effect. However, new HHS regulations also create uncertainty, and it is not clear that reviewing regulations creates more uncertainty than adding new ones. Additionally, experience with existing sunset provisions discussed later in this comment yields little if any evidence that accidental expiration will seriously be a problem. Moreover, HHS considers no serious alternatives that might improve upon the SUNSET rule to prevent accidental expiration and reduce uncertainty. In fact, in its own economic analysis for the proposed rule, HHS assumes that no regulations will accidentally expire.\(^\text{18}\) If accidental expiration is a primary motivation of the proposed rule, then this supposed consequence of the SUNSET rule should be analyzed.

RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVES

OMB Circular A-4 and HHS guidelines require the agency to consider alternatives when regulating. According to HHS, “agencies must justify the need for regulatory action and consider a range of policy alternatives,”\(^\text{19}\) and “considering a wide-range of options both helps inform agency decision-making and encourages public comment.”\(^\text{20}\)

However, HHS considers only two alternatives in its economic analysis for the proposed rule. These two alternatives are (a) moving the sunset date forward for regulations older than 10 years such that these regulations are reviewed in the first two years or (b) moving the sunset date back such that existing regulations are reviewed over a 10-year period.\(^\text{21}\)

HHS does note, “we request comment on whether, consistent with the goals of retrospective review as well as other current policy priorities and considerations discussed in this proposed rule, the Department should consider modifying, rather than withdrawing or repealing, the SUNSET final rule.”\(^\text{22}\) HHS also mentions numerous times throughout the preamble of its proposed rule that it considers a more targeted approach to reviews desirable.\(^\text{23}\) But neither of the alternatives considered are more targeted. Instead, the sunset date in the alternatives analyzed still applies to the vast majority of HHS’s 18,000 regulations. If HHS believes a more targeted approach is needed, it should consider more targeted alternatives in its analysis. In this spirit, this comment offers a few alternatives the department should consider that are more targeted than the SUNSET rule:

- HHS could review only those rules identified as having a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities at time of enactment.
- HHS could review only a particular section of the US Code of Federal Regulations, rules from a particular subagency within HHS, or rules associated with a particular statute.

\(^{18}\) “We maintain the assumption in the SUNSET RIA that the Department will satisfy the requirements of the SUNSET final rule and no regulations will automatically expire.” Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely; Proposal to Withdraw or Repeal, 86 Fed. Reg. 59924.

\(^{19}\) US Department of Health and Human Services, Guidelines for Regulatory Impact Analysis, 6.

\(^{20}\) US Department of Health and Human Services, 6.

\(^{21}\) Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely; Proposal to Withdraw or Repeal, 86 Fed. Reg. 59929.

\(^{22}\) Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely; Proposal to Withdraw or Repeal, 86 Fed. Reg. 59908–09.

\(^{23}\) “HHS now believes more targeted alternatives suggested by commenters merit further consideration.” Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely; Proposal to Withdraw or Repeal, 86 Fed. Reg. 59919.
• HHS could commit to retrospective review of new regulations going forward by including plans for retrospective review in future individual rulemakings but forgo mandating reviews of existing regulations at this time.

A benefit of these alternatives is that HHS’s review policy could inform a pilot program, which, if successful, could be expanded to include more reviews. For example, Virginia recently completed a bipartisan regulatory reduction pilot program at two state agencies, and HHS could do something similar.

Notably, each of the alternatives listed would eliminate most of the estimated costs and potential uncertainty regarding when regulations expire that HHS claims exist under the SUNSET rule. This is true because, by reducing the scope of the rule to a subset of department regulations, much of the workload on the department would be eliminated. The first and last alternatives mentioned would also eliminate uncertainty as to when regulations are expected to expire (because regulators know with certainty when the covered regulations were enacted).

The department also need not attach sunset provisions to regulations to review them. Rather, the department could issue a rule on rulemaking setting out a process for retrospective review that lacks a sunset mechanism. A rule on rulemaking would still create an enforcement mechanism to address HHS’s general failure to conduct Section 610 reviews systematically. It could require, for example, that new rules be issued with a plan for when and how retrospective reviews will be conducted and for the use of data. The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) has recommendations for rules on rulemaking, which include discussion of retrospective review. ACUS research supports the suggestion that regulations be issued with plans as to how retrospective reviews will be conducted. These plans, according to ACUS, should include descriptions of the objective of the rule, the way the agency plans to measure results going forward, and a time frame for conducting reviews. Alternatively, a rule on rulemaking could codify Small Business Association (SBA) procedures for conducting Section 610 reviews, which HHS identifies as best practices in its proposed rule. In short, there are many alternative retrospective review approaches that HHS has failed to consider in the proposed rulemaking.

THE EVIDENCE-FREE NATURE OF THE PROPOSED RULE

HHS MAKES MANY ASSERTIONS WITHOUT EVIDENCE

Throughout the preamble to its proposed rule, HHS makes countless assertions, often without presenting any supporting evidence or, in some cases, by citing further assertions made by commenters. The word “could” appears 69 times in the preamble notice, and “may” appears more

than 50 times. The word “assert” appears 28 times, and “commenters assert” appears 9 times. Aside from one report by the SBA (note 15 in the proposed rule) and some writings from ACUS (notes 20–26 in the proposed rule), there are almost no writings on retrospective review or sunset provisions even cited in the proposed rule.

One of ACUS’s reports cited in HHS’s proposed rule does mention the SUNSET rule. In rather typical ACUS fashion, it neither rejects nor endorses the SUNSET rule. It also neither rejects nor endorses sunset provisions in general as mechanisms to spur retrospective review. The report does note (and HHS quotes) that “there does not seem to be a strong analytic basis presented for the periodicity (5 or 10 years) required in the HHS sunset review rule.”

In other words, the ACUS report criticizes the term of the sunset provision for not having an analytic basis, rather than criticizing the sunset provision itself. The term does have a legal basis, however, as it simply mirrors the timeline from Section 610 of the RFA, which requires 10-year periodic reviews. HHS is correct that the RFA does not require a 10-year sunset, but this sunset term does fall within the normal range of terms for sunset provisions seen in many states and countries. For example, New Hampshire and North Carolina both have 10-year sunset periods for regulations. Arkansas has a 12-year sunset for regulations. And some states have even shorter periods. For example, Florida has a five-year sunset. Given that HHS is already required to conduct 10-year reviews under Section 610 of the RFA now, a 10-year sunset seems entirely appropriate and consistent with Congressional intent, and it could give salience to the provisions of the law with which HHS is arguably not complying.

To offer some further examples of how little regard for evidence HHS has in its proposed rule, in several places throughout the preamble, HHS claims “upon further consideration” to have changed its mind about something but offers no evidence to support its reasoning. For example, HHS states, “The Sensitivity Analysis Section of the SUNSET [regulatory impact analysis] RIA acknowledges that ‘[o]ne commenter noted that conducting a retrospective analysis can be as time-consuming and expensive as a prospective regulatory analysis, suggesting the Department’s estimates of the time and expense of Reviews may be understated.’ Upon further consideration, the Department believes that the commenter is likely correct.”

There is no further explanation or discussion of the evidence upon which this decision was made. Similarly, HHS dismisses, without offering any serious evidence, uncontroversial claims about political economy that virtually any political scientist would accept. Here is one passage:

Additionally, the final rule concludes that “stakeholder input cannot be the only source of information to spur reviews” because such input would not reflect the “dispersed costs” that “consumers, small businesses, and the public” experience, given that those groups “often find it costly to organize and lobby on behalf of their own interests” and “[c]oncentrated interests” that “find it relatively easier” to do so would not take such costs into account.

