M.R. Madhavan on Party Power and the Decline of India’s Legislatures

SHRUTI RAJAGOPALAN: Welcome to Ideas of India, where we examine the academic ideas that can propel India forward. My name is Shruti Rajagopalan, and I am a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Today my guest is M.R. Madhavan, co-founder and president of PRS Legislative Research. 

We talked about the role and purpose of the Rajya Sabha, treatment of money bills in a Westminster system, how the anti-defection law and party whips have hollowed out parliamentary function, parliamentary procedure, the role of the governor, and much more.

For a full transcript of this conversation, including helpful links to all the references mentioned, click the link in the show notes or visit mercatus.org/podcasts.

Hi, Madhavan. Welcome to the show. It’s a pleasure to have you here.

M.R. MADHAVAN: Thanks for calling me.

RAJAGOPALAN: You are my go-to person for all things related to Parliament, but Parliament has two houses, and we really over index on discussing one, and we rarely talk about Rajya Sabha. I want to start by asking you about Rajya Sabha and what you think is the role and purpose of Rajya Sabha as an institution. Then maybe you can talk about Rajya Sabha members and what their role and purpose is or should be.

The Role and Purpose of the Rajya Sabha

MADHAVAN: As an institution, the Constitution is very clear. Lok Sabha has exclusive rights on primarily two things: One is, who will be the prime minister of India. Effectively, who will form the government? And second, related to that, on everything to do with money bills, because under the Westminster system, if a money bill loses, it’s like a no-confidence vote, so it’s connected to the first.

On everything else, the two houses have equal powers. That’s at least in theory. Through the Constitution, or the way it’s now, Lok Sabha’s slightly more powerful simply because if there is a disagreement on bills, you can have a joint session, and 543 plus 245—obviously 543 has one member, one vote. They have a larger say to that extent. But every bill has to pass both houses other than the fact of the joint session. When it comes to a constitutional amendment, there cannot be a joint sitting, and therefore they are again equal in power.

The primary role of Rajya Sabha, as it was envisaged, and even Lok Sabha, is that any significant issue on legislation should have a second house looking at it and reviewing it before it is passed. Each house has to do an independent assessment. A bill could be introduced in Rajya Sabha, then Lok Sabha will be reviewing it and doing an independent session. Of course, if it comes to Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha does that. That is an important role that two sets of people are doing.

Another important part of Rajya Sabha in this process is the fact that Lok Sabha gets elected at one go. Every MP comes in at the general election. I’m not talking about occasional by-elections. That’s an outlier. Numbers are there. Rajya Sabha is a continuous house. 

So, every two years, one-third of them come in. There can be occasions when there has been some event and a country gets extremely passionate about it. Just think, for example, 1984, Indira Gandhi’s assassination. Immediately after that, there was a certain type of atmosphere in the country, and one party can sweep the polls. 

That is moderated by Rajya Sabha. Or even 1977, the other side, the party swept the polls. But Rajya Sabha is a moderating influence on such sudden changes because changes happen gradually over six years, so it won’t be run by any current passions ruling the country. In that sense, it has an important role, which is different from that of Lok Sabha.

RAJAGOPALAN: Now, I want to come to the role and purpose of Rajya Sabha members. This has some implications for the House as a whole. One way to think about it is, it is counter-majoritarian in the populist sense, that you have general elections and you can have one party or one sentiment sweep. Rajya Sabha, as you just pointed out, is continuous with a rotation of members. One-third gets replaced, so it can serve as that counter-majoritarian check.

A second kind of check one can think of is it’s supposed to be a Council of States, and its members are actually supposed to represent state interests. It can be a check against overcentralization or these anti-federal tendencies. They always said in India that India is a federal nation with a unitary bias. I used to say that that’s like being “a little bit pregnant.” [chuckles] You’re either pregnant or you’re not, and you’re either federal or you’re not. Rajya Sabha maybe can be a check against this unitary bias, whatever that is.

A third check is just in terms of short-run versus long-run thinking. People who are standing in general elections, they are on a five-year clock. They need to get reelected. Whereas Rajya Sabha members don’t have to worry about immediate reelection of that kind. They can be a check against very short-term measures, especially things that are introduced just preelection. Do you think that’s how the Council thinks of itself?

MADHAVAN: No. I don’t think members think of it like that. It’s partly of a federal nature, but not fully. I’m saying “partly” because there have been occasions when we have had a state election and a Lok Sabha election at the same point of time. For example, 2019, let’s say a state like Odisha. BJP did extremely well in the Lok Sabha election. On the same day, BJD won the state election. 

So, the population of the state is choosing differently when they’re electing their representative to the national parliament versus when they’re electing their representative to the state assembly. They are taking a different view for whatever reason. They’re possibly much more discerning than what people give them credit for because this shows that. 

So, Rajya Sabha, who are they elected by? By the MLAs of the state. It’s quite possible that the composition of people coming to Rajya Sabha from that state, party-wise, could be very different from the composition coming from a general election from that state MPs coming into Lok Sabha. There is another way it actually represents what—it’s a different way of looking [at] what people want in different places.

I agree with you in one thing, which is that Lok Sabha members have to win an election and therefore have to convince the people in their constituency that they are the best choice available. They have to satisfy people at the constituency, all sorts of grievances, and solve their problems. Rajya Sabha members don’t have such pressures. They have to convince, at least in theory, members who are themselves elected by others, so it’s an indirect election. It is presumably a more discerning decision-making because they are representatives of the people who are electing them, who are not necessarily driven by the immediate passions of the day. 

At least that’s in theory. In practice, of course, since by and large it’s on party lines, every party gets proportion of what they have there at that point of time. That’s what it happens. It represents the—

RAJAGOPALAN: Party’s interests.

MADHAVAN: —party’s interests and the party’s strengths in Parliament. And we have anyway moved away from the original thinking that they are representative of the state by even removing the domicile requirement. The Kuldip Nayar case decided that.

RAJAGOPALAN: Exactly. 

MADHAVAN: You don’t even need to be domiciled in the state. You actually see fairly often a party leader who has, for whatever reason, not been able to get elected to Lok Sabha, getting elected to Rajya Sabha from a very different state because that is where the party has the numbers to get them into Parliament.

We have also seen that, even in the current cabinet, there are several senior ministers who have been brought into Rajya Sabha from a state where they probably had no direct connection in their earlier life. We have seen that sort of thing happening. Constitution calls it the Council of States. Rajya word is there, but it might be more accurate to say “the other house,” or “the second house,” or, as some of them call themselves, “the House of Elders.” The minimum age is 30, and Lok Sabha minimum age is 25. OK, they are possibly older. You can’t even say “second house” because why should you call Lok Sabha the first?

RAJAGOPALAN: Here, the way you’ve set up how Rajya Sabha actually acts as opposed to whatever the constitutional plan was, it seems to do two things well. One is it represents the party interests reasonably well. If the party is a regional party and only operating in one or two states, then it ends up representing that particular state particularly well. But if it’s a national party which managed to win a particular state, and that’s where the numbers come from, then so be it.

But the second part you discussed is quite interesting because it’s almost become a way of bringing talent that is not easy to elect. Most famously, of course, Manmohan Singh, who was a two-term prime minister but was brought in initially through the Rajya Sabha.

MADHAVAN: He was a Rajya Sabha member from Assam. Manmohan Singh has never been a Lok Sabha member. He once contested a seat in Delhi which he lost.

RAJAGOPALAN: —a seat in Delhi and lost. Yes. He never stood for any by-elections anywhere during his prime ministerial term.

MADHAVAN: No. We’ve seen that in states also which have a second house. Nitish Kumar is always a Council member. He was never an MLA.

RAJAGOPALAN: MLA.

MADHAVAN: He might have been earlier, but when he was chief minister—

RAJAGOPALAN: Chief minister, that’s right.

MADHAVAN: —at least the last couple of terms, he was an MLC.

RAJAGOPALAN: That’s right. There are only a very handful of states which are bicameral.

MADHAVAN: Six states.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes. It ends up being usually this is not a problem in most states, or it’s not a feature in most states. The second feature of Rajya Sabha has been bringing in talent that is usually considered not easily electable. We need technocratic expertise. Of course, Manmohan Singh was the prime example. I think Arun Jaitley at one point was brought in through the Rajya Sabha.

MADHAVAN: Not at one point. Always.

RAJAGOPALAN: Always again.

MADHAVAN: Arun Jaitley was always a Rajya Sabha member. He contested— 

RAJAGOPALAN: He contested and lost in Punjab.

MADHAVAN: —one Lok Sabha election in Punjab, and in Amritsar, and he lost.

RAJAGOPALAN: And he lost. Is Rajya Sabha the counter-majoritarian force from a talent point of view?

MADHAVAN: Possibly. It’s a good way to get in talent, definitely, yes. But there is a larger role that Rajya Sabha has played from time to time simply because of this slow change that it has.

For example, it has changed only in the last few years. Right from the ’90s to a few years ago, there was one party, either a party or a coalition, which commanded [a] majority in Lok Sabha and formed the government. Earlier, NDA, then UPA, then, of course, the BJP from ’14 to ’24 had a majority on its own, which is back to a coalition of NDA because BJP on its own doesn’t have 272. But they have [a] majority in Lok Sabha. Much of this period, they did not have a majority in Rajya Sabha. In that period, it really worked as a check.

The government had to, on any important issue, get a consensus across with the major opposition parties, who could otherwise stall and not allow them to pass a bill. You need to build a consensus, which is actually in a democracy. It’s a good thing to build a consensus. If you want policies to be stable for a long time, you want at least the major parties on all sides to be committed to it, because who knows? Tomorrow they may come to power, and you want them to continue a policy. Continuation of policy is a good thing.

