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Robin Wigglesworth on *A Fabulous Debt*
Is the bond market the key to financial stability?
Robin Wigglesworth is the editor of FT Alphaville and the author of Trillions and A Fabulous Debt. He joins the program to discuss the history of bond markets, how bonds helped shape the rise of global powers, the growing importance of the US Treasury market, and the risks posed by hedge fund activity in Treasury markets, among much more.
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Read the full episode transcript:
This episode was recorded on October 19th, 2026
Note: While transcripts are lightly edited, they are not rigorously proofed for accuracy. If you notice an error, please reach out to [email protected].
David Beckworth: Our guest today is Robin Wigglesworth. Robin is a veteran correspondent and the editor of the FT Alphaville, a leading blog at the Financial Times newspaper. He’s also an acclaimed author with his first book, Trillions, and provided the definitive history of index fund industry and passive investing.
Today, he joins us to discuss his more recent book, hot off the press, A Fabulous Debt: The Epic Story of How Bonds Built the Modern World. It’s a sweeping and colorful book that looks at the history of bonds through storytelling, and I’m delighted to have Robin on the show. Robin, welcome to the podcast.
Robin Wigglesworth: Hi, David. I’m delighted to be here.
Beckworth: Well, it’s great to have you on. Of course, I’ve followed your work on FT Alphaville, your first book, Trillions, and then this one. And of course, I will give a shout-out to your new podcast, The Story of Money. Tell listeners quickly about that and why they should listen.
Wigglesworth: Well, it’s a financial history podcast that I do with my colleague, Gillian Tett. We love this stuff. We’re not necessarily podcasters, but I just think it’s a phenomenal medium to go really in-depth in some of the most interesting, fascinating financial or economic or business aspects of the world, really. You and I know money matters. It really does. And sometimes, in mainstream histories, it gets washed out. So, it’s been, yes, just a real fun—a passion for both Gillian and I to work on The Story of Money.
Beckworth: So, as someone who’s not in the journalism industry, but I look and I see people like you, what is it like to write a book and also be a journalist? How do you balance those two demands?
Wigglesworth: Well, I think maybe you better ask my wife how I balance [laughter] those two demands, or my children. I feel there are synergies, in that I deal with some of this stuff at work.
Beckworth: OK.
Wigglesworth: And that feeds my curiosity. I find it quite nice to have a big, titanic project alongside the shorter-form, almost daily or weekly or monthly stuff you do. So, I find it quite nice to do both, and if I didn’t have both, I’d probably miss it. But it does lead to certain logistical challenges and very few holidays. But I’m [laughter] a lucky person. I love what I do. It’s a real privilege. So—
Beckworth: Yes.
Wigglesworth: —I’ll figure I’ll take holidays when I’m dead.
Beckworth: Yes, so, as the saying goes, “Find a job you love and you’ll never have to work another day.”
Wigglesworth: Exactly.
Beckworth: Yes, so, that sounds like you and me as well. I feel fortunate to have this job as well. And I love your writing as well. We’ll come back to one of those articles that complements the book that you wrote recently, a long piece on hedge funds and their increasingly important role in the Treasury market and some of the challenges that presents.
Well, let’s talk about your book. Again, it’s called The Fabulous Debt. I’m going to hold it up here. I see it’s behind you as well.
Wigglesworth: Oh, yes. My publisher makes me put it everywhere. [laughter] My entire wall would be Fabulous Debt if it was up to them. But I thought, being Anglo–Norwegian, I have to make sure it’s a little bit tasteful and not overly gross.
Beckworth: OK. And we should note you are coming to us live from Oslo, Norway. I’m here in a bunker down in southern United States. Sometimes I’m in Washington, DC. But it’s great that we’re in a day and age where we can talk to each other across the world.
I was just there, though, with your fellow Norwegians in Oslo. I just missed you by a few days. I was visiting the Norges Bank. As I mentioned to you before the show, I met an actual Thor, Thorvald.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: Now, apparently that’s a common name, but I felt special, [laughter] meeting a god of thunder.
Wigglesworth: Yes. No, we have a few Thors and variants of it here in Norway. Not quite “throw a rock and you’ll hit one,” but the odds are OK, at least, whilst Robin Wigglesworth . . . there’s only one Robin Wigglesworth in Norway, luckily or unluckily.
Beckworth: One other thing about my journey there, I was taking photos. I was posting on X, on LinkedIn. Another prominent Robin, Robin Brooks, said, “Share more. Share more.” So, I had to share the image of The Scream, which you have there in Oslo in the National Museum. And I was like, “Robin, this is the perfect image for the Treasury market.” So, that is a nice hook and segue [chuckles] into your book about bonds, Treasury markets. Tell me about the motivation for this. Why write this now?