---

However, HHS now doubts this conclusion because, as explained above, HHS received numerous comments to the SUNSET proposed rule from a diverse array of consumers, small businesses, and the public asserting the undue burdens and costs that rule would impose.\textsuperscript{34}

The fact that HHS receives some comments from a variety of different trade associations and advocacy groups does not disprove the widely accepted fact that most members of the public have little incentive to take an interest in individual HHS policies, let alone participate in the rulemaking process, given that the costs and benefits to most individuals are small from any particular HHS action, whereas the costs and benefits to organized interest groups are often very large by comparison.\textsuperscript{35} HHS’s statement ignores the vast political science and public choice literatures, which emphasize the “rational ignorance” of members of the public.\textsuperscript{36} That term describes how it is costly for members of the public to follow and participate in obscure policy actions, and the benefits to each individual of doing so are relatively small in comparison to the benefits to organized interest groups. As a result, members of the public rationally tune out. This is one of the key insights of economist Anthony Downs, arguably “one of the greatest political economists of the 20th century,”\textsuperscript{37} whose contributions garnered deserved consideration for a Nobel Prize.\textsuperscript{38}

Presumably all of the American public, including many individuals not yet born, would be affected if the SUNSET rule were to be adopted, given the reach of HHS regulations into American lives. Yet according to the HHS docket for the SUNSET rule on Regulations.gov, there were a mere 530 comments submitted.\textsuperscript{39} Even if most of those comments were in opposition to the SUNSET rule’s implementation, this tells us very little as to whether the regulation is warranted or serves the public interest, because the overwhelming majority of Americans did not participate in this process and probably have never heard of the SUNSET rule. Interest groups, however, whose interests may or may not align with the interests of the public more generally, have a much stronger incentive to participate. Interest groups seek economic rents via, for example, business lobbying for government favors.\textsuperscript{40} The phenomenon of rent-seeking is a basic insight from public choice economics.\textsuperscript{41}

Rent-seeking is a mainstream concept in economics, but HHS ignores it when considering the costs of HHS regulatory actions or the likely unrepresentative nature of the comments received by HHS on the SUNSET rule. Rent-seeking costs may also affect cost estimates made by the

\textsuperscript{34} Sequeiro and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely; Proposal to Withdraw or Repeal, 86 Fed. Reg. 59920.
\textsuperscript{38} Tyler Cowen, “Anthony Downs on Race and Urbanism, That Was Then This Is Now,” Marginal Revolution, May 7, 2018; Tyler Cowen, “Who Are the Best Economists without a Nobel Prize,” Marginal Revolution, April 13, 2010.
\textsuperscript{40} Rent-seeking refers to wasteful competitive activities aimed at securing transfers of wealth. Rent-seeking occurs in the private sector as well as the public sector. For example, a form of private rent-seeking occurs when individuals try to improve their relative social status. When such competition is zero sum in nature (which is not always the case), these efforts waste resources.
department. If the entities that submit comments to the department while it is undergoing retrospective reviews would have been rent-seeking in absence of having to write comments, then the private costs to these individuals and groups from writing comments could well constitute social benefits to society writ large.

HHS IGNORES EXISTING EXPERIENCE WITH SUNSET PROVISIONS
HHS’s lack of concern for evidence continues with the department dismissing the numerous experiences of other jurisdictions with sunset provisions. Claims such as “the likelihood that regulations would automatically expire is high” are without merit,\textsuperscript{42} which experience has shown in other places. To its credit, however, HHS does note that “we welcome comments regarding the experience of state and foreign governments with these laws.”\textsuperscript{43}

Of the sunset processes in any state, perhaps the one in Missouri is structured most like the HHS SUNSET rule. Missouri connects a sunset provision to a five-year periodic review requirement in a manner very similar to the SUNSET rule:\textsuperscript{44} if a review of a regulation is not conducted and if a report based upon the review is not completed, the regulation expires. I communicated with an official from the office of Missouri’s attorney general (who is also an expert on regulatory reviews for having overseen a regulatory review in the state), and he stated in an email, referencing the state’s sunset provision, “I am not aware of any regulations that have expired as a result of the statute that you cited. From what I have seen, agencies review every regulation under their control.”\textsuperscript{45}

A 2021 report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ranks countries on the basis of how well they conduct ex post review of regulations. The United States is well below the OECD average and ranks just above Latvia.\textsuperscript{46} Elsewhere, the OECD also notes, “Sunset requirements provide a useful ‘failsafe’ mechanism to ensure the entire stock of subordinate regulation remains fit for purpose over time.”\textsuperscript{47} The OECD claims that just fewer than half of member countries have some form of sunset arrangements in place.\textsuperscript{48} The SUNSET rule itself notes that Australia, France, Germany, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have forms of sunset provisions.\textsuperscript{49}

With respect to foreign countries with sunset provisions, HHS asserts, on the basis of the comments it has received, that “these governments are not bound by the requirements of the [Administrative Procedure Act] APA,” and therefore HHS seems to presume that their experiences can be dismissed.\textsuperscript{50} The claim is baffling for several reasons. First, many industrialized countries have processes like those required by the APA, such as a process for accepting public comments. Second, HHS’s claim ignores the fact that many states have sunset provisions in place and that state regulatory agencies are bound by an administrative procedure act, just as is HHS. Every state

\textsuperscript{42} Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely; Proposal to Withdraw or Repeal, 86 Fed. Reg. 59916.
\textsuperscript{43} Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely; Proposal to Withdraw or Repeal, 86 Fed. Reg. 59919.
\textsuperscript{44} Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.175.5. (2021)
\textsuperscript{45} Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely, 86 Fed. Reg. 5747.
\textsuperscript{46} Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021, 2021, 84, figure 2.18.
\textsuperscript{47} Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Reviewing the Stock of Regulation: OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy, 2020, 11.
\textsuperscript{48} Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Reviewing the Stock of Regulation, 25.
\textsuperscript{49} Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely, 86 Fed. Reg. 5694.
\textsuperscript{50} Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely; Proposal to Withdraw or Repeal, 86 Fed. Reg. 59919.
has an administrative procedure act, and, in forthcoming research, I and my coauthors find that 17 states have some form of sunset provision for regulations. A diverse set of states including Indiana, Kentucky, New Hampshire, and New Jersey have sunset provisions for regulations.

If anything, the state-level administrative procedure acts have more oversight mechanisms in place (and therefore include higher hurdles to rule reauthorization) than the federal APA because state administrative procedure acts often create an extensive role for the legislature in approving new rulemakings. Many states have legislative review committees that review new rules. Parliamentary systems tend to work similarly in that parliamentary action is often needed to reauthorize sunsetting laws.

Remarkably, HHS asserts that states “may not have the same resource constraints as HHS, for example, with respect to earmarked funds.” HHS's annual budget exceeds $1 trillion annually, which rivals the GDP of many countries. Although much of HHS’s spending is earmarked and therefore not discretionary, the claim that states are not as resource constrained as HHS strains credibility. HHS employs more than 80,000 people. If anything, all states and probably many countries lack the resources HHS has to review regulations.

The evidence from the states and OECD nations casts doubt on HHS’s claims that accidental expiration will be a problem under the SUNSET rule. Even if it were going to be a problem, HHS could amend the rule to give itself more time to review regulations, or review only a subset of department regulations, or, as noted earlier, it could forgo the use of a sunset provision altogether but still enact a rule on rulemaking mandating periodic retrospective reviews.