Let the compromises be made, adjustments be done before the policy is implemented, so that what we have implemented has a by-and-large broad agreement in it. That sort of a role Rajya Sabha was playing. Now, of course, the coalition which has a majority in Lok Sabha also has a majority in Rajya Sabha. That particular check is no longer available at this point of time.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, or is weaker, at least.

MADHAVAN: It’s weaker at this point of time, but it could change with time. Who knows?

Money Bills, No-Confidence Motions, and Design Flaws

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes. Now, coming to money bills. Rajya Sabha technically can vote on money bills, but Rajya Sabha can also be bypassed on money bills.

MADHAVAN: Oh, they can’t vote. Rajya Sabha, actually, the technical word used, Rajya Sabha doesn’t “pass” a money bill. It “returns” a money bill.

RAJAGOPALAN: Returns a money bill.

MADHAVAN: Because they’re voting on it. But then they are returning it. They are not passing it.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes. The vote is not binding.

MADHAVAN: Yes. They can be overruled.

RAJAGOPALAN: Exactly. They can be overruled, and they can be bypassed altogether.

MADHAVAN: Not “bypassed,” it’s “overruled.” Since every bill passed by Lok Sabha has to go to Rajya Sabha. Rajya Sabha, if it does not act in 14 days, it is deemed to be passed.

RAJAGOPALAN: Exactly. That’s what I mean by “bypassed.”

MADHAVAN: Bypassed, but it has to still go to Rajya Sabha. Rajya Sabha has 14 days to act, so it’s not fully bypassed.

RAJAGOPALAN: It’s not fully bypassed, I guess. Rajya Sabha need not vote on money bills. I’ve always believed that that’s a bad idea, because we need fiscal checks and balances as much as you need any other kind of political check and balance. India is also very fiscally centralized, so the Council of States not opining on money bills itself is a problem, as a design feature. 

Now, specifically, when it comes to modern times, one thing we’ve seen is during elections, there is this massive bloat in transfer payments and welfare payments. This started in the mid-’90s. As India started growing richer, the revenue started coming in. But post-Aadhaar and Jan Dhan accounts and electronic transfers of money and direct cash transfers and things like that, this problem has really snowballed. You talk to any politician or political economist, it’s a kind of competitive populism almost. If one state gives so many rupees in subsidy or a welfare entitlement, or one state gives it to a particular category, like women, then another state must match, and the same is true for political parties.

Now, given that Rajya Sabha doesn’t have the same election pressures as Lok Sabha, I think in modern day and age, it’s even more detrimental that money bills don’t have to pass through Rajya Sabha. 

Do you think this is a problem at all? Is it a general problem, it’s not a current problem, or money bills just don’t matter? What’s your opinion on money bills overall?

MADHAVAN: I think money bills in a Westminster system have to be exclusively in the domain of the house which elects the prime minister. There’s no choice. I’ll tell you why. This is where the parliamentary system differs from, let’s say, the presidential system. I’m actually just taking [the] U.S. because that’s the one which most of us understand. You keep seeing, once in a while in the U.S., a government shutdown because the Congress hasn’t given money. 

You will never see that in a parliamentary system by design because if a money bill doesn’t pass, which is a government shutdown, the government of the day goes; it’s a no-confidence motion. So you cannot have that, and that’s actually a good design feature because you don’t want government shutdowns. [The] U.S. has got stuck into that system because it was designed in the 18th century for whatever reason. Lots of these things are designed for a particular purpose and, over two centuries, things might have changed.

Money bills have the power to throw out a government. We say only Lok Sabha has the power to decide who will form the government. You cannot have, by definition, Rajya Sabha having a say on it, because otherwise you are giving Rajya Sabha the power to do a no-confidence motion against the prime minister. If they vote on a money bill, the prime minister goes. How can you give them the no-confidence power? Rajya Sabha cannot have. That’s an intrinsic design feature. There’s no way out of it.

RAJAGOPALAN: I want to pause here for a minute. I know what you mean by, “It is an intrinsic design feature of how we do things now.”

MADHAVAN: No, in any form of Westminster system, bicameral, where one house has exclusive power to decide the head of the government, the other house cannot have the power to remove the head of the government.

RAJAGOPALAN: Which just means that you need to whip up enough votes and form consensus same as any other system.

MADHAVAN: Not necessarily. Let’s just take an example. Let’s say the BJP has the majority in Lok Sabha and Congress has a majority in Rajya Sabha. Lok Sabha elections happen. BJP becomes the prime minister. First bill comes, Congress says, “We’ll unseat him,” defeats the money bill, the prime minister goes. What do you do? You can’t have it, and they will do it. It’s not a question of whipping up a consensus. It’s a chance to give the opposition to dethrone the current government. No opposition of any political party [chuckles] is going to let go of that.

RAJAGOPALAN: I also don’t know if any opposition government is going to keep using it either because this—

MADHAVAN: Of course they will!

RAJAGOPALAN: —is a repeat game on all sides.

MADHAVAN: But they will because at that point of time, they want to dethrone. That’s why you will find this in every Westminster system with two houses, you will find this disenfranchised.

RAJAGOPALAN: This seems like an easy enough tweak, though, that you say that money bills can pass in Rajya Sabha, and a defeat of a money bill does not mean a no-confidence motion.

MADHAVAN: The reason that a defeat of a money bill has to lead to a no-confidence motion comes back from the U.K., where this evolved sometime in the 19th century actually. Because if the government has been elected on a particular campaign, and the government cannot have the funding to implement the measures it has promised, on which it has elected, a government cannot function. That is the theory behind it.

The government should have the ability to allocate funds for what it sees as important because it has been elected on those lines. No one else should have the say. Therefore, the house which elects the government and no one else should have a say.

RAJAGOPALAN: I don’t agree with the last part of “no one has a say.” There are lots of things on which we give other people outside of elected representatives a say. You have parliamentary standing committees. You have all sorts of measures within Parliament.

MADHAVAN: They’re all recommendatory. Nobody has—I’m just saying no one else should have the power to dethrone.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, I agree. 

MADHAVAN: And, if you don’t have the financial power or ability to implement your policies, you might as well not be there.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, but there’s a difference between not having the financial ability versus “this is the exact plan that must pass.” A money bill is typically a particular configuration of a particular set of budget appropriations.

MADHAVAN: Agreed.

RAJAGOPALAN: It’s not saying that the government can’t have the money. You come up with a better set of appropriations and you can pass it. So, I’m saying what if—

MADHAVAN: That’s not the government’s plan. If the Lok Sabha other members don’t agree, they should be voting against that. The whole idea is, and I’m coming back to, as I said, my favorite topic, let’s assume there’s no anti-defection law. And there’s no whip. So, the prime minister has to— 

RAJAGOPALAN: Then people can vote their conscience, yes.

MADHAVAN: —the prime minister has to convince a majority of Lok Sabha members, including from his or her own party, that this is a good measure. That is the correct check.

We are now thinking, and we have got, I would say, socialized [chuckles] to think that there’ll be a whip; people have to vote on party lines. Then you’re trying to think of solutions.

GST and Constitutional Design

RAJAGOPALAN: Not at all, actually. I completely agree with you that anti-defection has to go, and we’ll get into it properly. But we are also unlike other Westminster systems. We have things like GST, where we explicitly have revenues coming from the state. There is a GST Council. A certain percentage of a very large pool of revenue comes from the states, and the Council of States is not allowed to vote on how that is appropriated.

I do think that blindly following 19th-century UK law may not quite work for modern-day appropriations, irrespective of anti-defection, which needs to go. I agree with you that you need to separate, perhaps, whether the government falls and the prime minister is voted out if a money bill gets rejected, but that’s an easy enough caveat to add.

MADHAVAN: It’s not. That is, I think, fundamental.

RAJAGOPALAN: I don’t know if it is.

MADHAVAN: It’s fundamental to the working of a government. For example, the U.S., actually, I think, has a serious design problem, where the Congress controls the purse, and the executive is expected to perform. The only check the Congress has on the executive, that’s the problem there. In India, Parliament has a much better check on the prime minister. Parliament can throw out the prime minister tomorrow. In the U.S., if the president is not caught doing whatever high crimes of treason and—whatever they call it—and impeached on that, you cannot kick out the president because you don’t think the president deserves to be the president any longer. You’re stuck with that.

RAJAGOPALAN: Well, the president can be impeached also by Congress.

MADHAVAN: Impeached only for crime of some type, not for incompetence, not because you don’t like his policies. In India, a prime—

RAJAGOPALAN: Well,I’m not sure we’re doing that in India either. [chuckles]

MADHAVAN: We have done it in the past. We have done it enough times in the past, and look at the U.K.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, the U.K. is a model of that.

MADHAVAN: U.K., the previous Conservative Party, I think, changed the prime minister more often than whatever you can think of, and already the Labour Party, somebody led them to power with the largest-ever number and has been kicked down in two years.

RAJAGOPALAN: But I don’t think the U.K. is a good model because the U.K. is not federal in the same way that India is federal.

MADHAVAN: Agreed.

RAJAGOPALAN: And its fiscal pool of resources doesn’t have the same problem that the Indian fiscal pool has.

MADHAVAN: Let me come to the GST, which you pointed out. Now, there are two sides of the money bill, right? One is the revenue side, and the other is the expenditure side. Both are money bills.