Exploring the Past to Understand the Present
Wigglesworth: Well, years ago, almost a decade ago, I was playing around with the BIS database, as all cool people do on a Friday evening. And I discovered that the bond market, the data that the BIS has on the international debt securities market essentially, was larger than the data that they had on the assets of the banking system.
Now, there are some asterisks around that data, that the BIS actually doesn’t have great data on the Chinese banking system, which is a big one. But I just thought it was fascinating. I wrote a column about [it in] the FT, that the bonds are now fixed-income securities, now over half of all global debt. And I think there were many downstream consequences from that. But then I started digging into the history. Because I knew some parts of it, but I didn’t know where it all started, where it ended, all the different intermediate steps. But I just did it for my own sake.
It was really in 2022, after I’d written my first book on the history of passive investing, I thought I’d return to this. This is my first love as a financial journalist. My first job as a journalist was covering Sukuk Islamic bonds in the Middle East. They walk, talk, and quack a bit like conventional bonds, are structured to look a lot like them, to get around the prohibition on usury and interest payments.
But I just think—look, I love the history. I think the history is fascinating and it helps me understand the present day. But I also think the reason why I felt it warranted a book wasn’t just the fact that the bond market’s history is so colorful and vibrant and fun, and it’s shaped the world we live in, but it is also hugely important to understand where we’re going.
It’s a cliché, that George Santayana quote about “to understand the present, you have to understand the past.” But today, I’d argue too many people do not understand the global financial system because they don’t have an understanding or an appreciation for the role that the capital markets, and fixed income in particular, play. And I think that’s become quite painfully apparent over the past 20 years. I think it’s going to become even more apparent over the next 20.
Beckworth: Yes.Even your introductory chapter, you outlined some of these issues, some of the implications. You noted, for example, that the one thing that did discipline President Trump was the Treasury market, the bond market, right?
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: And, of course, you bring up the famous James Carville quote: If he had to be reincarnated, he’d like to do it as the bond market, not the pope.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: All these great stories—
Wigglesworth: You can’t write a book on bonds without including that Carville quote, right?
The Treasury Market 101
Beckworth: Yes. But give us an overview of the bond market, maybe the Treasury market in particular, since it’s the anchor part of that market. How big is it? How important is it? We’ve touched on this, but paint the broad strokes here so we can then jump into your book.
Wigglesworth: Yes, so, the size of the Treasury market is a moving target given the scale of the issues we’re seeing from the US government lately. But it’s around, what, $35 trillion, and there are a few more trillion here and there of government debt. The US famously hit, or crossed, the $40 trillion mark recently, its public debt stack. That is huge. That is the pillar of the global financial fixed-income system, but it’s just one pillar. The entire global bond market—again, the data gets very sketchy on this—but the latest BIS data puts it at around $188 trillion at the end of 2025.
Beckworth: Wow.
Wigglesworth: So, a fair bit larger than the global stock market and then bigger than the banking system, certainly, where frankly a lot of the assets are in the form of fixed-income securities. It’s huge. When we talk a lot about shadow banking and the nonbank financial system that we know is an issue—and what has been an issue ever since 2008, albeit not maybe gets the same attention as the banking part—the bond market is by far the biggest part of that. Private credit, it’s like 2, 3 trillion. Crypto, another 2, 3 trillion. They’re all basically little ants compared to the elephant of the bond market.
Beckworth: Yes, and some of the recent stories, again, highlight this importance. We touched on Liberation Day, which you noted was then called “Liquidation Day” [laughter] when President Trump responded. But even some of the more recent activities by the Trump administration. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s desire to intervene in the Japanese yen market was indirectly tied to wanting to keep downward pressure [chuckles] on the yields, talk of reforming the Fed’s FEMA facility. It’s a repo facility for foreign government entities.
A lot of talk about how can we step in and keep yields—now, interestingly, Robin, as you know, yields went really high in 10-year Treasury. They’re back down quite a bit. We don’t need to spend much time on this, but do you have a good theory for interest rates before we jump into the bonds themselves?
Wigglesworth: I don’t have a good theory. [laughter] I’ve got a theory. I’ve got probably 10 theories, and I pick and choose which one suits me every day. [laughter] I do think people have been too quick to look at inflation break-even rates and dismiss inflation expectations as a cause for the sell-off. I think there are many factors rolling in. There are some technical factors and maybe some demand from the bond splurge from the AI hyperscalers. All these are small things.
I think broadly speaking, there are two big things. It’s rising global growth. The global economy has actually been very resilient this year, far more resilient [than] you would have expected given the scale of the shock we’ve had over the past few years. And inflation has been higher than targeted by most central banks for a while now. The war in Iran and the energy shock that flows from that is naturally not great.