FLAWED ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

NEGLIGENCE BENEFITS IN THE FORM OF COST SAVINGS

HHS makes no attempt in its proposed rule to quantify the benefits forgone by rescinding the SUNSET rule (other than finding cost savings to the agency and public commenters, which it refers to as negative costs). HHS does note that there would be “disbenefits from the information” in forgone reviews. Information is indeed valuable. However, the benefits of the SUNSET rule are much more substantial than just information. I have conducted an original benefits analysis of the SUNSET rule that relies on estimated benefits and costs of previous rules amended as part of retrospective review efforts (see the attachment at the end of this comment). To be clear, the benefits analysis depends on ex ante estimates of the benefits and costs of regulations before they went into effect. Moreover, these reviews are not likely to be repeated in exactly the same form in

the future as part of reviews under the SUNSET rule; thus, my benefit estimates are subject to a high degree of uncertainty.

Nevertheless, although these efforts are not a perfect representation of what will occur under the SUNSET rule, they do shed light on the magnitude of benefits that are likely to be achievable. A reasonable approximation, made on the basis of reasonable assumptions, of the benefits of the SUNSET rule is $5 billion to $28 billion. Moreover, some of these benefits stem from indirect public health benefits of the SUNSET rule, which arise from raising incomes and thereby increasing risk-reducing expenditures. This analysis highlights the public health rationale that underlies the SUNSET rule.

For comparison, HHS estimates the present value of the cost of the SUNSET rule at $530 million to $600 million, according to its updated cost analysis in the proposed rule. Even if one assumes that these cost estimates are accurate, the best available estimate of benefits (HHS has not officially estimated benefits) of the SUNSET rule exceed the cost estimates by a factor of about 8 to 50. By rescinding the SUNSET rule, the math works in reverse: costs likely exceed benefits by a factor of about 8 to 50.

In a recent report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) says five departments achieved $160 billion in net benefits under recent retrospective review efforts during the administration of Donald J. Trump. Some of these net benefits may not be attributable to President Trump's Executive Order 13771—some perhaps would have occurred even absent the executive order—but the net benefits are attributable to retrospective review generally, highlighting the benefits of the exercise. (Strangely, HHS cites examples of past retrospective review efforts by the department as a reason not to instate the SUNSET rule, but these have primarily been one-off efforts that have not been institutionalized into a recurring process.) If HHS's experience were like that of the five departmental experiences reviewed by the GAO, and if cost savings of this magnitude could be achieved on a regular basis, then the benefits of the SUNSET rule could easily exceed the costs, perhaps by an order of magnitude or more.

None of this should be surprising, given the high cost of HHS activities to society. As noted, HHS's budget exceeds $1 trillion annually. Healthcare spending more generally constituted about 17.7 percent of GDP in 2018, or $3.8 trillion (including $950 billion on nonclinical administrative functions). The administration of Joseph R. Biden has identified about $20 billion of HHS

59. Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely; Proposal to Withdraw or Repeal, 86 Fed. Reg. 59928. These are the central estimates of cost at varying discount rates.
61. “These efforts demonstrate the Department’s ongoing commitment to retrospective review, which could be upended rather than strengthened by the SUNSET final rule.” Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely; Proposal to Withdraw or Repeal, 86 Fed. Reg. 59920.
62. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Office of Burden Reduction and Health Informatics is one notable exception in that its reviews are recurring. The experience of this office could help inform retrospective reviews more generally across the department.
63. US Department of Health and Human Services, “HHS Proposes Unprecedented Regulatory Reform.”
spending that constitutes improper Medicare payments in 2021.65 Meanwhile, HHS’s updated cost analysis of the SUNSET rule finds that, if it were implemented, the rule would cost between $70 million and $76 million annually (over a 10-year period).66 These statistics suggest that if HHS, as part of its reviews, identifies savings equal to even a miniscule amount of annual department spending or annual national spending on healthcare, the regulation will pay for itself.

This expectation is not unrealistic, given the reach of HHS regulations. For example, a recent study coauthored by economist David Cutler of Harvard University notes that “simplifying administration could save the US health care system an estimated $265 billion annually.”67 Moreover, that money “could be saved without compromising quality or access.”68 In other words, the costs HHS is anticipating from the review of its rules are a drop in the bucket compared to the potential savings of streamlining administrative bloat in the economy generally, much of which likely owes directly or indirectly to federal regulations.

A recent OECD report finds that the United States spends more as a percentage of GDP on healthcare than any other OECD nation, even when looking only at government and compulsory health insurance.69 This finding is true, even though other nations’ public healthcare systems cover their entire population, whereas the US public healthcare system does not.

The Regulation Rodeo database from the American Action Forum catalogues 628 final regulations from HHS between 2005 and 2021, with total costs of $183.2 billion and 357 million paperwork hours.70 Some of these costs may be sunk, meaning they cannot be recovered. But paperwork burdens in particular are likely to be a source of low-hanging fruit, where HHS could save the economy billions of dollars (support for which is the recent decline in improper Medicare payments).71 Cass Sunstein, a former administrator in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) during the Obama administration, has recommended that paperwork burdens be targeted as part of what he calls “sludge audits.”72 President Biden is also asking agencies to consider reducing paperwork burdens as a means of making government more customer focused. Finalizing the SUNSET rule or an alternative retrospective-review-oriented regulation would be consistent with this goal.73

**NEGLIGENCE OPPORTUNITY COST**

HHS claims that the proposed rule repealing the SUNSET rule would generate cost savings of approximately $70 million to $76 million annually. However, from a purely technical standpoint,

---

68. Sahni, Carrus, and Cutler.
71. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Biden-Harris Administration Announces.”
this is not true. Although HHS would possibly have to hire additional staff to implement the SUNSET rule, it is quite likely (and indeed stated by the department) that existing personnel and resources would have to be reallocated away from other programs and activities toward conducting reviews and assessments if the SUNSET rule were to be implemented. To quote the department, “Preventing the automatic expiration of regulations, however, would require prioritizing retrospective review above many other Department programs and missions,”\textsuperscript{74} and, “given the large scale of resources that would be required to conduct the required reviews, compliance with these new review requirements would lead to the diversion of resources from existing and new priority programs to the detriment of the other programs.”\textsuperscript{75}

These claims undermine HHS’s cost estimates. Because most reviews would apparently be done by existing personnel, the expenditures HHS makes on staff will be made whether the SUNSET rule goes into effect or not. Thus, these costs to the agency and to taxpayers are in the baseline. The real opportunity cost of HHS’s proposed rule is not what is spent on the staff, but rather what activities the staff would have done in absence of this regulation being enacted.\textsuperscript{76} Furthermore, HHS has no idea the of value of these foregone activities, both because HHS has failed to estimate them in its economic analysis and because HHS refuses to systematically conduct retrospective reviews of its regulations.

HHS’s cost estimates are clearly in violation of various best practices. According to OMB \textit{Circular A-4}, “‘Opportunity cost’ is the appropriate concept for valuing both benefits and costs.”\textsuperscript{77} Similarly, HHS guidelines state that “opportunity costs are easy to confuse with accounting costs” and “economists measure costs by the value of forgone opportunities. In other words, costs are incurred when resources are used for one purpose and hence cannot be used for another purpose. . . . This interpretation differs from the concept of accounting costs (i.e., actual expenses plus depreciation of capital equipment).”\textsuperscript{78}

A recent book by former FDA economist Richard Williams, who was the FDA’s director of social science at the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, provides further context on this topic. In a discussion of opportunity cost, Williams notes that

When a new regulation goes into effect, managers have to figure out how it applies to their firm and oversee implementation. That means instead of developing a new product or training workers, they need to work on the regulation instead. But the “price tag” for the managers, their salary, doesn’t change. To economists, even though they are paid the same amount of money, the cost is not being able to do what would have been done in absence of the

\textsuperscript{74} Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely; Proposal to Withdraw or Repeal, 86 Fed. Reg. 59909.
\textsuperscript{75} Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely; Proposal to Withdraw or Repeal, 86 Fed. Reg. 59909
\textsuperscript{76} It could be argued that markets are so efficient that the wage of HHS staff exactly represents the opportunity cost of their time. Such an argument is unlikely to be true in this case because (a) the government is unlikely to produce competitive market outcomes because the price mechanism is generally absent in the public resource allocation process and (b) if markets really were this efficient, there would be little need for further government interventions because resources would already be allocated efficiently. Employee wages, especially government employee wages, often bear little connection to the social opportunity cost of individuals’ time.
\textsuperscript{77} Office of Management and Budget, \textit{Circular A-4}, 18.
regulation. . . I told the scientists that the same thing holds true for when they're working on a regulation and their manager comes along and tells them to do something else.79

The discussion highlights that the problem facing HHS analysts when calculating the cost of the proposed rule is not how to tally up how much HHS employees and the monitoring public are paid, as has been done. Instead, the problem is figuring out the social value of these people's forgone activities. The value of those activities could be positive, negative, or zero, depending on whether HHS activities and public commenters’ activities are, in general, net beneficial.