And in both, Lok Sabha has exclusive power. Here, I think GST is particularly problematic on the revenue side, not on the expenditure side. I don’t have a problem with the expenditure side. Just consider the following situation: GST Council votes and decides to, let’s say, do a particular tax rate or do whatever. Make some changes. 

Those have to be implemented by passing a law in Lok Sabha and in every state legislature. Let’s say three state legislatures decide to not pass it. They have a sovereign power, or Lok Sabha decides not to pass it. Lok Sabha is unlikely to do that simply because the central government has a veto power in the GST Council in the numbers. If they did not want this, they would have blocked it there. 

But some state government which is outvoted, let’s say they decide. What happens to the GST? Actually, I think the GST Council was a compromise to get states to give up the—

RAJAGOPALAN: To give something up.

MADHAVAN: Yes, sign up and give up the—

RAJAGOPALAN: Sovereignty on certain tax matters.

MADHAVAN: —sovereignty on certain taxes, and I don’t think it’s a good design.

RAJAGOPALAN: I think it’s the opposite. I think it’s a good design because no matter—

MADHAVAN: Wait till it fails. It’s too early.

RAJAGOPALAN: Fair enough. But I think what ends up happening is, no matter who has how much veto power and if only one state is a holdout, the GST Council eventually only passes things that everyone is likely to accept and implement.

MADHAVAN: No, not necessarily.

RAJAGOPALAN: No.It’s not necessary but it’s how it plays out. Otherwise, it will fail.

MADHAVAN: We don’t know how it plays out. It’s all of five years old. Think of, let’s say, a state like Tamil Nadu. I would think that a large number of manufacturing—some item is flowing through Tamil Nadu because it’s a big manufacturing hub. If they don’t pass something, what happens to all your input credit, etc., on that?

RAJAGOPALAN: No, it won’t pass then because it has to be the same rate all across for that particular band.

MADHAVAN: No.The GST Council has passed something, agreed on something. GST Council has to have three-fourths power. Tamil Nadu is part of the one-fourth and has voted against, has been outvoted fairly. GST Council has adopted according to the Constitution. But the guy in Tamil Nadu says, “I don’t want this. I’m not going to pass this in my assembly.” What do you do? There is no— 

RAJAGOPALAN: No. Then it’s a complete failure of GST.

MADHAVAN: There is no resolution.

RAJAGOPALAN: You have to go to Supreme Court to figure out how to interpret the law.

MADHAVAN: Incidentally, the first version of the GST bill had a recourse to Supreme Court, and it was pointed out that that would go against the, I think, constitutional design or something and blocked.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, it need not be about the exact rate. That is the part which doesn’t have recourse.

MADHAVAN: I’m not even saying the rate. We need some design. You change some GST design in some way, and one state doesn’t agree to that change.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, but this is a standard union-government, state-government tax battle which can go to Supreme Court.

 MADHAVAN: No, it’s not, because this is a sovereign power of the state to pass what—to pass a law.

RAJAGOPALAN: It’s a sovereign power of the state, but the state also—no.

MADHAVAN: If it requires a law to be passed by the state assembly. Supreme Court cannot—

RAJAGOPALAN: Force a state legislature to—

MADHAVAN: —force a state assembly to pass a law.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, in that case, then GST Council’s recommendation is useless because GST has to be one rate.

MADHAVAN: It has failed. So, that’s all. GST Council, that way.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, but I don’t think it will fail, Madhavan. That’s my point. It is that—

MADHAVAN: Lots of things that were designed in 1950 Constitution, they designed it fairly well, assuming people are not—

RAJAGOPALAN: No, but tax rates have a huge advantage which is very quickly you reveal the differences.

MADHAVAN: But things have changed. That’s fine, but lots of things assumed a certain type of behavior by people. I would say, if I may use the word, that everyone will behave “honorably.” Without pointing out particular instances, we know that that hasn’t played out properly. Just to name one set of offices, governors, if I may say.

RAJAGOPALAN: [laughs] One of my questions today.

MADHAVAN: The Constitution writers thought of the governor’s office as something. My point is, GST is all of—it’s not even—it’s what, 2017? It’s exactly nine years old.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, but here, the failure is very clear. In the sense, no—

MADHAVAN: So is in the case of governors.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, not really, because in case of the governor, no one ends up paying for it. If the Constitution says that nobody can force a state legislature to pass a law, then GST Council has to revise it. That’s it. Otherwise, it’s not “one country, one tax system.” It’s very simple.

One Country, One Tax System?

MADHAVAN: Yes.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, then the whole construct has failed. That’s a separate problem.

MADHAVAN: No.

RAJAGOPALAN: You’re still not going to get a situation where you get a different rate in Tamil Nadu and a different rate in the rest of India. 

MADHAVAN: So, the design problem—

RAJAGOPALAN: But that’s not a failure of GST design.

MADHAVAN: It is. GST, a cleaner design, would have been forget the consensus, it’s a union tax. You have one country, one state, and you will share it with the state. Maybe 50 percent goes to the state, 50 percent goes into the divisible pool, the way it does now.

You design that, but you say the sole authority, because if you want “one country, one tax,” then you need to have one decision maker. You can’t have “one country, one tax, 29 people,” with some people having the ability to later throw a spanner in the works.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, actually, I think that’s great for taxation. You need people to have an ability to throw a spanner in the works because— 

MADHAVAN: So, one small state with equal power can. Then you can have a complete logjam.

RAJAGOPALAN: I think that’s good. You need to build consensus on certain rates.

MADHAVAN: No, you can never have—so, again, I remember the very first GST bill, which came, it used the word “consensus.” Then people said, “What does consensus mean? Does it mean everybody? Does it mean supermajority? Does it mean—?”

RAJAGOPALAN: You can define all that.

MADHAVAN: No, so right now, they have defined it as a supermajority—

RAJAGOPALAN: They have defined it.

MADHAVAN: Seventy-five percent, with 33 percent of the union and 66 percent of the state.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, but effectively it’s 100 percent because they can’t do it without the state saying so.

MADHAVAN: That’s right. No, but if two states say something else, and today, it’ll get passed. Everybody else passes their laws. Two states don’t, what happens? My point is—

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, we haven’t seen that situation yet.

MADHAVAN: We haven’t seen that partly because it’s too early in the game.

RAJAGOPALAN: It’s too early.

MADHAVAN: Today, we are also seeing that a large number of states has the government of the same party as the union. It’s too short a period to actually make any conclusive statements on how it’s likely to play out. I’m just saying as a design.

RAJAGOPALAN: Fair enough.

MADHAVAN: Designs should account for things going wrong and not assume things are always going to go right.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, but I don’t think people disagreeing on tax rates is things going wrong. I think that’s where— 

MADHAVAN: No, that I agree. But my point is if somebody disagreeing on tax rate can block everybody else who’s agreeing on that tax rate, is things going wrong.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, I don’t think so at all.

MADHAVAN: Everyone has a veto power, therefore.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, that doesn’t bother me because the nature of the tax is it’s a very regressive consumption-based tax, which affects every single constituent in that state.

MADHAVAN: Let’s not get into that because that’s— 

RAJAGOPALAN: No, I do want to get into that.

MADHAVAN: No, because I don’t want to get into the concept of taxation, right?

RAJAGOPALAN: Again, I don’t want to—OK, fair enough.

MADHAVAN: That’s never-rending. There’s an ideological position.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, fair enough. But GST touches everybody no matter how tiny a thing they buy unlike income tax unlike property taxes.

MADHAVAN: Of course it does. Of course it’s regressive. Nobody’s saying it’s not regressive. That’s a description. But how does one design that is a different thing.

RAJAGOPALAN: I’m OK with what you call a failure. I’m OK with them requiring a very high degree of consensus.

MADHAVAN: Then let’s not have a GST, let’s not have a consumption tax, if you have that point of view. My point is if you’re going to have a GST, if you have agreed—my assumption is, the fact that you’ve agreed on having a GST means you’ve agreed to have the regressive tax. I’m not going to one level before that, saying, “Should we even have a GST?” Because then the question is—that’s a different question.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, you might have agreement on a regressive tax and a disagreement on the exact rate depending on how rich or poor your constituents are.

MADHAVAN: No, I agree. So, it’s not only the rates. GST Council decides a lot of things.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, they decide a lot of things. They decide what actually falls in which classification and a number of things. Yes.

MADHAVAN: They also—lots of design of issues.

RAJAGOPALAN: I am somehow OK with states being able to veto GST. My bigger problem is Rajya Sabha not having any say on it given that this is fundamentally a center state split in taxes.

MADHAVAN: Doesn’t matter. We have already agreed Rajya Sabha does not represent states in any case. We discussed that. Rajya Sabha is just called Council of States. Let’s forget it. Let’s just call it the second house. That’s something I thought we agreed on. [chuckles]

RAJAGOPALAN: OK. On both the revenue and expenditure side, you’re like, “This has nothing to do with the state,” so it’s fine anyway.

MADHAVAN: Yes. Rajya Sabha has nothing to do with the state, so it’s irrelevant. Other than the fact that they’re elected by MLAs.

The Problem with Anti-Defection Laws and Whips

RAJAGOPALAN: Now, coming to anti-defection, which is the other big part. In the previous conversation we were having about money bills, you were like, “Given that we have anti-defection, there are a number of issues in terms of members of Parliament voting their conscience.”

A prime minister or the head of government doesn’t necessarily need to persuade every single Lok Sabha member on whatever tax, or in any case, any bill that they wish to pass. Now it just gets made official through the party web. Few questions overall on anti-defection, and this is irrespective of money bills. Does it have any role at all in a constitutional democracy?