And I think some people have looked at break-evens staying so calm this year and have overly wishfully said, “It’s all global growth expectations. It’s just a real move.” I think that misses the fact that obviously the Fed has not lost all its credibility. I think Kevin Warsh has been quite good about saying, “After these doubts, we will take this seriously.” And that has crimped the break-even rate.
The Fed still has the credibility that when it signals, “We’re going to get on top of this problem . . ..” That’s why break-even rates have stayed relatively calm. They’ve only gone up, what, 20 basis points or so this year, if that, whilst the move in the real yields is a natural flow from higher rate expectations than we had at the beginning of the year. Where that leaves us, I don’t know. If I knew for sure where things were going, I’d have my own private island in the Caribbean. [laughter] But it’s going to be fun to see how it all plays out.
Beckworth: Yes. In the meantime, gives you plenty of material to write about and to cover.
Wigglesworth: Yes. God bless Bessent and Kevin Warsh [laughter] and everybody involved because they keep people like me and you gainfully employed.
Beckworth: Oh, absolutely. I’ve told this story on here before, but when I started this podcast back in 2016, my superiors were like, “I don’t know if there’s a market. [laughter] I could see maybe five or six episodes.” I said, “No, trust me. [laughter] We never settle anything in macro and finance.”
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: There are always debates. There’s always something new, some new shock, some new controversy. This is this great material.
Wigglesworth: No, it really is. Look, for a different article, I once spoke to Harry Markowitz, the Nobel Prize winner, about more financial economics, of course. And I just was marveling that even in his late 80s, he was working on a five-volume series of books—
Beckworth: Wow.
Wigglesworth: —about something. He had as many questions for me as I had for him. I think there’s something about this world that we live in that maybe in the—
Beckworth: Yes.
Wigglesworth: Nothing ever stays the same. Nothing is settled. I think there are always new regimes, and it keeps us young for a long time.
Beckworth: Yes.
Wigglesworth: Let’s hope so. A bit of exercise and staying interested in financial matters keeps people young, I say.
Beckworth: Yes. No, just one anecdote to that. As I mentioned, I was just in Norway. I actually traveled to several central banks. I was talking to them about their operating system. And to me, it’s quite shocking, even surprising, that the Federal Reserve is now talking about rethinking its operating system, its balance sheet.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
The Innovative, Ill-Fated Doge
Beckworth: A year ago, this was sacrosanct. You didn’t touch this. Just that the Overton window has shifted, to me as, again, an example. There’s always something new to talk about, always something popping up that we did not expect to happen, so . . .
Well, let’s talk about your book. Your book begins with this incredible story. I learned a lot about Italian city-states. I didn’t realize they’re such an important part of the beginning of our bonds.
Wigglesworth: Yes. No, I learned a lot as well researching it. That’s part of the joy of it.
Beckworth: Yes.
Wigglesworth: I like learning stuff, and I like reading, and I do like doing research. I have to write at the end of it to get paid and be gainfully employed, but the fun part is the research. Yes, the Italian city-states—we know that a lot of modern finance stems from really the Italians and the Dutch. The Italian—the modern banking approach, as it were—the word “bank” comes from the banche, wooden tables the Italian moneylenders would have in the market squares of Venice or Florence or Milan. The Italians, specifically the Venetians, invented by accident the first bond, the first tradable fixed-income security, in 1171 amid lots of drama.
Beckworth: Now, tell us about a character in particular that was behind this story. As I read the name, I had to do a double-take because it sounds like, looks like “DOGE,” which has a different history here [chuckles] in the United States.
Wigglesworth: Yes, no, it was the doge. He’s the elected leader of Venice. Venice is—have you been there, David?
Beckworth: I have not, but I want to go after reading the book. For sure.
Wigglesworth: Yes, no. I went as a feckless student, and I wish I could go back now knowing a bit more about the city’s history.
Beckworth: Yes.
Wigglesworth: It’s just an incredible town. It was founded by refugees fleeing the Vandals, so, basically German barbarians at the time. They fled to Venice because it was a swampy hellhole that nobody else wanted. There was nothing of natural resources, nothing. No wood, no stone, no nothing. No nobles were interested in it.
But they therefore had to live off their own ingenuity. They became probably the most amazing merchant-explorers and commercial entrepôt in the world. And they became a republic in this era of, frankly, mass despotism in Europe, and serfdom. There are examples of people literally rising from slavery to being the doge of Venice within two generations, which for Europe at the time—even today, that’s an incredible story.
Beckworth: Yes, yes.
Wigglesworth: But for Europe in the 12th century, it’s incredible. They technically owed religious fealty to Rome, to the Vatican City, the pope there, because it was a Catholic town, and it was in Italy. But they were actually ruled by the Byzantine Empire based then in Constantinople, or today’s Istanbul. But because they were so uppity and nouveau riche and would trade with everybody, even Muslims, even the Saracens—they annoyed everybody. And eventually, Constantinople arrested—they got so annoyed—the emperor there got so annoyed, he ordered the arrest of every Venetian they could round up in the entire Byzantine Empire.