HHS has presented accounting costs in its RIA, not opportunity costs, in direct violation of its own guidelines. Even if the $70 million or so in annual costs to HHS is a perfect estimate, these are not the opportunity costs of the proposed regulation. To be fair, this criticism probably applies to most HHS cost estimates (including the SUNSET rule’s cost analysis). However, the systematically poor analysis conducted by HHS generally does not excuse the poor analysis conducted in this particular instance.

IGNORANCE OF BASELINE

HHS cites “questions of attribution” in its proposed rule80—i.e., questions about whether benefits and costs of rules emanating from the SUNSET rule, yielded by the reviews that would be conducted, should be counted as benefits and costs of the sunset rule itself (or its repeal). On this matter, “the Department no longer believes it was appropriate to unambiguously attribute to the SUNSET rulemaking subsequent regulatory actions of this nature in the context of a regulatory impact analysis.”81

If HHS is correct, then costs related to having to write comments to HHS on future regulations reviewed and amended under the SUNSET rule should not be counted as costs of the SUNSET rule (and, by extension, savings of the proposed rule). These savings represent about 70 to 80 percent of the estimated cost savings of the proposed regulation.82 Arguably the costs to the agency of reviewing rules in the future should not be counted either, because these would also be attributable to future actions (thereby eliminating 100 percent of the estimated cost savings HHS claims in its proposed rule).

Putting that aside, however, HHS’s own guidelines suggest that the costs and benefits of future regulatory actions should count. OMB Circular A-4 states, “You need to measure the benefits and costs of a rule against a baseline. This baseline should be the best assessment of the way the world would look absent the proposed action.”83 HHS’s guidelines on regulatory impact analysis state, “The core of the RIA is an assessment of the benefits and costs of regulatory and other policy options in comparison to a ‘without regulation’ (or ‘no action’) baseline.”84 HHS guidelines go on: “The analysis should, at minimum, compare conditions with and without the policy once the policy is fully implemented.”85

82. Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely; Proposal to Withdraw or Repeal, 86 Fed. Reg. 59928.
85. US Department of Health and Human Services, 6.
Without the SUNSET rule, a number of reviews and subsequent amendments to regulations enacted in response to those reviews will not happen. Any regulatory amendments, rescissions, accidental expirations, or other activities not occurring because the SUNSET rule is rescinded need to be counted as consequences of the proposed rule. These events occur in the baseline scenario but not in the scenario in which the proposed rule takes effect.

Consider this example from HHS’s guidelines: “If a change in food handling procedures is expected under the baseline, the associated costs would not be counted as costs of the regulation. Similarly, the benefits of that change would have materialized in the baseline and cannot be attributed to the regulation.” Therefore, if a policy were to prevent the food handling regulation from being updated—because, for example, a retrospective regulation requiring that the rule be reevaluated were repealed—then the net benefits forgone from updating the food handling regulation would obviously have to be counted as costs of this new policy.

One of the challenges that has been identified with legislative impact accounting (i.e., impact analysis for congressional legislation) is that it is difficult to produce cost and benefit estimates for all of the regulations likely to emanate from a particular piece of legislation. This is precisely the issue that arises with analyzing the costs and benefits of the SUNSET rule: many subsequent regulations are likely to be modified owing to this change in department policy. This fact no doubt makes regulatory analysis more challenging. But the response to this challenge should not be to invent a new definition of the baseline concept. Rather, HHS should acknowledge the analytical challenge involved and do the best it can. I again direct the agency’s attention to the good faith attempt this author has made to estimate benefits of the SUNSET rule in an attachment to this comment.

Even if HHS’s approach to the baseline is defensible, OMB notes that multiple baselines can be considered in an analysis. Indeed, I have pointed to the practice of utilizing multiple baselines as a best practice. The department should heed this good advice and assess the baseline in the standard way, where the net benefits from all forgone regulatory actions conducted under the SUNSET regulation are counted as costs of the proposed rulemaking. Then HHS can, if it wants, use an alternative baseline where these are considered part of separate actions (though the economic rationale for doing so is unclear).

OVERSTATED COSTS
HHS’s cost estimates are likely to be inaccurate for several reasons. First, HHS states, “We assume that, under the baseline scenario of the SUNSET final rule, the Department will follow the recommendations in the SBA guidance.” I sincerely hope the department would follow through on this promise to adhere to SBA guidance when conducting Section 610 reviews, but past experience and even the proposed rule itself suggest that this is unlikely to be the case.

86. US Department of Health and Human Services, 7.
HHS has a history of not complying with guidelines and of having low-quality analysis generally. A review of HHS RIAs over the 2008 to 2013 period gave the agency an average score of 8.9 out of 20.0 on the quality of analysis.\(^91\) This score places HHS near the bottom of the ranking of agencies considered. Similarly, HHS received an average score of 1.3 out of 5.0 on the extent to which it uses analysis in decision-making, again placing it near the bottom of agency rankings.\(^92\) These scores reflect not just a lack of competency and attention to evidence when regulating, but also a lack of adherence to principles in Executive Order 12866, OMB Circular A-4, and HHS guidelines on RIAs.

Even within the current proposed rule, HHS violates elements of its own guidelines as well as OMB guidelines because (as noted earlier) it fails to rigorously consider the problem the regulation is addressing, it does not consider a wide array of alternatives to the proposed action, and it misunderstands basic regulatory analysis concepts such as baselines and opportunity cost. In short, given HHS’s track record, there is little reason to believe that analysts at HHS will comply with SBA guidelines that are not binding on the agency and for which there are no serious penalties if HHS does not comply. (However, as noted earlier, HHS should consider adopting a rule on rulemaking that codifies SBA’s Section 610 review procedures as official department policy.)

More generally, there is a strange mental disconnect in the department’s cost analysis. The department considers costs to the public of monitoring HHS activities while it is conducting retrospective reviews and updating regulations in the future. For example, it considers the costs of writing comments, yet the purpose of the RFA was clearly to alleviate burdens of regulations on small businesses. Thus, presumably the regulations these commenters will be writing about will be eliminating costs on these same (and other) commenters. Yet these cost savings are completely ignored by the department. As noted earlier, HHS also neglects the costs of rent-seeking, which leads to questions about the opportunity cost of the commenters’ time. The one-sided nature of the department’s cost analysis is highly concerning.

HHS’s economic analysis is also problematic because it neglects the differential timing of benefits and costs. HHS cites uncertainty as a major reason for not enacting the SUNSET rule,\(^93\) but if there is any uncertainty from the rule, it is mostly upfront. Even if one assumes that HHS’s assertions about accidental expirations are true, uncertainty will be resolved as the schedules for expiration are discovered.\(^94\) Within a few years, it is reasonable to conclude that most uncertainty will fade and any accidental expirations will stop.