MADHAVAN: No, it should not have any. In a way, we are the only country of any significance which has this. I tried to find other countries, and I found things like Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone and things like that.

RAJAGOPALAN: OK, so maybe, just for the listeners who are completely uninitiated and not as obsessed with getting rid of anti-defection as you and I, do you want to give them a very brief primer on what it is and then we can go from there?

MADHAVAN: It’s a very simple one. Two parts to it: Let’s say a person is elected to Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha or to a legislative assembly, so person becomes an MP or an MLA on a party ticket. Then, A, that person cannot move from this party to another party. There’s one exception which is playing out, so it’s important, so I’ll tell that. First one is fine. B, if the party issues a whip, which means—what’s a whip? The party leadership sends a note to every member of that party in that house on any vote to say “you have to vote yes” or “you have to vote no” or “you have to abstain.” It could be one of the three things. You have to follow that order.

If you do not follow that order, that vote counts, but the party can then remove you. Not from the party, which is fine. You’re a member of a club, you don’t enjoy, you don’t agree, you’re kicked out from the club, that’s fine. Not from the party, but from the membership of the house itself. The price you pay is extremely high, so most people, unless it’s on most things, would not take that call.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, and just to be clear, most Westminster and presidential systems, almost everywhere in the world, there is some form of a whip. But it’s not official, and it’s not constitutionally mandated the way we have in India, where literally, if you don’t vote the whip that your party has officially issued, you can get thrown out of your parliamentary seat, which the party didn’t elect you to, the people elected you to, which is frankly shocking.

MADHAVAN: Exactly. What will happen in other places is obviously, the party doesn’t like you if you vote against the party, and what can they do? They can deny you party positions. They can deny you a ticket in the next election. They can do all those things.

RAJAGOPALAN: They can throw you out of the party immediately.

MADHAVAN: They can throw you out of the party immediately, but you will still be a member of Parliament. They can deny you a ticket in the next election, but if people in your constituency like you enough, you can again get elected from that next election, or you can decide not to continue, but that’s your call.

But you do not pay the consequences of being kicked out of the House the very next day or next week. This effectively makes every member completely subservient to whatever the party leadership tells that person to do.

How do we actually characterize what is a representative democracy? What does it do? It says that people at large, which is all citizens, are choosing a set of people to represent them to take decisions on their behalf on public issues for a limited period of time, which is the election cycle. You are actually handing over your power to someone else to exercise on your behalf, saying that these are the right people to exercise power on my behalf, and they are expected to take considered decisions on your behalf.

And if they do not take those considered decisions, this power is given to them for, let’s say, five years. At the end of five years, you kick them out and give someone else that power. That’s the core design of a representative democracy. Here, I have elected somebody to take considered decisions on my behalf, but that person now has to take decisions as ordered by someone else. It goes to the core of the design, what we are talking about.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes. They are no longer members who are representing the people who elected them. They are members representing the party interest.

MADHAVAN: You don’t need them. What you need is, let’s say you have an election, like we had. Everyone is elected. I am rounding off numbers. I don’t know the exact—let’s say BJP has 240 people, Congress has 100, Samajwadi has 37, and so on. All you need is one person from BJP comes, presses a button, and you say 240. One person from Congress presses a button, you say 100. One person from Samajwadi—why do we need a Parliament which is such a, now even it’s a larger Lok Sabha building?

RAJAGOPALAN: But then how will they get all their nice bungalows and life and perks and everything?

MADHAVAN: No.You give them that.

RAJAGOPALAN: Oh, you say, “You give them that.”

MADHAVAN: You give them that and hold the actual Parliament in a conference room, board room, which can seat 20 people. Twenty parties, one member each. Take up a room in some place, 20 people can sit, and you have 20 buttons. I am obviously, [chuckles] trying to make a point that—

RAJAGOPALAN: No, but you’re absolutely right. I don’t think this is an exaggeration. I think this is what actually happens.

MADHAVAN: This is what’s actually happening, and then they’ll come and make some speeches. That’s for the record, but when the voting comes, they have absolutely no choice. That’s what the anti-defection law has done. What it has actually done over a period of time is much worse. 

Once you have this design, what are the consequences? A, somebody is elected as the party boss, as a chief minister, as a prime minister, or whatever. That person cannot be removed. If the party is a majority in that house, cannot be removed for the next five years. Just look at the U.K. I think, what, the sixth in—

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, sixth.

MADHAVAN: The sixth is going out, and seventh is going to come in the last 10 years. There’ve been only—

RAJAGOPALAN: No one’s completed a term from either party.

MADHAVAN: No, and it’s not because there were general elections.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes.

MADHAVAN: It’s because within the period of that House of Commons, the members of the party lost faith in that person. Of course, there was Rishi Sunak, who led them into the elections. Of course, their party lost badly. Starmer got two-thirds majority, more than two-thirds majority, and he has been removed in two years by the same party. This is inconceivable if you—

RAJAGOPALAN: In India.

MADHAVAN: —in any system which has an anti-defection law, because you can’t remove. You’re effectively electing a person to hold power for the next five years without—the whole idea—so, a no-confidence motion can only work in India in a coalition government.

RAJAGOPALAN: Exactly.

MADHAVAN: It cannot work if a government has ever one majority. You have taken away the core design of the Westminster system, which is the government is accountable to Parliament, and this final point of accountability is a no-confidence motion. Now there’s no no-confidence motion of any—

Who Will Bell the Cat?

RAJAGOPALAN: Here’s my question. Why are parliamentarians going with this? It makes no sense to me—

MADHAVAN: They don’t have a choice.

RAJAGOPALAN: —why they would give up their power in such a way.

MADHAVAN: OK. If you talk to them, many of them don’t like it, but obviously, all party leaderships like it because they have the power. They’re not— 

RAJAGOPALAN: No, but you can imagine a number of parliamentarians banding together and going to the Supreme Court to get this invalidated, and so on. They just don’t seem to do any of it.

MADHAVAN: That, they can’t. People have gone to the Supreme Court. Supreme Court has said this is fine. 

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, but which people have gone to the Supreme Court also changes.

MADHAVAN: No, that’s fine. That doesn’t matter.

RAJAGOPALAN: Well, I think it does change the optics. If there were 50 or 100 Lok Sabha members—

MADHAVAN: They won’t go.

RAJAGOPALAN: Exactly. Why?

MADHAVAN: No, they won’t go because, again, they’ll have to pay the consequences.

RAJAGOPALAN: Not really. They’ll always have to pay the consequences, but they can’t lose their seat in Parliament because they approached—

MADHAVAN: They can’t lose it. But that is like saying, “Who will bell the cat?” It’s the same story. This is too much.

RAJAGOPALAN: But it’s so contrary to their individual interests, they have to bell the cat.

MADHAVAN: They will all murmur. They will all, in individual, crib about it. They will even speak about it in public. We heard them speak about it in public at our conference, which is an open conference. Enough of them have spoken. People have even written about it, in fact, from both the leading parties. Manish Tewari had introduced a bill. His bill said “restricted to no confidence in money bills.” Jayant Sinha, when he was an MP, had introduced a private member bill which said, “Omit the Tenth Schedule.” It was straightforward—one-line, effectively—bill. 

In that sense, there are people from—and several others have actually done it. This is a public statement in a way by introducing a private member bill in Parliament. They have actually taken that stance. Now, I don’t know whether the Supreme Court will do anything. Frankly, let’s not— 

RAJAGOPALAN: But honestly it is so blatantly unconstitutional. It’s—

MADHAVAN: I don’t—but I do have a collection of one-rupee coins, so I will not talk about the Supreme Court.

RAJAGOPALAN: [laughter] I think we have to play that clip as our promotional material for this podcast. So, is there any way we’re ever going to get rid of the anti-defection then, or this is just now part of our design feature and we live with this forever?

MADHAVAN: No. I think we’ll get rid of it sometime. I don’t know when that will happen. Don’t expect it to come from there. In many other things, like you talked about the freebie subsidies, etc., I think it’s actually a good thing. I’ll tell you why I’m saying that. If I’m looking at the public finance and economics, I don’t like it, but I’m looking at democracy. 

People are voting for it. Politicians are saying, “If you vote us, we’ll give you this.” They are saying, “Yes, therefore, we’ll vote for you.” That is democracy. It’s actually a very democratic system playing out. Even in these, and many other things— 

RAJAGOPALAN: No, but, I’m not interested in only living in a democratic majoritarian system. I’m interested in living in a system which has checks and balances precisely to that, too.

MADHAVAN: Yes, but this is—no. Yes, agreed, but this is not democratic majoritarian system.

RAJAGOPALAN: It is. You’re taking someone else’s money and giving to someone else. It must have a check.

MADHAVAN: It’s not someone else’s money.

RAJAGOPALAN: It is someone else’s money. They tax someone for it, and they can put them in jail for not paying it.

MADHAVAN: That is true, but that’s true of every taxation system. Either you say—

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, I agree, which is why we need checks.

MADHAVAN: Frankly, I know there are people who are very ideological position saying that taxation is violence. I don’t agree with that.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, I’m saying you need to still have checks on it.

MADHAVAN: I agree. There are checks on it. They promise, then they bring in a budget. They put it in the budget. The budget has to pass the House. It doesn’t go to the committee.

RAJAGOPALAN: All this has to happen with anti-defection where the—

MADHAVAN: Of course, but the design—so, there are checks. It’s not that— 

RAJAGOPALAN: No, but you’re now negating every argument you made in the money bill context, which you would have just made in any other context.