And the Doge Vitale, who was the doge at the time, was a very cautious guy. He decided, “Well, I don’t really want to go to war. War is bad for commerce. Let’s try first peace.” But then, literally, as they were debating this in the ducal palace, basically, in Venice, one ship of fleeing Venetians who managed to escape the clutches of the Byzantine Empire sailed in and told everybody about this injustice.
It was a republic, so, you had to do what the people said. The people were so angry. Venice was not—it was a city-state, but it was a very wealthy, successful one. They thought they could take down Constantinople that notch. To pay for it, because they didn’t really have much in tax revenues—the city-state was wealthy, but it was small—they forced everybody in the city to pay a one-off proportional wealth tax, essentially. But to soften the blow, they made it pay 5 percent a year, so they—“Oh, it’s a loan. You’ll lend the government money until we can take Constantinople down a notch. We’ll pay you 5 percent a year, and we’ll make the receipts tradable.”
And that was the crucial bit, because then anybody could go down to the Rialto, which is the main square in Venice, then and today. Now you can buy fresh vegetables there and fish. Back then you could buy anything on the planet, really. But you could buy and sell the receipts of this prestiti, as it was called, this loan, and then buy yourself a 5 percent income stream—for perpetuity in theory—or sell one if you needed to raise cash, or use it as collateral for a loan, and so on. It became quite powerful.
Beckworth: So, the big innovation was a tradable loan that people could sell. If they didn’t want to hang onto it, they needed liquidity, they needed some funding quickly that they could sell to someone else, and they would get that income stream, those payments, and then it became a market. This was an innovation. Necessity is the mother of innovation.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: This is the case where the local city needed the funds. They came up with this innovation. Again, the history—I encourage people to read the story, but the history: They go—as you outlined, they go to war with Constantinople, but they’re on their journey. They build a huge fleet, but they’re cautious, and they get hoodwinked by the emperor. Tell that part.
Wigglesworth: Well, the poor doge was a peace-loving, very careful man, unusually for the era as well. He kept suing—so they managed to pay for this huge fleet. They set sail to attack the Byzantine Empire. They were going to attack some of the Greek little cities on the way, as it were. They were part of the Byzantine Empire. Then some of the Greek citizens said, “OK, no, please stop attacking us. We will send emissaries to the emperor in Constantinople, begging him to release all the Venetians and pay reparations.”
And, the doge just said, “Well, that sounds fine.” They were too cautious. They were too slow. So, they wintered, and the emperor realized that he could just play for time. Wars are very expensive. Keeping this going is very expensive. So, he just kept fobbing the Venetians off. This is really where things went horrifically wrong. That anchored fleet got hit by the plague, some sort of pestilence or plague. We don’t know exactly which one, but we know hundreds, and eventually, thousands of people died.
In the end, the force wasn’t large enough to sail on Constantinople. They had to return to Venice, tail between their legs, and basically admit that they’d lost this war. They were not able to free their compatriots in Constantinople. And worse, the poor doge had brought the plague back to Venice with him. And because it’s a republic, and there was a direct democracy, there was a public inquiry. This is by 1172.
The doge has to have all these citizens in that start screaming at him for messing everything up. “He was too cautious, too cowardly.” They get angrier and angrier. Slowly—and the doge should have realized this was a red-light moment—his advisers start slipping out. They’re all in there with him, but eventually, they start tiptoeing towards the exits because people are getting angrier and angrier. One speaker is riling up the next speaker, and he’s just sitting there taking it until he also has to make a dash for it. But he’s caught on the streets of Venice and murdered by his own citizens.
Poor Doge Vitale. [laughter] I always joke that it shows financial innovators get no respect whatsoever, but most of them don’t get murdered or clubbed to death or stabbed to death on the—
Beckworth: Right, right. [chuckles]
Wigglesworth: —streets of their hometown.
Beckworth: Now, you do go on to say, though, that he was vindicated after his death. People are like, “What were you thinking? This was a great leader.”
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: And so, in his death, he becomes a hero. But the big insight here was, though, the tradable loans. Also, you highlight the Catholic Church gave an endorsement. That was pretty important, too, given the issue of usury during the time.
Wigglesworth: Yes. So, some of these bankers had been getting around the injunction against usury for a while before this, typically by structuring things as a profit share or fees or some way around it. Money, like life, to use that quote from Jurassic Park, “Money finds a way.” It always does. But the church tacitly blessed this, and eventually, later on, explicitly blessed it, as basically, because it was a loan, a forced loan, it wasn’t really making money from nothing. You were buying an income stream. You were buying something, essentially.