After an initial pass through the regulatory code occurs, the job of conducting reviews becomes much easier as well. Because regulations are likely to be updated in response to the SUNSET rule in perpetuity, if one assumes that these regulatory actions are net beneficial, then the benefits of the SUNSET rule seem to be ongoing whereas the costs may be mostly immediate.

---

93. For example, HHS asserts that “in the event regulations automatically expire, they will be faced with enormous administrative costs such as computer system upgrades, staff training, amended services contracts, and public education on new requirements.” Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely; Proposal to Withdraw or Repeal, 86 Fed. Reg. 59915.
94. Note that in the SUNSET rule, HHS states plans to publish a schedule of when rules were enacted, which may reduce most of this uncertainty.
Thus, HHS demonstrates a kind of present bias by giving so much emphasis to short-term costs while downplaying long-term benefits.

There is one additional point about uncertainty worth noting. HHS takes a one-sided view of uncertainty in its proposal. The department notes that uncertainty is created by the SUNSET rule (because, for example, existing rules might expire or be updated in response to reviews conducted under the rule). However, HHS ignores any consideration of uncertainty in the baseline. HHS activities create uncertainty. To the extent fewer new regulations are issued by the department, as resources are reallocated toward conducting reviews and away from other HHS actions, then there is a corresponding reduction in uncertainty, which is a benefit of the proposed rule. This benefit should be acknowledged, as it could easily offset whatever uncertainty might arise from rescinding or updating regulations in response to reviews. Again, the one-sided nature of HHS's analysis is troubling.

CONCLUSION
With the notable exception of the current administration, retrospective review has been a critical component of every president's regulatory program going back to Jimmy Carter. These one-off review programs, however, also highlight the need for a systematic process that institutionalizes reviews into the existing process. As former OIRA administrator Cass Sunstein has noted, “After rules are in place, [agencies] should test [their ex ante] speculations, and they should use what they learn when revisiting a regulation or issuing a new one” because this is “one of the most important steps imaginable.”

There are many reasons to believe that regulations, once enacted, will not have the same effects that were anticipated before enactment. The billionaire investor David Rubenstein summed up this issue nicely in a recent interview:

Most business people—if you go back and look at their original business plan, you'll find that it bears no relationship to what they actually became. If you go back and look at what Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, Mark Zuckerberg, Jeff Bezos were going to do at the beginning—what they ultimately turned out to do was completely different. For example, Jeff Bezos—and I knew him at the beginning—he was just going to sell books over the internet, and that was it, nothing else. And then later he evolved to doing everything over the internet.

Most regulations are probably having effects completely unanticipated from those predicted ex ante, just as occurs in business. Without some form of retrospective review, these impacts will never be understood.

Imagine if a business decided it would estimate revenues from the sale of a new product once, before the product went on the market, and then never evaluate the sales from the product

ever again. Instead, the managers say, “it would be nice to measure those returns in theory, but accounting departments cost money. It is far too time consuming to assess revenues year after year. We have many, much more important new product lines to launch. And besides, the product is going great. No one is complaining, so it must work as intended.”

Rational investors would immediately pull all their money out of this company. Yet this is exactly the logic HHS follows in its proposed rule and exactly what occurs in the federal government when regulatory agencies produce ex ante analysis and do not follow up with ex post retrospective analysis.

HHS claims, “the Department is committed to exploring ways to improve its processes for conducting retrospective reviews under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) and identify and retire obsolete rules.” However, HHS’s claim is not credible. HHS could make its claims convincing by adopting a final rule that requires the agencies to conduct retrospective reviews in some form. If it does not like the approach taken by the previous administration, it should offer its own alternative.

The entire point of retrospective review is to make policy evidence based. Ironically, the proposed repeal of the SUNSET rule, with its near-complete dearth of supporting evidence, is one of the strongest recent examples I can think of for enacting the SUNSET rule. Without an enforcement mechanism, the danger that HHS will implement its agenda based on politics, blind faith, and special-interest favoritism appears strong.

ATTACHMENT

On January 8, 2021, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) announced that it would be finalizing a regulation titled “Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely,” which forms the acronym SUNSET. Despite its unassuming name, the regulation is actually one of the more ambitious rule changes to emerge in the four years of the Trump administration.

Regulatory agencies in the federal government are required to conduct periodic reviews of their regulations under Section 610 of the 1980 Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA). Section 610 requires agencies, consistent with their other statutory objectives, to periodically look back at existing regulations to minimize economic impacts on small businesses. In so doing, agencies are to determine whether rules are still needed, whether they are overly complex, and whether they should be updated to reflect evolving circumstances. The RFA was intended to alleviate regulatory burdens and create regulatory flexibility for small businesses, which are known to be disproportionately burdened by the costs of regulations.

Historically, RFA compliance has been weak. HHS, during the process of promulgating the SUNSET rule, identified just three regulations in the past decade that were finalized in response to Section 610 reviews. HHS estimates that 85 percent of regulations adopted before 1990 had never been edited. As one study recently noted, the periodic review requirement of the RFA has not been complied with consistently “in part because there is no penalty if an agency ignores the RFA.”

HHS's new SUNSET rule is an attempt to increase compliance with the RFA and to spur more retrospective reviews. It does so by creating a new forcing mechanism according to which, if HHS fails to review a rule in accordance with the RFA, the regulation automatically expires after a predetermined amount of time (in most cases after 10 years). Such an expiration date is known as a
The SUNSET rule imposes a sunset provision on the vast majority (with some exceptions) of the approximately 18,000 sections of the US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) under HHS's purview.

The RFA review process HHS sets forth in the SUNSET rule works as follows: First, regulations need to be assessed in order to determine if they have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities (SEISNOSE—a term of art from the RFA). If they do, a more in-depth review follows, based on review criteria set forth in the RFA. The first sunset date kicks in five years after the SUNSET rule is finalized, meaning that about 95 percent of HHS regulations will have to be assessed (and potentially reviewed if found to have a SEISNOSE) by the end of 2026 or else the various regulations expire, since most HHS regulations were adopted before 2016 and, thus, will be 10 years old by the time of the first sunset date. Once assessed (and reviewed, if necessary) a regulation’s expiration date is pushed back another 10 years. If a regulation requires updating, HHS has two years to update it, though this deadline may be extended.

HHS’s preamble to the SUNSET rule includes some estimates of the rule’s costs. These estimated costs fall into two categories: (a) costs to the department from allocating personnel to assessing and reviewing department regulations and (b) costs to the public from monitoring and commenting on regulations during the review process. HHS estimates that annualized costs over 10 years would fall in the range of about $8 million to $25 million. However, like most regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) issued by federal agencies, the RIA for the SUNSET rule does not include a monetized estimate of the rule’s benefits.

The purpose of this policy brief is to provide such an estimate of benefits to compare with the department’s estimated costs of the SUNSET rule. This policy brief is organized as follows. The next section provides a benefit estimate for the rule based on some recent HHS experiences with retrospective review. All told, the benefits of the rule are potentially very large, such that it could pass a benefit-cost test, perhaps paying for itself many times over. After that, the brief compares estimated benefits to the costs found in the RIA accompanying the rule, which tend to be about two orders of magnitude lower than the estimated benefits. Later, the brief discusses potential shortcomings of this benefit estimate, which, because it is based on past government RIAs, is subject to considerable uncertainty. The brief concludes that the success of the rule will ultimately depend on which regulations are amended in response to conducting future retrospective reviews. The identities of these regulations are to some extent unknowable. However, the SUNSET rule’s new forcing mechanism gives reason to believe that in the future, retrospective reviews will become a much more prevalent and important part of HHS policy than they have been historically.
BENEFITS ANALYSIS

Background
The benefits stemming from the SUNSET rule are the net social benefits of whatever regulatory updates, amendments, or rescissions end up occurring as a result of the assessments and reviews that will take place following the rule’s implementation. It is impossible to know with certainty the universe of regulations that will be updated in light of strengthened enforcement of periodic review requirements and better department compliance with the RFA. However, past Section 610 reviews offer some perspective, as does former President Barack Obama’s Executive Order 13563, which ordered a review of existing regulations. Both past experiences can potentially inform an estimate of the benefits of the SUNSET rule.