MADHAVAN: Fortunately in India, by and large—I don’t know why it has been—most parties have been actually fiscally reasonably conservative over a period of time. You will see election promises are large. After getting elected on all those schemes, they will find the ability to put in conditions, put in this, put in that, and not actually fulfill many of them.

RAJAGOPALAN: I agree with you partially. I think that is more true of the union government than state governments, for sure.

MADHAVAN: Even many states. Look at Maharashtra’s, that Ladli Behna. I mean, what was said and what is implemented is very, very different. 

RAJAGOPALAN: Fair enough. No, but they typically tend to make more of these welfare entitlements and promises in general. They now, increasingly—this is another design feature we’ve only seen in the last seven, eight years. This is a very post everyone having Jan Dhan accounts and Aadhaar cards and having this deep penetration where you can press a button and things happen. I think you’re going to get more of this at the state level.

MADHAVAN: Possibly. I would say it’s a signal of the failure of the state to provide public goods.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, I agree.

MADHAVAN: If you’re not giving me good public health, if you’re not giving me good public schools, OK, let me at least take the cash.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, I don’t blame people for demanding it.

MADHAVAN: Right? Like, “Give me the cash.” [chuckles]

RAJAGOPALAN: But I do want a design system which has some checks and balances in it. [chuckles]

MADHAVAN: I agree, and this is perverse because now I’m giving you cash, I don’t feel any obligation as a state to give you the state public goods because I’m just buying you off with cash. Actually, I agree with you. It’s a perverse system which is playing out. But I think, like many of these things, these always have an expiry. For example, just look at the promises made in the recent TN elections by the DMK government. They didn’t win. In fact, the promises made by TVK were much less than what was made by—

RAJAGOPALAN: Much lesser.

MADHAVAN: But DMK lost.

RAJAGOPALAN: In fact, that was part of the campaign, right? No, I don’t think voters are stupid.

MADHAVAN: Yes. I don’t think these things win you all elections, and political parties are smart. Politicians are smart. Once they see that this has no longer incremental advantage on winning elections, they will drop it and move on to something else. I am nowhere near as smart as they, so I don’t know what they will move on to, but they are incredibly smart. They know the pulse. They know what’s going on. They will do that.

Parliamentary Pressures: Constitutional vs. Constituent Expectations

RAJAGOPALAN: On this margin, going back to what is the role of a parliamentarian or a state legislative assembly member, one thing I’ve found which is remarkable about Indian representatives at whichever level, they are deeply in touch with their constituents.

MADHAVAN: Yes.

RAJAGOPALAN: I’ve grown up in Delhi. Anytime you go to one of these Lutyens bungalows, there will be a long line of people, either from the constituency or representing them. It is every small and large problem. It’s like, “Cattle are dying in our village and our district,” up to some road needs to be built, whatever it is. No problem is too small or too big.

Sometimes it’s personal problems and family problems because they consider the legislator as the head of their community, or something like that. It’s quite remarkable how much they are in touch with their constituents. 

Now, the way we think about Parliament, we want this representation to be very legible. Folks like you and me, anyone who studied political science or the Westminster system, we want our representatives to actually attend Parliament. We want the attendance to be made public. We want their vote on every topic to be made public. These are things India is not good at and doesn’t do. We want, of course, people to vote their conscience, which they can’t with anti-defection. We don’t want debates to just be where things get staged when things are actually discussed in the party office, but actual debates. 

But their constituents don’t seem to care too much about it, and they seem to know exactly what their constituents care about. Is this just one of those instances where, theoretically, what we think parliamentarians and legislators should function as is not happening, and it’s not legible to people like you and me who are students of democracy and political science? Or is this just there is a problem in the way we run this?

MADHAVAN: Oh, big question, right?

RAJAGOPALAN: Take your time. [chuckles]

MADHAVAN: I agree with you what’s going on. I have interacted with a large number of MPs. Most of them don’t like what’s going on. They did not get in here to solve these sort of—I remember once—I mean, it’s a hilarious story if you think of it. I met an MP for breakfast, and he said he had a bad sleep the previous night because he was woken up at 3:00 a.m. with a call from the constituency saying, “Ki uska bhains chori ho gaya.” [My buffalo got stolen]

RAJAGOPALAN: “Bhains chori ho gaya” is a very serious problem.

MADHAVAN: So, he says, “What do I have to do in Delhi? ‘Somebody’s culling my buffaloes.’” Now, is that an MP’s job to find somebody’s buffalo in North Bihar?

RAJAGOPALAN: I’ve got one better for you, and I got this story from a LAMP fellow, and I won’t name the LAMP fellow or the member of Parliament or the state. It is, “Meri biwi mujhe chhod ke bhag gayi.” [My wife left me].

MADHAVAN: I’ve heard this also.

RAJAGOPALAN: Right? This is like the wife—

MADHAVAN: What does he do?

RAJAGOPALAN: —has left with the dowry she brought. She left with all the gold that she brought, and it belongs to me, and the wife has left. These are really the problems that they get.

MADHAVAN: They get. They’re not particularly happy solving them. They’re also caught in this whole bind because if they don’t address them—in fact, there is a very nice frame that was in one of our conferences, and because it’s an open conference, I’ll cite the person. This was Prithviraj Chavan. He recited a story, one of these, and the framing he used was, “There is a constitutional expectation of my role, and there’s a constituency expectation of my role. I want to do the constitutional expectation, but if I don’t do the constituency expectation, I am not back here next term to do the constitutional expectation.” To balance the two things.

I agree with you. Now, part of the problem, and I think a large part of the problem, is the failure of our representative governance in the lower ranks. You don’t have proper city governments, proper panchayats, etc., across the country.

RAJAGOPALAN: Sometimes proper state governments also. If there is President’s Rule and other things, crazy things go on.

MADHAVAN: I’m not even talking about President’s Rule. I’m talking about basic issues like MPs have to address all the time issues like streetlights not working, garbage not being taken. They don’t even have the power to do anything. They don’t have the authority to do anything.

RAJAGOPALAN: They can just make a call from New Delhi, and it’ll count for something.

MADHAVAN: The role is of the local government. Local government is failing, and people don’t make that much of a distinction. Lots of people, they come to the representative MPs. The representative MP shouldn’t be doing it. In any case, we have, what’s the number, 1.4 billion or something like that. Today, by 550, it’s a very large number. It’s like 25, 30 lakh people per constituency. Double parliament, 15 lakh, big deal.

RAJAGOPALAN: You still won’t solve the problem, though.

MADHAVAN: If you want the member of Parliament to have a reasonable level of connect with a large part of the constituency over five years, what’s the maximum number? Maybe 100,000 people. That means your Parliament will be 15,000 people.

RAJAGOPALAN: Fifteen hundred.

MADHAVAN: Fifteen thousand if you have one lakh people.

RAJAGOPALAN: Oh, just one lakh. Wow, OK.

MADHAVAN: Yes. If you have one lakh. How can you know 10 lakh? The UK Parliament, the constituency size is one lakh.

RAJAGOPALAN: It’s very small.

MADHAVAN: It’s one lakh.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, but in India, the original constitutional design was 750,000.

MADHAVAN: That’s OK because we are a large country.

RAJAGOPALAN: We’re a large country. No, but if we do seven lakh, 50,000, if we do that, it’s going to be more than 1,800 already.

MADHAVAN: No, but seven lakh, 50 doesn’t solve the problem. Seven lakh, 50, and 30 lakh is the same because your problem is that the MP cannot know most people.

RAJAGOPALAN: That’s true.

MADHAVAN: I don’t know how to swim. Give me 20 feet or 60 feet, it’s the same. You have to either give me three feet of water. Once you’re putting me over six, it’s all the same. That problem doesn’t get solved anyway. You might as well have 550 people. So the— 

RAJAGOPALAN: We can’t solve this unless we have multiple levels of functioning governments with representatives.

MADHAVAN: Exactly, and that is in the design.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes. But we haven’t implemented it.

MADHAVAN: So, the state governments are, in a way—our states are the size of a European nation. State governments in their domain should be like that. Then we should get down to the next rung, which is where a lot of local problems need to be solved. Now, the problem is many of these things are failing. Part of it they’re failing is because the higher rung doesn’t allow them to work.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, they don’t devolve. States don’t devolve to local governments.

MADHAVAN: Not only they don’t devolve. When we say “devolve,” there are multiple ways of devolution. One is devolution of money, which is what people don’t do.

RAJAGOPALAN: They don’t do.

MADHAVAN: Forget money. Before that, devolution of power. They don’t give devolved power. Even before that, when was the last time Bangalore had its—Bangalore is, I think, an important city. OK, Bangalore corporation elections, when were they held?

RAJAGOPALAN: Oh, boy.

MADHAVAN: I think it is 2015. Since 2020, Bangalore has not had a corporation. You’re talking about possibly one of the bigger, more important economic engines of the country. You’re not having elections. Mumbai, what happened? All of Maharashtra. You’re talking about devolving. I’m saying, forget devolving. Existence of a body is not there.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, which can get elected, which doesn’t get sidelined by a district collector, all those things.

MADHAVAN: There’s no elected body, so it’s been run by appointed administrator who’s an official—

RAJAGOPALAN: Who’s typically an IAS officer.

MADHAVAN: —official of this—who’s an IAS officer. So, there is no accountability to the people at that level.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, and the IS officer is not the representative of the people. 

MADHAVAN: He’s not a representative.

RAJAGOPALAN: They don’t call them.