The Romans had invented annuities for much the same reason. And the fact that it was tradable just—it became a commodity you could trade. It was generally accepted. Venice lost this war, so they weren’t able to pay back that loan. But it actually became so powerful in the hands of a commercial city as collateral. One of the first use cases—well, there are two. One is collateral. You can endow your favorite church. You could leave it to your descendants. You could make your money work for you. You could use it as surety for trade credit. It started getting used as trade credit.
And also, in a world where there’s no paper money, there’s quite often a shortage of specie, of coins, silver and gold coins that people wanted. This became big money. It was a piece of paper from a very credible, rich government that still paid 5 percent a year every year. That became very powerful. In fact, being able to buy this prestiti became a privilege that only Venetian citizens and a few selected, honored foreigners were allowed to do. The other Italian city-states saw this and basically copied the invention en masse. You see exactly the same thing crop up in Florence, in Milan, in Genoa, in Pisa, Rome. Eventually, it just spread around Europe.
Beckworth: One of the interesting themes that runs through this story, as well as the next story we’ll get to, the Netherlands, is this notion of empowerment—that everyone got to participate.
If you’re in Venice, again, you mentioned the rags-to-riches story. Everyone got to be a part of something, an activity. It connected them. With the Dutch, actually, the whole republic was connected. This is almost like a libertarian paradise, except for some of the outcomes. People get killed, and they go to war. But it’s really interesting, and one of the things that I was left wondering—and I don’t want to spend too much time on this because your book’s not about this—but I was wondering the counterfactual. What if [the] doge had sailed all the way down to Constantinople? [chuckles] How would the world be very different today?
Wigglesworth: No, that’s a great question that I was pondering myself. I thought about writing, not necessarily a counterfactual, but we could have seen, let’s say if Venice had won that war very quickly, raided Constantinople, seized its treasury, and paid back the loan as soon as they came back the next year. Maybe the Venetians would have still, in that intervening period, realized the magic of a tradable fixed-income security, how powerful a tool that is. But maybe not. We don’t really know.
And I do agree on your broader point that—I don’t even think it’s a libertarian fancy. It’s more that actually debt and anything that binds—the word “bond” itself—bonds and financial securities can, in a weird way, help bind us together. One thing that I did not expect before doing exhaustive, if highly delightful, research into all of this period is to what extent the bond actually helps strengthen Venice by binding citizens together as creditors.
If they lent money to the government, they had a vested interest in that government being well run, and the government had a vested interest in making sure it seemed to be transparent. They set up a finance ministry that would share government finances, all the data. They passed laws saying creditors ranked below even the sailors and soldiers of the city. So, it helped strengthen—it actually, as a procyclical tool, almost helped strengthen the accountability and the governance of the city.
Lo and behold, the best cities, the best-ruled city-states and eventually nations, like the Dutch or the British, the ones that were the best run, the most accountable, the most transparent, they could borrow more cheaply and, ergo, they generally became more powerful. That is the feedback loop there.
Beckworth: Yes.
Wigglesworth: I’m not going to say that the bond market helped usher in democracy in Europe, because that would be comically overdone, but I definitely think it is one of many myriad factors, like a small-F factor that definitely helped usher this in. We see it later on, of course, but I think the Venetians were the first to really show how the bond market can help bind a people together rather than just pull it apart.
The Netherlands: Land of Bogs and Bonds
Beckworth: Yes.That was a beautiful part of the story for me. It’s just an important technology, especially in this day and age where social trust is low, it’s broken down. [chuckles] It’s something to restore that sense of community that they had there, and it was through a financial instrument of all things.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: Well, let’s move on to the Dutch. Now, the innovation in Venice was the first tradable loan. The innovation for the Netherlands was what? What did they add to this story?
Wigglesworth: Well, we don’t know exactly what the first Dutch bond is. We definitely see this bond, a tradable loan, start migrating around Europe by the 1300s. There are rentes in France or renten in the Germanic states then—there was no Germany yet—and renten in the Dutch states. But don’t forget, there is no Netherlands yet. It’s generally ruled by the Spanish Empire. Lots of wars going on, but it’s fairly swampy. Large parts of the Netherlands are below sea level. It’s called “the bog of Europe,” which I rather cruelly [laughter] title my chapter on the Dutch bond market.
But they use them, to begin with, overwhelmingly to defy the elements. Like I said, it’s mostly below sea level, large parts are below sea level. So, that incredible, intricate system of dykes and waterways that the Dutch have built—which really is, I’d say, a wonder of the modern world, because it’s one of the first times where humans, on a massive and truly remarkable scale, adapted the climate to suit our needs—
Beckworth: Yes.
Wigglesworth: —that was to a large extent financed by the bond market. Different Dutch towns and villages and areas would band together into these water works, these water boards. They would basically pay taxes to the water board. These water boards survived even as the borders of the states kept waxing and waning over the centuries. Some of them exist to this very day.