In order to produce an estimate of benefits, the analysis in this brief makes several assumptions. The first assumption is that the initial assessments (which are conducted to determine whether HHS regulations will have a SEISNOSE) result in no new rulemaking activity on their own. This assumption seems reasonable, given that once a regulation is deemed not to have a SEISNOSE, HHS will have fulfilled its retrospective review requirement, and the expiration date will move back 10 years on the relevant regulation. In its final notice of the SUNSET rule, HHS is clear that it contemplates amendment or rescission of regulations that have been reviewed, which is a step that comes after rules are assessed.

The next assumption is that no regulations will accidentally expire owing to HHS not conducting a timely assessment or review. This assumption also seems reasonable, given the experiences of many states with sunset provisions in their laws. For example, in its final notice of the SUNSET rule, HHS points to states such as Idaho, Missouri, New Jersey, and North Carolina, which have sunset provisions for regulations and where accidental expiration of rules seems to be an exceptionally rare phenomenon.

HHS has also built safeguards into the SUNSET rule to prevent inadvertent expiration of regulations. For example, the public will be able to submit comments requesting that HHS commence an assessment or review, and HHS plans to release a list of when all of the regulations under HHS authority were created or last modified, which will allow the monitoring public to determine the expiration date for all or nearly all HHS regulations.

Benefits Assessment
The benefit estimates in this section focus on the reviews expected to be conducted and the corresponding amendments and rescissions that follow from these reviews. As noted, HHS identifies three regulations in the past decade that emanated from its Section 610 reviews. These regulations are presented in table 1, along with the corresponding impacts these regulations were expected to produce, according to the economic analyses accompanying these regulations at the time of their promulgation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF RULEMAKING</th>
<th>RIN</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PRESENT VALUE OF ESTIMATED COST SAVINGS (MILLIONS OF 2020$, 7 PERCENT DISCOUNT RATE)</th>
<th>PRESENT VALUE OF ESTIMATED COST SAVINGS (MILLIONS OF 2020$, 3 PERCENT DISCOUNT RATE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Regulatory Provisions to Promote Program Efficiency, Transparency, and Burden Reduction; Fire Safety Requirements for Certain Dialysis Facilities; Hospital and Critical Access Hospital (CAH) Changes to Promote Innovation, Flexibility, and Improvement in Patient Care</td>
<td>0938-AT23</td>
<td>2019 (Final Rule)</td>
<td>$5,976</td>
<td>$7,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicare and Medicaid Program: Conditions of Participation for Home Health Agencies</td>
<td>0938-AG81</td>
<td>2017 (Final Rule)</td>
<td>−$1,317</td>
<td>−$1,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities</td>
<td>0938-AR61</td>
<td>2016 (Final Rule)</td>
<td>−$3,431</td>
<td>−$3,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$1,228</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,985</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Annualized figures from the RIAs for these regulations were converted into present values and updated to 2020 dollars.

Sources: US Department of Health and Human Services, Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Regulatory Provisions to Promote Program Efficiency, Transparency, and Burden Reduction; Fire Safety Requirements for Certain Dialysis Facilities; Hospital and Critical Access Hospital (CAH) Changes to Promote Innovation, Flexibility, and Improvement in Patient Care, 84 Fed. Reg. 51732 (September 30, 2019); US Department of Health and Human Services, Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Conditions of Participation for Home Health Agencies, 82 Fed. Reg. 4504 (January 13, 2017); US Department of Health and Human Services, Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities, 81 Fed. Reg. 68688 (October 4, 2016).
None of the rules in table 1 have monetized estimates of nonmarket benefits in their RIAs, but they do have estimates of cost savings, which, although sometimes appearing on the cost side of the ledger, are indistinguishable from benefits (since net benefits are calculated by subtracting costs from benefits). Relying on cost savings is defensible in a benefits analysis for several reasons. First, it is reasonable to conclude that reducing regulatory burdens on small businesses may end up being one of the primary benefits of the SUNSET rule. Cost savings has been one of the primary benefits associated with regulatory reform efforts under Executive Order 13771. Finally, cost savings have been used to evaluate net social benefits in other federal government reports, most notably from the Council of Economic Advisers.

As is evident from table 1, at the time of promulgation two of the regulations were expected to impose net costs (suggesting that it is possible for regulators to impose additional costs on the public as a result of retrospective reviews), but the other regulation was estimated to produce enough savings to more than make up for the net costs imposed by the other two.

On balance, the present value of the net benefits of the three regulations is estimated to be $1.2 billion (in 2020 dollars, at a 7 percent discount rate), according to the economic analyses accompanying these regulations. However, these regulation amended more CFR sections than typical regulation under HHS’s authority. In HHS’s RIA for the final SUNSET rule, HHS notes that one regulation amends five CFR sections on average. However, approximately 130 CFR sections were amended by the three regulations in table 1. Thus, the total benefits and costs reported in table 1 can be thought of as having emanated from 26 average regulations for the purposes of this benefits analysis.

In the RIA for the SUNSET rule, HHS also projects that 53 average regulations are likely to be rescinded and 159 are likely to be amended as a result of the rule. HHS does not provide information about whether savings are more likely to come disproportionately from amended regulations or from rescinded regulations. If one assumes that savings are likely to come from both equally, then these 212 combined updates could be expected to yield $10.0 billion to $16.2 billion in net savings, provided that HHS’s recently completed actions stemming from Section 610 reviews are representative of the benefits likely to follow from the SUNSET rule.

However, any regulations updated in response to the new retrospective review procedure would not be promulgated immediately. Some would likely be finalized in the decade following implementation of the SUNSET rule, and the finalization of some could even extend into the following decade. Assuming that, on average, regulations deliver benefits 10 years in the future, then the present value of these benefits is $5.1 billion (in 2020 dollars) at a 7 percent discount rate and $12.1 billion at a 3 percent discount rate.

Given the uncertainty surrounding this benefit estimate, one could look at other retrospective review efforts in addition to HHS’s Section 610 reviews. Another source of information about the
benefits of retrospective review efforts are the regulations promulgated in response to Executive Order 13563. A study of these efforts by the Administrative Conference of the United States identifies three major regulations from HHS that were the result of retrospective review and were included in the 2013 and 2014 Office of Management and Budget reports to Congress on the benefits and costs of federal regulations. Table 2 presents those regulations along with estimates of their impacts, as quantified in their RIAs at the time of promulgation. The preamble of one of the rules (0938-AQ89) notes that the rule’s provisions meet the objectives of Section 610 of the RFA. However, the rule is not labeled as resulting from a Section 610 review in HHS semiannual agendas, which explains why it is left out of table 1.

As a group, at the time of their promulgation, the three rules were expected to achieve net benefits of $4,640 million at a 7 percent discount rate and $5,227 at a 3 percent discount rate (in 2020 dollars). Those rulemakings amend between 120 and 180 CFR sections. Taking the midpoint of this range suggests these rules amended 30 average rulemakings. Assuming that 212 rulemaking updates occur in coming years, these could be expected to yield $32.8 billion to $36.9 billion in benefits. If these benefits arrive in 10 years, then the present value of these benefits is $16.7 billion at a 7 percent discount rate and $27.5 billion at a 3 percent discount rate.