MADHAVAN: No, they won’t because they know what happens when you go there. [laughter] Then people reach out to the next level because there’s the first level of representative they can reach to. The MP is caught in a bind, which they don’t like also. They have not come to Parliament to settle these problems. They have come to Parliament to think about larger issues. In their own mind, they want to do that.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes. They are also trapped in the same system.

MADHAVAN: They are trapped in the same system. The solution out of this is to fix the lower end. Then these things will automatically, slowly get shifted. Some of our obsession, I would say, with having Parliament meet more often, etc., will happen again, like everything else. 

I know you believe in markets. There’s also a market. If people want MPs to be in Parliament and think of these larger things rather than be in the constituency and solve their problems, Parliament will start meeting more often. Today, the people in the constituency want the MP right there and not in Delhi to be solving their problems sitting there. Do I want to come from my constituency and line up in their house in Lutyens, Delhi, or do I just want to take my local bus and go to his house, which is 20 kilometers away or 10 kilometers away? Which would I prefer? I would prefer the latter because it’s easier.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, but you’ve opened up a huge can of worms now because this fundamentally means that Indian voters are thinking of all these representatives as political fixers as opposed to actually building out the operating system that governs us.

MADHAVAN: Yes.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, but that is a bigger failure of—it’s not a failure of money bills or anti-defection or Westminster. That’s a huge failure.

MADHAVAN: No, why are they thinking of it? Because the alternate system of the words you said, “political fixer,” which isn’t required, which is required at the panchayat level, has failed. If you fix the, if I may use the word, if you fix the political fixers problem at that level, then this automatically gets resolved.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, but that can’t get fixed until they legislate properly, no?

MADHAVAN: The problem again is at the state government level, not at the Parliament level. State assemblies have to start devolving power there. And again, that will happen again if there is enough pressure coming from the people to do that. Some states have done it well.

RAJAGOPALAN: Some states have done it well.

MADHAVAN: Some states have done it well.

Challenges Faced By State Legislatures

RAJAGOPALAN: Also, we’ve had local governments only for 25, 30 years in the best of states, where elections were regularly held and things like that. That also, I think, is something we are learning. We are learning how to have democratic participation—

MADHAVAN: Of course.

RAJAGOPALAN: —at the local level, more so in grams than in cities. There is that distinction. But hopefully, over a period of time, that also matures. But how do you view state legislatures? Because we’ve had state legislatures since the beginning of the republic. They’ve had as much time to mature as Parliament, as any other post-freedom, post-constitutional function.

Was this an original design problem? Did we ruin it with the role of the governor? Did we ruin it with overcentralization and planning commission holding the purse strings? What is the reason that our state legislatures just don’t function like a legislature?

MADHAVAN: Well,let me ask you a question first, which is, can you guess, last year, which is last calendar year, 2025, average across all states, number of days that they sat.

RAJAGOPALAN: Number of days they sat, average across all states.

MADHAVAN: Number of days of sitting across all states, what is the mean number?

RAJAGOPALAN: I would say it’s under 50.

MADHAVAN: OK. I’ll give you the numbers later. What is the highest?

RAJAGOPALAN: Highest must be 85 or something.

MADHAVAN: What’s the lowest?

RAJAGOPALAN: Eleven, 10-ish. I mean, because some states are really, really badly functioning.

MADHAVAN: OK.I’ll give you the answers. Average is 24. 

RAJAGOPALAN: Oh, boy.

MADHAVAN: It was the highest in the last four years. Slowly going up from 21, 22, 23, 24. I keep saying that by Viksit Bharat will be 47, and maybe we’ll hit 100 or something like that at this rate. Highest last year was Odisha at 43. 

RAJAGOPALAN: Wow.

MADHAVAN: Kerala has done sometimes slightly better. Kerala, Odisha do 50-ish some years. Nobody has ever done 80 in living memory. The lowest last year was Nagaland, seven.

RAJAGOPALAN: Seven. OK. I’m close on the lowest. [chuckles]

MADHAVAN: You’re close on that. There are several below 15 because if the average is 24, and there are some above, I mean, obviously, there’s a distribution, several below 15. They are not even meeting. 

RAJAGOPALAN: I didn’t expect them to be so tightly clustered, by the way. That’s a random aside. I thought there’d be some states that do really well and some states that do really badly. This is very bad news.

MADHAVAN: Really well is 45.

RAJAGOPALAN: That was my average in my head. OK. Wow. That’s extraordinary.

MADHAVAN: If you think of it, normal two months is 60 days. Take off eight days for weekends, 52, and maybe a couple of other days off. If a normal person goes to office for two months, that person is working more days in office than MLAs are working in the assembly. They’re, of course, working in the constituency. That’s a different story. But how much are they working in the assembly, which is, at least constitutionally, their primary role?

RAJAGOPALAN: Now, there is a byproduct to this, which is sometimes they pass 40 bills in a single day. There is no debate. There is no discussion.

MADHAVAN: Agreed. So, there are—

RAJAGOPALAN: You table and you pass, and most of our assemblies are unicameral.

MADHAVAN: We have the data. I don’t remember them off. I don’t have my report right now on me. There are several states where every bill has been introduced, passed the same day or the very next day. Last year, Karnataka had the maximum number of bills passed. They had 85.

RAJAGOPALAN: In a single day?

MADHAVAN: No. They passed totally 80-odd bills in that year.

RAJAGOPALAN: OK, in the year.

RAJAGOPALAN: Out of which one day they passed 20-something. Another day, they passed some 17 or 18. They passed them off all in one day. Done. I’m talking about the lower house because Karnataka does have two houses. Most states pass most bills without discussion. Some exceptions. Kerala actually sends most bills to a committee, but the committee design is very interesting. Unlike Parliament, where, by design, committees do not have a member of the government—so, it’s an entirely legislative committee, no executive—Kerala, the committee is chaired by the respective minister, the committee it goes to.

Last year, in a majority of the bills referred to the committee, the committee report came within two to three days of its being referred to. Of course, there are some bills where they have taken much longer. They’ve actually done detailed. A couple of years back, Kerala passed a public health bill. They did detailed consultations. They actually had public consultations in four cities across the state, which were open. Anybody could actually walk in. We were invited to one. I’d actually gone off to Trivandrum for that. There were lots of people. It was actually in a hall. All you had to do in the assembly was to show some ID document to get in, any ID, sign a register, and you can come into the hall.

RAJAGOPALAN: Wow.

MADHAVAN: They were sitting. There was a proper public consultation. They were listening to people, and they were taking notes, and all that was going on. Kerala has done some. Maharashtra is not too bad. Karnataka is actually one of the better ones. Rajasthan has improved. It has started issuing. Haryana was a state which used to pass every bill on the same day.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes.

MADHAVAN: Then, the last set of five years, not now, just before the election, there was a different speaker. That speaker decided that bills will go to committees. Then, many bills started going to committees. So, I’m actually always optimistic in the sense the changes just require some person to take a call, and there are such people who come in. We actually see that. One way to put pressure on the system to improve is actually to just put all the information out so that people know and there’s pressure.

RAJAGOPALAN: PRS is extraordinary.

MADHAVAN: Oh, yes, putting out information.

RAJAGOPALAN: I know this thing about most states passing bills on the same day because of PRS reports. I know anything about state legislatures only because of PRS reports.

MADHAVAN: And actually, the state data is way more difficult to compile than Parliament. Parliament has an excellent website, so you can actually—some states have good websites, but not all, so we actually— 

RAJAGOPALAN: But even in Parliament, now if I get into nitty-gritty procedure, you don’t—there is no automatic division call unless someone requires the division to be called, except for constitutional bills.

MADHAVAN: Agreed.

RAJAGOPALAN: Right? Our quorum requirements are very low. They’re just 10 percent. There is no mandatory quorum call. A member has to ask for it. This is all not law. This is all nerdy, geeky parliamentary procedure that you live by. Why are we not able to fix these sorts of little things? Because it will make such a big change. Just changing the parliamentary procedure on requiring a quorum call, this can all come from the speaker, the secretariat.  

MADHAVAN: See, quorum actually is not a problem.

RAJAGOPALAN: I know.

MADHAVAN: No, simply because there is rarely that Lok Sabha doesn’t have 50 people.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, fair enough, but I feel as a practice we should do it, right?

MADHAVAN: Yes, what I’m saying is it doesn’t matter because even if there is one—because somebody has to notice there are less than, somebody has to come. That’s fine. Quorum, I’m not bothered about, because there’s not a burning problem. The voice vote problem, I actually think of it as even a more fundamental problem.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes.

MADHAVAN: Which is that I have elected or not even elected. I may or may not have elected that person, but I live in a particular part of India— 

RAJAGOPALAN: And he’s my representative or she’s my representative.

MADHAVAN: X is my representative. He or she is my representative. That person, the way the parliamentary system is supposed to work is that person is accountable to me, and that accountability is enforced in the next election when I can vote that person out. And on what basis do I do that? I am seeing that person’s performance in Parliament. I want to know whether that person voted for the bill, against the bill. Now, of course, one could say, back to the favorite topic, the person didn’t have a choice, but was the person even present in the House?

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes.

MADHAVAN: We don’t even know that. That, I think, is information which should be the right of the voter to know whether the representative was there or acting on their behalf. The voice votes take away that. We have been arguing for a long time that all votes—at least, let’s say if you are voting on a bill, clause-by-clause voting, OK, don’t bother, because it’s a time-taking thing, but the final vote should. 