But they issued bonds, and then the Dutch also, I think, took this invention and used it to pay for their war of independence against Spain eventually. As it was part of the Spanish Netherlands, the more Protestant part, or the Catholic parts stuck to Belgium and France, really to France at the time. But the Protestant bits managed to secede after a very bloody, long conflict lasting around 80 years.
But the reason why the Dutch could fight the superpower of the era, the Spanish Empire, to a standstill in the 1600s was because they could finance themselves so adeptly with the bond market that they helped nurture forth, and they nurtured by being very credible borrowers. They mobilized, essentially, the capital of the Dutch burghers, the Dutch merchants, the Dutch businesspeople, and ordinary people to fight for independence whilst the Spanish crown at the time was infamous even for the era for defaulting all the time, ruining many banking families in the process.
Beckworth: An understated part of the Protestant Reformation is the bond market.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: The Protestants today need to give more credit, more recognition [chuckles] to the support they got from the bond market.
Wigglesworth: Everybody needs to give more credit to the bond market.
Beckworth: OK, OK. [chuckles]
Wigglesworth: That’s my strong conviction.
Beckworth: In general. [laughter]
Wigglesworth: In general. Yes.
Beckworth: Yes, long-run economic growth. We’ll talk about the UK in a minute and Industrial Revolution also. But the other thing that was interesting about this, and you mentioned it just a minute ago, is because Spain did not take that approach. They borrowed and they defaulted. It actually impacted—it not only was that the Dutch were funded efficiently with this new technology called bonds, but the Spaniards were so poorly financed and the default history so strong. You tell the story in 1576 of a mutiny of these Spanish soldiers because they’re not getting paid, which then, again, made it easier for the Dutch to defend themselves. Finance is such an important part of history and the storytelling.
Wigglesworth: Yes, no, it’s fascinating. So, I would say, in a way, more modern-day historians have looked at some of the financial details on the banking families in Germany and especially Italy that would lend to King Philip of Spain at the time. His defaults, multiple, they’re weird because he was famous for being a very cunning administrator. He was not some spendthrift, useless royal as was sometimes the rule. But he did default several times, and especially this one default was so important.
People have realized that later on that the bankers actually managed to extract such good interest rates and sometimes collateral out of the Spanish king that they weren’t as mad as it might seem to lend to him again and again—
Beckworth: OK.
Wigglesworth: —and again. But, clearly, sometimes these defaults happen at very strategically inopportune times. And around this mutiny that caused—first of all, it was an important time militarily in this war for independence for Netherlands. But the mutiny soldiers—if I remember correctly, I remember, I forget the date—but they basically sacked Antwerp, brutally sacked Antwerp, to get their money somehow. That was such a brutal moment in the history that actually it helped really solidify the revolutionary fervor in the Netherlands states—the provinces around them, and certainly the Protestant ones. So, it’s a bit like the British reaction to the tea getting thrown in the Boston Harbor, right?
Beckworth: Yes.
Wigglesworth: Certainly these moments, whether they’re financially or militarily important, we can debate, but they certainly became symbolically—
Beckworth: Sure.
Wigglesworth: —hugely powerful.
Beckworth: So, it was a perfect storm of many events, including finance, coming together. But I think one of the big insights from that chapter and that story is then they go on to use these bonds to help fund the Dutch East India Company.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: So, this was the first corporate bond. Is that right?
Wigglesworth: Yes. So, in 1622—it depends a little on what you call a corporate or a company, but broadly speaking—
Beckworth: OK.
Wigglesworth: I think we can call the Dutch East India Company the first proper “company company” with a—
Beckworth: OK.
Wigglesworth: —decentralized, broad shareholder list. It was the first listed company. Amsterdam had the first proper stock market, and it issued the oldest bond I could find in 1622.
Because, the interesting thing is that even today, the stock market—I sometimes cruelly joke that it’s like trading Pokémon cards. It’s really just secondary market activity. It doesn’t actually fund companies. If I’m buying an Apple share, it’s not giving money to Apple. I’m just giving money to another person who owns an Apple share.
The Dutch East India Company hardly ever issued any shares apart from that first initial public offering. But it funded itself all the time through bond issuance. The oldest one we found is in 1622. That almost certainly is the first proper corporate bond. I think it paid 6 ½ percent interest rate for five years. Typically, at the era, bonds were perpetual. But the corporate bond market, those first few corporate bonds, they had a firm maturity date. You can start to see how that starts spreading as well afterwards.
Beckworth: I want to give a quick shoutout to the Bank of Amsterdam in this story. I know it’s not a big part of your book, but I had previous guests on, Will Roberds, Steve Quinn. They have a book on How a Ledger Became a Central Bank. I just bring it up because I do think this is an important contributing factor, maybe, to some of the success of the Netherlands.