If one assumes that the entire sample of rules in tables 1 and 2 should be considered together, then the combined estimated net benefits of the regulations are $5,868 million to $7,212 million, amending approximately 280 sections of the CFR. Taking into account that an average rulemaking amends five sections, and assuming that benefits arrive 10 years in the future, this approach yields a present value of estimated benefits of $11.3 billion at a 7 percent discount rate and $20.3 billion at a 3 percent discount rate.

Sensitivity
The secretary of Health and Human Services has the option to extend expiration dates, so there is a chance that benefits will be pushed further into the future, which would lower the present value of these benefits. If the review of a regulations concludes that regulations should be amended or rescinded, then HHS has two years from the date that the findings of the review are published in the Federal Register to amend or rescind the regulation. If the secretary determines that completion of the amendment or rescission is not feasible by the established date, he or she can certify this in a statement published in the Federal Register and then extend the completion date by one year at a time for no more than three times. For sensitivity purposes, one might assume therefore that the benefits estimates, which range from $5.1 billion to $27.5 billion, might arrive three years later as a result of the delay provisions available to the secretary. In that case, benefits would range from a low of $4.2 billion to a high of $25.2 billion.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RULE</th>
<th>RIN</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PRESENT VALUE OF ESTIMATED COST SAVINGS (MILLIONS OF 2020$, 7 PERCENT DISCOUNT RATE)</th>
<th>PRESENT VALUE OF ESTIMATED COST SAVINGS (MILLIONS OF 2020$, 3 PERCENT DISCOUNT RATE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement and Breach</td>
<td>0945-AA03</td>
<td>2013 (Final Rule)</td>
<td>−$354</td>
<td>−$350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Hospital andCritical Access</td>
<td>0938-AQ89</td>
<td>2012 (Final Rule)</td>
<td>$4,387</td>
<td>$4,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital and Critical Access Hospital Conditions of Participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicare and Medicaid Program; Regulatory Provisions to Promote</td>
<td>0938-AQ96</td>
<td>2012 (Final Rule)</td>
<td>$607</td>
<td>$677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Efficiency, Transparency, and Burden Reduction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$4,640</td>
<td>$5,227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Annualized figures from the RIAs were converted into present values and inflation adjusted to 2020 dollars.

Context
To put these estimates (which may seem large at first glance) in context, one recent study estimates that the cumulative cost of federal regulations in 2012 was $4 trillion.\(^{13}\) The $4 trillion federal regulatory cost estimate is derived using an endogenous growth model and data on regulatory restrictions across US industries. Regulatory counts, and specifically counts of regulatory requirements or restrictive terminology, are now often used to evaluate regulatory burdens. For example, Canada recently adopted measures of regulatory burdens across agencies using regulatory counts.\(^{14}\) These kinds of metrics are employed in states as part of regulatory reform efforts and now appear widely in peer-reviewed academic studies.\(^{15}\)

In 2012, HHS regulations comprised about 5 percent of federal regulatory restrictions.\(^{16}\) If HHS restrictions impose on average the same burden as restrictions from the federal government as a whole, then HHS regulations imposed costs of $200 billion in 2012, which, in 2020 dollars, is $228 billion.\(^{17}\) Meanwhile, $10 billion in benefits annualized over 10 years at a 7 percent discount rate constitutes about $1.4 billion per year in savings, which is less than 1 percent of the annual estimated costs of HHS regulations, suggesting that the benefits estimates earlier are plausible and may even be modest compared to the estimated costs of HHS regulations. It is also worth noting that many of the regulations appearing in tables 1 and 2 amend the Medicare program. Because of that program’s size, it is not surprising that regulations amending it could have impacts in the billions of dollars.

Indirect Benefits
The benefits of the SUNSET rule are not purely financial, as coincident risk reductions are likely to extend from the benefits estimated earlier. One recent study estimates that for every $109 million (in 2019 dollars) in costs resulting from a regulation, one can expect one death to occur.\(^{18}\) Regulatory costs induce mortality because income reductions reduce expenditures on health and safety, thereby increasing risks to life. Put differently, every $109 million in 2019 dollars (or $111 million in 2020 dollars) HHS saves through its retrospective review efforts will yield one expected life saved. These lives saved (or extended) in turn produce additional cost savings not considered in the previous calculations and are thus a cobenefit of the SUNSET rule.

The fact that HHS regulations cost an estimated $228 billion annually suggests that approximately 2,050 additional expected deaths occur annually as a result of the cost of HHS regulations. Although this increase in mortality does not account for how the HHS’s regulations may reduce mortality, it is unlikely that the costs and the benefits of HHS policy all fall on the same individuals, so these effects deserve attention in their own right.

The cost savings in the discussion of benefits earlier can be used to estimate the coincident health benefits—as well as their corresponding cost savings—that serve as additional cobenefits of the
SUNSET rule. These cobenefits help to reduce any overall negative health consequences imposed by the costs of HHS’s regulations. For example, the $5.1 billion to $12.1 billion in projected cost savings based on HHS’s past Section 610 reviews yields an indirect benefit of 46 to 109 initial expected lives saved (this range is “initial” because it is a present value). Assuming saved individuals contribute roughly the average amount of goods or services an American produces in their remaining lifespan, extending each life saved yields an additional return (in terms of cost savings) of $1.1 million on average, which cumulatively yields another $50.6 million to $119.9 million in additional cost savings.

The cobenefits will be offset to a modest extent by the costs of the SUNSET rule and could also be offset if there are unquantified risk increases that stem from the rule. However, even at the high end of HHS’s projected total cost estimates, which are around $200 million in present value terms, costs may not induce more than two initial deaths, meaning that the net risk reduction anticipated from the rule may not differ significantly from the gross risk reduction.

Although these cobenefits are relatively minor compared with the direct benefits anticipated from the SUNSET rule, the cobenefits alone may be large enough to exceed the estimated costs of the rule. Furthermore, because HHS intends to assess and (if necessary) review most important health and safety regulations, it is possible that regulations that reduce risks on balance will not be allowed to be rescinded to offset these estimated indirect cobenefits. The estimated indirect cobenefits of the SUNSET rule appear in table 3.

### Table 3. Estimated Indirect Mortality Cobenefits of the SUNSET Rule, in Present Value Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASIS OF ESTIMATE</th>
<th>EXPECTED BENEFITS (BILLIONS OF 2020$)</th>
<th>INITIAL EXPECTED LIVES SAVED</th>
<th>ADDITIONAL COST SAVINGS FROM LIFE EXTENSION (MILLIONS OF 2020$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>610 reviews</td>
<td>$5.1 to $12.1</td>
<td>46 to 109</td>
<td>$50.6 to $119.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13,563 reviews</td>
<td>$16.7 to $27.5</td>
<td>150 to 248</td>
<td>$165.0 to $272.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NET BENEFITS**

Table 4 aggregates the direct benefits and cobenefits estimated in this analysis with the costs estimated in the SUNSET rule RIA. Total benefits are estimated to range from $5.2 billion to $27.8 billion. On an annualized basis, the benefits are expected to range from $740 million to $3.3 billion annually over a 10-year time horizon, depending on the discount rate used. Meanwhile, total costs range from $60 million to $199 million. The costs are expected to range from $7.9 million to $25.2 million on an annualized basis. Thus, benefits are expected to exceed costs by about two orders of magnitude. The present value of the net benefits expected from the SUNSET rule range from $5.0 billion to $27.7 billion (in 2020 dollars) depending on the discount rate used and the source of the benefit estimate.
DISCUSSION AND UNCERTAINTY

The estimates of benefits presented earlier are surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty because it is impossible to know which regulations will be affected by the SUNSET rule. It is, therefore, worth revisiting some of the assumptions underlying the benefits estimates. First, this analysis assumes that past retrospective reviews such as those resulting from past Section 610 reviews or as a result of Executive Order 13563 are likely to be representative of future review efforts under the SUNSET rule. This could turn out not to be true. And while these past reviews also offer some reason to be optimistic that substantial savings are already being achieved even without a new forcing provision, the analysis here also suggests the net benefits of reviews could be increased substantially if the number of reviews were increased. This would likely occur with stronger enforcement mechanisms, such as a sunset provision.