Another way which people actually don’t talk about, where we have, I would say, short-changed the constitutional provisions: Every constitution actually explicitly states that every bill shall have three readings. We have the first reading, which is introduction of the bill. Hardly ever any discussion, it’s voted and fine. We do have on many bills, a proper second reading. I have, in the 20 years of PRS that I have been watching Parliament closely, never seen a third reading—

RAJAGOPALAN: Wow.

MADHAVAN: —other than—no, there has always been a third reading. But because it’s mandatory. I’ll tell you what happens. First reading is introduction. Then it may or may not go to committee, come back, there’s a discussion, and then there’s a clause-by-clause vote on every clause. That’s the second reading. 

And then, what is the third reading? It is the bill, as amended, may be passed. In the U.K., this is usually done on a different day, and there’s still a discussion on it. In India, there’s a 20-second thing. Clause by clause done, OK. The bill, as amended, is voted upon. Ayes—it’s always ayes because it’s agreed upon. By now, it has been voted on. That’s the 20-second thing. We don’t even do it.

RAJAGOPALAN: I don’t consider this a third reading.

MADHAVAN: No, what I’m saying is, constitutionally, it’s a third reading.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes.

MADHAVAN: It’s like, I remember one of my nieces, very smart kid, went and asked her grandmother, “Can I go to play?” Grandmom said, “No.” Went to Dad and said, “Can I go to play? I’ve already asked Grandmom.” Dad said, “OK, go.” 

This is like that. Constitution says, “Do a third reading.” I’ve done a third reading. Is the bill passed? Yes. Because I have done the third reading. [laughter]

RAJAGOPALAN: What is the barrier in changing these sorts of rules? Because I imagine parliamentarians do wish to— 

MADHAVAN: This should not be difficult, because—and we have tried to discuss this with some of them. Many of them say that vote should be there and—all you need—let me put the different type of things. Anti-defection is a big one because you need a constitutional amendment. What does this require if it should happen? Now, what does the rule say? Rule says that there will be a voice vote. If any member asks for a division, division should be carried. Of course, it gives speaker the power to not do it, unfortunately, because speaker has the power to do whatever. But it ordinarily says “everything.” All you need, yes. You don’t need 100 MPs, as you said, to go to Supreme Court.

RAJAGOPALAN: You need one member to ask for a division every time.

MADHAVAN: Yes, one member or three or four of them— 

RAJAGOPALAN: Who rotate.

MADHAVAN: —who say that, “OK, this is a cause we have taken up.” Ideally, three, four across parties, so it doesn’t become very partisan. This is a call we have taken up. We are a group of, let’s say, young MPs who want to reform Parliament because we are going to be here for a long time. This is an important reform. We’ll take this. It’s not a partisan issue. It’s just cleaning-up-Parliament issue. On every bill, one of us will ask. One of us, because all of us may not be present in the House because there’s something burning in the constituency, political thing, we may not be there at all times, but one of us will ask. That’s all it requires. It’s a relatively easier thing to do.

RAJAGOPALAN: What is the barrier then? You’ve been doing this a long time. You know a lot of parliamentarians.

MADHAVAN: I don’t know.

RAJAGOPALAN: What do they say when you recommend it?

MADHAVAN: No, we tell them this is an issue. We don’t tell them, “You do it.” Because it’s their choice.

RAJAGOPALAN: Fair enough.

MADHAVAN: My job is to point out issues. My job is not to tell them what to do because they know what to do.

Reforming the Office of Governor

RAJAGOPALAN: I want to talk a little bit about the role of the governor. This is another, like one of those anti-defection problems, where there is a twofold issue. If I look at it as a geeky thing, we have a very fundamental design flaw where we’ve made the governor, who has some very important parts, including who is actually invited to form a government in a particular state, which is one of the most important functions. Then the letter recommending President’s Rule.

MADHAVAN: Yes.

RAJAGOPALAN: These are two functions which are, I wouldn’t even say that the spirit of democracy, they are such core democratic functions. It is crazy that we’ve done this with an unelected person. Now, other than the fact that we’ve done this with an unelected person, this person was appointed by the union cabinet, which is the other problem, serving at the pleasure of the president. It’s not even one of those situations where they were appointed by the previous legislature and they continue, or something which makes a little bit more design sense. We’ve had a vast improvement in President’s Rule, which me and my coauthors have found empirically, but that’s a poor—

MADHAVAN: That is Bommai.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, that’s thanks to Bommai.

MADHAVAN:  Just one judgment.

RAJAGOPALAN: Exactly. But that also shows that simple things like requiring a floor test and having some very simple procedural safeguards can make a big difference even with a system as flawed as we have with the governor. Why don’t the states protest, come together, have any kind of—this is something that is impacting every single state legislature across the country and union territory also. Why is this simply not an issue in Indian democratic politics, and only people like you and me are frothing at the mouth about the governor?

MADHAVAN: This is serious. It’s not an easy solution. I’m not saying politically solution to solve. It’s not an easy design to make. Because you pointed out, you got to the nub of it, which is that somebody has to do one role, which is after an election, decide whom to invite. Someone has to do it. 

Now, who that someone we’ll come to, but you need to have somebody doing it. Second, and this is a slightly wider question, someone may have to recommend President’s Rule. I’m not even saying someone has to have it, OK? It’s a slightly open question.

RAJAGOPALAN: I think we should have no President’s Rule but that‘s a separate matter.

MADHAVAN: One thing. Because there could be occasions. Let’s say some state decides to secede. Extreme circumstances. You might need to have, to hold the union together. That is the design of the Constitution. It is like you started off by saying unitary, federal, whatever.

RAJAGOPALAN: That’s why I think India is not federal.  

MADHAVAN: No, it’s not. It’s a union of states. That’s very clear. Because Parliament can decide that one state can be split into two.

RAJAGOPALAN: By a voice vote.

MADHAVAN: By whatever. [laughter] But it’s not—the core is, once that is the—you have to abide by that design. Let’s not get into, at that level. At some level, we have to start, OK, this is the design and not start from zero.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, OK, so I’m with you.

MADHAVAN: You need somebody—

RAJAGOPALAN: Let’s start with someone has to do these two functions.

MADHAVAN: Someone has to do these two functions. Now, how do you find that someone? There’s a problem. One, you cannot have an elected person. Simply because, and this was discussed in the constituent assembly, and I agree with them, that then there’ll be two people who have legitimacy of having been elected, the chief minister and the governor. You cannot give them. 

One possible thing is—I’m thinking out loud, yes—where do we have the problems here? The governor does multiple things. The governor does these two, and the governor does many other things also. Governor is often the chancellor of universities. Governor has to give assent to a bill or refer to president, it goes to the governor, and a bunch of other things.

Now, let us say, whom to call? We have broadly solved it after the Bommai judgment. Who do you call? Has to prove majority on the floor. You call the wrong person, that person will not last. It’s a very temporary problem which will get resolved. President’s Rule, again, has to be ratified by Parliament. There’s a second round of check by each house. Both Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha have to vote on it. You’re having some level of check. Governor cannot act unilaterally.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, they can’t go completely rogue, but they are totally agents of the union cabinet which is the problem to start with.

MADHAVAN: No, but even President’s Rule, it’s a limited thing. It’s six months. I’m saying, if you have a— 

RAJAGOPALAN: Well, except in the case of Punjab and this and that, and you can extend.

MADHAVAN: I agree with you, but those are exceptional cases. Kashmir and Punjab are the only cases where they hard coded, and those are exceptional times.

RAJAGOPALAN: We’ve had President’s Rule more than 128 times.

MADHAVAN: I agree, but all of them, the max limit is six months twice, one year. In the recent past, last 20 years or so, we’ve not had President’s Rule often at all.

RAJAGOPALAN: But that’s a consequence of Bommai and only Bommai.

MADHAVAN: I agree, but now we are living in the post-Bommai region. In a way, President’s Rule, the one we had recently was Manipur, but I think that the opposition was demanding for a President’s Rule. It was not that the union government wanted. We actually have not had the governor problem, if I may say so— 

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, we’ve not had crazy abuse of that.

MADHAVAN: —with respect to these two issues. OK. So, what if we say—

RAJAGOPALAN: No, we have had governor issues with the first one which is who to invite.

MADHAVAN: First one, but—I agree.

RAJAGOPALAN: We’ve seen this in Maharashtra. We’ve seen some serious chaos.

MADHAVAN: Agreed with that, but that gets resolved if you say—and the Supreme Court has intervened enough times—that there should be a floor test within two weeks. If the person calls the wrong person, who doesn’t have a majority, in two weeks, it falls. Of course, you have first-mover advantage and all that. I’m not getting into that.

RAJAGOPALAN: No, but we should get into that, given anti-defection law. No?

MADHAVAN: No, in fact, anti-defection law prevents the wrong person from that.

RAJAGOPALAN: Not really, because now there’s an incentive to buy groups wholesale which is what we do.

MADHAVAN: That’s true. [laughter] But what I’m saying is, let’s stick to—[laughter] If you keep expanding the problem, you’ll never find a solution, right? [laughter] You’re an economist.

RAJAGOPALAN: You’re taking away my job. This is a growth industry for me, Madhavan. [chuckles]

MADHAVAN: As far as you know, as an economist, you always start with something called ceteris paribus.

RAJAGOPALAN: OK. We’ll stick with that for a second. No, we’ll talk specifically about these two.

MADHAVAN: Let’s say these two are problems. They are not no problems, but they are things that we have at least figured out now how to manage. Let’s assume we have the same system of electing governor. This is not going to happen.

RAJAGOPALAN: Same system of electing governor—appointing.

MADHAVAN: Not electing, appointing governor. What I’m saying, it’s never going to happen. I’m just imagining.