This effectively became a central bank. It was a city. It was an urban-based—and because of that, they didn’t have this seigniorage incentive, like most national, central banks—Bank of England, they have an incentive to help fund the government. This bank was set up for price stability to keep markets running, a medium of exchange, very different incentive structure, which I think plays into you trust the corporate bond market there as well.
Wigglesworth: Yes. No, I think the Wisselbank is fascinating. I have to admit, when I was writing this book, you’ll be unsurprised to hear that there were so many separate, interesting [laughter] adventures, as it were, I could have gone on: the history of central banking, the history of banking, the history of money, the history of—
Beckworth: Right.
Wigglesworth: —financial securities in general. But I tried to, as much as possible, to stick to my hero, the bond. The Wisselbank—
Beckworth: Fair enough.
Wigglesworth: —is fascinating. Actually, I haven’t read that book yet, but I have it downloaded on my phone to save now that I’m finally catching up—
Beckworth: [chuckles] Yes, yes.
Wigglesworth: —on all my non-bond-related literature. I’m planning to enjoy that very soon.
Beckworth: Well, the nice thing about that story is if you ask the question, “Who was the original central bank?” Well, you could say, “Well, the Riksbank.” It’s in existence, but it’s the oldest central bank still in operation.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: The Bank of Amsterdam is arguably the oldest and the original central bank, so—
Wigglesworth: And it seemed to have been the direct inspiration for the Bank of England when that was set up after what became known as the Glorious Revolution, where the British just basically copied a lot of Dutch—first of all, they imported the Dutch prince—
Beckworth: Yes, yes.
Wigglesworth: —but also imported a lot of Dutch financial practices as well.
Beckworth: Well, that’s a nice segue. Way to roll there, Robin. [chuckles] Let’s talk about that.
Wigglesworth: Thought it handed it right over, yes. [chuckles]
British Contributions to the Bond Market
Beckworth: You did. You’re perfect. You’re a pro at this, obviously. You had a number of chapters, but let’s talk about the big contributions the UK has made to the bond market over the years.
Wigglesworth: Yes, so, there will be some pedants that say the first true government bond is the bond that basically set up the Bank of England.
Beckworth: OK.
Wigglesworth: Because all the other bonds, until then, had generally been city-states or provinces or towns or royal families or individual companies or individual people or water boards. But the first true sovereign nation that explicitly sold a sovereign bond backed by the entire country of—it wasn’t quite Great Britain yet, or, it was Great Britain—it wasn’t the United Kingdom yet—
Beckworth: OK.
Wigglesworth: —was basically the bond that the Bank of England bought as part of its founding, that they set up the Bank of England as basically a way to lend money to the British government.
Now, I’d argue that’s not true because that bond did not trade. It was structured like a bond, but didn’t really trade. It was symbolically repaid on the Bank of England’s 300th birthday. But you can see the English—they’d have this incredible hodgepodge of debt-like securities that they’d issued in the years up to this. There’d been a sovereign default before the Glorious Revolution as well. It’s one of the motivations for importing a Dutch prince and getting a new royal family.
But over time, you can see this government debt stock. It was a mess of all sorts of different things. Some of it was more like lottery sales and annuities and all sorts of it. It was not very well thought out. But you can see the emergence of what became known as the consolidated annuities market, which is the first risk-free market, really, if you can say anything is truly risk-free. But that was—they took, in the 1700s, the mid-1700s to 1750, if I remember correctly—it was one of the first of several operations where they consolidated all these different debts, did a big, massive debt exchange, and swapped them for a homogeneous security of consolidated annuities that first paid some 3 ½, 4 percent, 3 percent, around that.
That became the financial backbone for the British Empire and a large reason why I’d argue Britain became the world’s leading power for a couple of centuries on the back of the consolidated annuities market, or the consol market. It was, to a large extent, the Treasury market, before the Treasury market existed.
Beckworth: So, there are many key inputs into the Industrial Revolution, but an important one is a good financial technology, and this was it. You’re talking about the perpetual bonds. Is that what you’re talking about?
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: Yes, OK.
Wigglesworth: These are still perpetual securities. Typically, you’ll lose 3 percent.
Beckworth: This is a fascinating story because effectively, they inherit the culture or the thinking of the Dutch financial system. You highlight some people were critical of that, but that actually was a blessing [chuckles] for the nation. But tell us about the perpetuals because that is such a fascinating security. Later in the conversation, I want to come back to this. There’ve been some people, like John Cochrane proposed that the US government should issue it.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: So, tell us more about how do they operate.
Wigglesworth: Well, it’s just a bond without a maturity. Almost all government securities or state-linked securities, bank bonds, were essentially perpetual for several centuries. So, the British didn’t invent perpetuals at all.
Beckworth: OK.