Also, the prospective forecasts of the effects of rules emanating from these past review efforts could turn out not to be correct. For example, sometimes important cost or cost savings estimates are left out of HHS regulatory analyses. Hence, an implicit assumption in the calculations earlier is that the RIAs for those rules were produced competently and absent political interference, which may not be the case. However, uncertainty in prospective analyses is also one of the primary reasons for conducting more retrospective reviews, an aim of the SUNSET rule. Moreover, the net benefits stated earlier are so large that billions of net savings could be wiped out and the net benefits would still be positive. For example, 50 percent of the combined benefits from the regulations identified as cost saving in tables 1 and 2 could be wiped out and cumulatively the projected net benefits of the SUNSET rule would still be over $1 billion.

A plausible way that the SUNSET rule could produce negative net benefits is HHS using the enhanced review process to impose additional regulations with negative net benefits. Sometimes

| Table 4. Present Value of Projected Benefits, Costs, and Net Social Benefits of the SUNSET Rule, at 3 and 7 Percent Discount Rates (Millions of 2020 Dollars) |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
|                                  | 7 PERCENT DISCOUNT RATE         | 3 PERCENT DISCOUNT RATE         |
| **BENEFITS**                    |                                |                                |
| Direct cost savings             | $5,100 to $16,700               | $12,100 to 27,500               |
| Additional cost savings from    | $51 to $165                     | $120 to $273                    |
| reduced mortality               |                                |                                |
| Total benefits                  | $5,151 to $16,865               | $12,220 to $27,773              |
| **COSTS**                       |                                |                                |
| Total costs                     | $60 to $177                     | $68 to $199                     |
| **NET SOCIAL BENEFITS**         |                                |                                |
| Total net social benefits       | $5,000 to $16,800               | $12,000 to $27,700              |

Note: Figures may not sum exactly owing to rounding.
regulators use retrospective review efforts as a justification to move forward with policies that were already a priority for other reasons. To the extent that the rule facilitates such efforts, it could impose net costs. That said, to some extent this issue has already been considered, since some of the rules appearing in tables 1 and 2 were expected at the time of their promulgation to impose net costs. Moreover, to the extent HHS uses retrospective review efforts as a justification to move forward with policies that were already a priority, such regulations may have been likely to be promulgated even absent the SUNSET rule. HHS is likely to impose costly regulations with or without an enhanced retrospective review process, and it seems more likely that HHS will choose to reduce burdens on balance if it has stronger incentives to conduct retrospective review.

Another source of uncertainty relates to HHS’s cost estimates, which, although modest relative to estimated benefits, may actually be overstated in the RIA for the SUNSET rule. The largest cost identified by HHS is the estimated cost of monitoring, which essentially involves the writing of comments and tracking of HHS regulatory activities by interested members of the public. However, HHS has not taken into account the cost of rent-seeking. To the extent that lobbying for anticompetitive regulations is displaced by having to monitor HHS’s new regulatory reviews and write additional comments, this may well constitute a social benefit to society as a whole (even if it constitutes a private cost to the monitors). The analysis in this brief has not attempted to quantify the costs of this rent-seeking but notes that benefits may be underestimated here (or, similarly, costs may be overestimated in the RIA) if rent-seeking activity is reduced by the SUNSET rule.

A final source of uncertainty is the small size of the sample of rules used to project the future benefits of regulations emanating from retrospective review. This small sample size results from there not being a large number of rules updated in response to reviews and from few rules having any economic analysis associated with them, regardless of whether they are the result of retrospective review or any other reason. The sample size certainly leads to questions about the precision of the benefits estimates here. However, a goal of the SUNSET rule is to stimulate retrospective analysis (although perhaps not a complete cost-benefit analysis in most cases). Thus, conceivably a larger sample of regulations will be available for future studies of the benefits and costs of retrospective review owing to the SUNSET rule.

**CONCLUSION**

Overall, there is considerable uncertainty with respect to this analysis. In general, the numbers stated earlier should be taken with caution, since HHS is not going to be updating the same regulations in response to future reviews as it did in response to past reviews, and there is considerable uncertainty about whether these past efforts were as successful as their forward-looking analyses projected at the time of their implementation.
That said, the potential for billions of dollars in net benefits is realistic, especially given the reach and burden of HHS rules across the economy. Benefits could conceivably extend into the tens of billions of dollars, dwarfing costs that are in the tens to low hundreds of millions. Given the vast discrepancy between estimated benefits and estimated costs, it is not surprising that HHS has concluded that it is appropriate to move forward with the SUNSET rule. The rule may also lead to substantial health benefits for the public as an indirect consequence of the cost savings that future review efforts are likely to uncover.

Ultimately, the success of the SUNSET rule will depend on the civil servants tasked with executing it. However, a forcing mechanism such as a sunset provision seems likely to ensure that more good-faith efforts at retrospective review actually occur.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
James Broughel is a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Broughel has a PhD in economics from George Mason University. He is also an adjunct professor at the Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University.

NOTES
4. See, for example, annual accounting statements from the Office of Management and Budget, providing status report updates from Executive Order 13771 efforts.
6. This result may be driven to some extent by the time horizon used in these analyses. Sound analytical practices require that a time horizon be selected that captures the most important costs and benefits of a rulemaking. If the analyses for these rules leave out important costs or costs savings because, for example, those impacts occur outside the time horizon considered by the analyst, this could influence the cost and cost savings presented in table 1. This analysis has not attempted to make any adjustments for poor time horizon selection, because adjustments of this sort could cast doubt on the vast majority of cost estimates produced by HHS, not just those presented here. Addressing the competency of HHS cost analyses in general is beyond the scope of this benefits analysis.
7. The number 26 is 130 divided by 5.
8. Net savings is calculated as follows: 212 rulemakings × 1,228 million in savings / 26 rulemakings = $10,012 million, and 212 rulemakings × 1,985 million in savings / 26 rulemakings = $16,185 million.
9. This calculation assumes that the sample in table 1, which is admittedly small, is representative of amended and rescinded rules emanating from future sunset reviews.
10. This analysis uses a 3 percent discount rate for sensitivity purposes because the use of this rate is a standard practice that the Office of Management and Budget enforces in RIAs. However, it is generally inappropriate to discount cash flows with the Office of Management and Budget–recommended 3 percent rate because that rate is a consumption rate of interest that reflects society’s time preference. For the purposes of this analysis, the 3 percent rate can be thought of as reflecting a relatively low opportunity cost of capital.


12. It is often the case that benefits asserted in RIAs are overstated. Even if some of the estimated cost savings from the rules’ RIAs are overestimated, the net benefits of the six rules listed in tables 1 and 2 are large enough that all of the net benefits of the rules in table 1 could be eliminated and the rules together would still produce net savings in the billions.


16. In 2012, the CFR contained 1,033,847 regulatory restrictions, of which 50,801 were from HHS. Data are from Quantgov.org, Patrick A. McLaughlin, RegData 3.2 Annual (dataset), QuantGov, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, 2020, https://www.quantgov.org/regdata-us-documentation.

17. The assumption that HHS restrictions impose, on average, the same costs as other federal departments may underestimate HHS costs, given the reach of healthcare regulations in the nation’s economy. HHS cost estimates here may also be underestimated, given that the $4 trillion annual cost estimate of federal regulations is exceeded by cost estimates in some other studies. See, for example, John W. Dawson and John J. Seater, “Federal Regulation and Aggregate Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic Growth 18, no. 2 (2013): 137–77.