RAJAGOPALAN: If wishes were horses.

MADHAVAN: Yes. You amend the constitution to say the governor has exactly two roles. These two, bills will be passed by the assembly, and that’s it. They don’t go to anybody. Assembly passes, bill is law. The governor is not the chancellor, the default of universities. Somebody else you make. Governor has no role. Give him the big bungalow if you like. We spent so much money on everything. Let the guy have his day. Maybe the guy can come on Republic Day and Independence Day and things like that.

RAJAGOPALAN: But you’re basically saying the way out of this mess is to start stripping away powers—

MADHAVAN: Yes, all powers of the government.

RAJAGOPALAN: —so that this becomes a very, almost like a paper—

MADHAVAN: You need a person for these two roles. You don’t need a person for the other roles, so take out the roles.

RAJAGOPALAN: I do think it’s important to give assent.

MADHAVAN: No, irrelevant.

RAJAGOPALAN: The way we are passing bills in our legislatures five minutes ago, we were talking about how crazy that is.

MADHAVAN: That doesn’t matter. That is the will of the people. Why should an unelected guy decide to give or not give assent?

RAJAGOPALAN: Because the design is that we have checks and balances. Counter-majoritarian checks.

MADHAVAN: No, these are not checks and balances. If the legislature passes a bill which is unconstitutional, then it goes to the court. If it’s constitutional, they have the right to pass. They have been voted to do that. An unelected guy doesn’t have any role.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes, here, the really big problem is that he’s not elected.

MADHAVAN: No, an elected guy will have a dual power center, so you cannot have an elected guy. The only way out is to not give that power. Frankly, even if you look at the union Parliament, there was only one case in the last 70 years where the president has returned.

RAJAGOPALAN: Has returned, yes.

MADHAVAN: They give assent. There have been a couple of instances, actually one instance where the president sat on it, which I think was wrong. Should have returned it if you don’t like it, but that’s about it. It is just a process which they sign on the dotted line, right? Why have that process? That’s what you want in the states. You take the governor off all the other roles—

RAJAGOPALAN: I don’t mind the idea actually now that you explained it.

MADHAVAN: —other than the two which are where you can—ideally, you can take the governor off everything, but you need somebody to do these two. That we agreed on.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes.I don’t even agree on the second one. I don’t think President’s Rule should exist at all.

MADHAVAN: Fine. I don’t have strong views on that. I’ve not thought about it too much. Let’s say as long as you have it, you need to have somebody to recommend, OK?

RAJAGOPALAN: Fair enough.

MADHAVAN: You have to have somebody to decide whom to call. If you did not have these two, I would say get rid of the governor’s office itself. If these are the only two things, let the person do only these two things.

RAJAGOPALAN: Actually, I really like this idea. You start stripping things of power.

MADHAVAN: Give the person whatever, the nice-looking hat [laughter] and power to unfold the flag. Let the person do all those ceremonies.

RAJAGOPALAN: All the ceremonial moments.

MADHAVAN: Like the British monarch. Do all those things. Provide entertainment. Go on a buggy or whatever. [laughter] I don’t mind. We spent a lot of money, we can spend a few more crores. We have enough cash.

RAJAGOPALAN: I think there’s some room for ceremony, calling the opening of a House, all the Republic Day stuff. I agree with you. I don’t mind the ceremony of it. 

MADHAVAN: When you’re saying ceremony, did you see the photo of the West Bengal Chief Justice when the new judge was being done?

RAJAGOPALAN: No.

MADHAVAN: You should look it up.

RAJAGOPALAN: OK. It’s a photograph.

MADHAVAN: I’ve seen the photo. There should be video also, I’m sure.

RAJAGOPALAN: OK. I’ll go look this up.

MADHAVAN: The person is dressed up like a 19th-century Englishman.

RAJAGOPALAN: Oh, wow.

MADHAVAN: Because that is their ceremonial dress on that day.  

The Role of PRS in Parliamentary Functioning

RAJAGOPALAN: Oh, wow. OK. I just saw the picture. This is extraordinary. [chuckles]

As we close, I want to ask you about PRS. Now, PRS is an extraordinary institution. Your core belief, at least the way PRS was both created and has functioned, is that if legislators had better information, had better research, aid, and access given to them, had groups of people with whom they could consult, because there’s no legislator who can know about everything. You’ve conducted all these workshops. You do budget sessions. You provide legislative aides. You provide so much information about the functioning of the institution.

The idea is if we do that, then legislative processes become better, Parliament will function better, and so on and so forth. Has that thesis played out, according to you, given your experience with PRS in the last 20 years? This is not me asking if PRS has done a good job. PRS has done an extraordinary job, but has it translated into all the things you thought it would translate to?

MADHAVAN: I’ll come back to the basic premise. Basic premise is we are a representative democracy. If a representative democracy has to function, the core representative institutions have to function, which is Parliament and state legislatures.

RAJAGOPALAN: And state legislatures.

MADHAVAN: Let’s stick to Parliament because what I’m saying about Parliament is equally true there, just as a shorthand, because if Parliament doesn’t function, then our democracy fails. It’s a necessary condition.

Now, the next necessary condition is for MPs to be able to function, they should have sufficient amounts of information, research, analysis, support system, etc. Now, is that a sufficient condition? No. Is that a necessary condition? Yes. What we are trying to do is to provide some of the necessary conditions and hope that that is used. That was the idea.

Now, what is played out is, now on most bills, we do get calls from MPs, and across all parties, trying to understand what are the issues and what are the nuances of the bill? They actually want to know. This was possibly not the case, maybe 20 years ago, simply because they did not have somebody who would be providing them this information in an easily understandable manner.

What we don’t do—and they also know that—is to try to say, “This is the right thing to do” or “This is the wrong thing to do,” because it’s up to them, and they have to add their ideology on top of that. Then they are actually happy about it because we are not trying to push them in any particular direction.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes. Also, it won’t be bipartisan or across all parties.

MADHAVAN: Yes. We are just trying to explain things. In a way, the model institution for us is the Congressional Research Service in the U.S. They do a fantastic, extraordinary job. Of course, they are extraordinarily well-resourced too. Unfortunately, the Indian system doesn’t provide a public institution with that sort of mandate or resources or independence.

We have seen them using more and more. On a very simple metric, we conduct some of these sessions when Parliament is on, where we call an expert to have an interaction with them on a topical issue. For example, in the last one year, given what the things are happening, we had called somebody to come and talk about critical minerals. Someone came about nuclear power. They are very technical. We had one of the former foreign secretaries come in and talk about the situation related to Iran, what’s going on, U.S.–Iran, etc., because that was there. 

Now, these are held at 9:00 a.m. Nobody is going to get a re-election benefit because of attending these sessions. Nobody’s party is going to give them an extra leg up because they’re attending the exposition. Why are they coming here? They are coming here because they want to understand, they want to learn. They’re not getting any other direct benefit.

RAJAGOPALAN: They’re also not getting any other direct support to learn these things on their own.

MADHAVAN: And they’re actually paying an opportunity-cost price because the one hour they’re here, they’re not meeting constituents lining up outside their house at that one hour. They’re actually possibly losing some votes, who knows? They’re doing that. That means that they’re keen to understand. I still remain quite optimistic about the way things happen. There is enough of a critical mass to stay optimistic.

RAJAGOPALAN: And there is some genuine learning happening. Despite all the design flaws and anti-defection and official whip and so on, whether they’re allowed to vote their conscience or not, they have opinions on things.

MADHAVAN: Of course, they are. I have to tell you this story. This story is 20 years old about. There was a bill on amending the Contempt of Court Act. What the original bill said was, “It is not contempt of court if what you say is the truth.” Then it went to committee, etc. It came back and changed to say that it should also not be mala fide, it should be in public interest, etc. 

There was this MP from CPM called Varkala Radhakrishna, very senior person. He had been speaker of Kerala. His party had issued a whip to support the bill. He was himself a senior lawyer. He understood the issue. He felt that if it’s true, it’s true, like defamation. Why should I have any other parameter? 

So, he stood up. It was a beautiful speech. He says, “Sir, I stand to support the bill.” Next eight minutes, he demolished the bill. He argued saying everything about it is wrong. Then he says, “Therefore, sir, I support the bill.” He has abided by the whip [chuckles] and explained what he actually believed. People have done that.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes. Eventually, hopefully, we’ll get rid of anti-defection.

MADHAVAN: I think, slowly. Yesterday, somebody wrote in The Hindu about that, or Express, I don’t remember, one of the papers. Fifteen years ago, when you used to talk about it, people used to say, “Oh, we should strengthen the anti-defection division happening.” I think slowly people are realizing the harm it has caused. 

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes.

MADHAVAN: Obviously, the first instinct is, defections are bad. Therefore, you should actually have a stronger anti-defection law. That’s the natural instinct.

RAJAGOPALAN: Yes. Most people didn’t know that the whip was attached to it also.

MADHAVAN: Not only that. Unless you dig deep into it, understand the second-order consequences, then you realize the harm it does. On the face of it, I voted for somebody who’s belonging to a party. If that person is moving, that person is behaving dishonorably, so it should be kicked out. That’s an obvious conclusion.

RAJAGOPALAN: Thank you so much for doing this. I’m hoping that in the future, you and I don’t have to talk about anti-defection anymore because the problem has been resolved, and we’ll get into other crazier problems. We didn’t talk about delimitation. Hopefully, you'll come back, and we'll talk more about that.

MADHAVAN: Thanks. It was fun talking to you.

RAJAGOPALAN: Always.