Wigglesworth: But I think they perfected it and took it several degrees before that. The prestiti that the Italians also issued, that was also perpetual. What happened is that you issued prestiti or consols at a 3 percent fixed interest rate. But if, for example, you were hard up and there was a war and you had to borrow a lot, you might sell it below par. You might sell £100 worth of consols for £90. The interest would still be 3 percent. In practice, of course, you’d get less. It might be as little as 80 cents/pence on the pound. You vary.
The market clearing mechanism is really the price, not the yield. The yield is typically fixed to make sure that these are interchangeable. That one 3 percent consol is exactly the same as the next 3 percent consol, even if they’re issued 10 years, different times. Then the government would retire them whenever it won the war, for example, or raised taxes. It would retire them, ideally proportionally. But sometimes, if they’d issued something quite cheaply or with a higher interest rate, because sometimes they would do, those countries, they’d say, “Well, we won’t redeem it for at least 10 years.”
Sometimes, obviously, they’d rather retire something paying 5 percent rather than 3 percent. But essentially, the debt stock would wax and wane and ebb and flow with wars, almost certainly, or big disasters like the South Sea bubble.
Beckworth: Yes.
Wigglesworth: When times were good, you paid down that debt, you bought back these consols, and when times were lean, you issued more of them. That’s how things operated for a very long time. There are pros and cons to that, but it worked reasonably well for the British because, yes, you could sell something below par, and that was annoying, but you could generally always sell it at such a big discount that you get some buyers. Even at the depths of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain was able to sell consols at a far higher price and at a lower effective interest rate, or bond yield, than the French were. That helped bankroll Britain’s victory in the Napoleonic Wars and helped them subsidize allies in Portugal and Prussia and elsewhere, and keep them with material.
But also, in the Industrial Revolution—and this was something I hadn’t really quite appreciated enough until I started researching A Fabulous Debt—but, when Britain won the Napoleonic Wars, the famous [story] of Rothschild sending carrier pigeons, hearing that the Battle of Waterloo [had been] won, and he bought lots of consols to let the price go up. It’s actually not entirely accurate, but consol prices obviously rose. And you can imagine the entire British populace, which had been stuffed to the gills and encouraged to buy all these consols that went from trading at maybe 50, 60, 70 pence on the pound, suddenly went trading at 100, not even overnight, but quite quickly traded up.
It was this massive capital gains, this huge tax-free recapitalization of Britain just as these new technologies were coming on stream. It proved transformative and helped finance, to a large extent, the Industrial Revolution. That was something that I never really quite appreciated, the extent to which the consol market actually helped, almost indirectly, finance that. The financial gains that British investors made on consols helped pay for the investments of the Industrial Revolution.
Beckworth: Yes, such an intriguing story and an idea for a debt security. A key thing again is this: Every security is interchangeable, no matter when it’s issued.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: It’s a very liquid market. You have no uncertainty. It’s not like holding a 10-year Treasury bond today.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: It’s like the liquidity of all Treasury bills, but everything’s completely interchangeable, and everything lasts forever. It’s super fascinating. I’ll just have to throw out there: It’s interesting to compare the British and the French. Though, clearly, they had this technology, they also were very much more disciplined.
I’ve had some previous guests. I had George Hall, who’s written papers with Tom Sargent. They talk about how the British, what they did is they effectively followed Robert Barro’s tax-smoothing view, that when you have a big war, you don’t want to raise taxes, because it’s distortionary. You want to borrow, but then you run primary surpluses. The British did this.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: The French did not. The British had technology. They also had the fiscal discipline that the French seemed to lack.
Wigglesworth: Yes, also, a certain amount of, and you again see that democratic aspect of it. The French would have, periodically, incredibly brilliant finance ministers or prime ministers or chief ministers to the king that would try to institute changes, would sharpen things up. But inevitably, this is unpopular, and they’d fall out with the king. So, Jacques Necker, before the French Revolution, a brilliant Genevan banker who was highly regarded, but was eventually ejected before he could really bring meaningful change to France.
Same thing with Spain and other countries, that actually the fact that the UK had managed to defang its royal family and shifted sovereignty over to Parliament and enfranchised not most of its population—let’s face it.
Beckworth: Yes.
Wigglesworth: It was mostly wealthy men, and only a small section of that, but at least there was some sort of accountability. I didn’t spend as much time on the French or Italian or Spanish history because Italy broke up into different parts and was only unified later. But it’s very clear that you can see that they had opportunities to turn a certain way, and they didn’t take them.
Whilst the British consistently, for a long period of time—even when they were massively indebted—the British debt stock after the Napoleonic Wars, I think it was north of 300 percent of GDP—still the biggest debt burden we’ve ever seen in [the] history of a major country. But again, they made the right choices afterwards and didn’t crush the economy. They started paying it down very slowly, but let economic growth do most of it, of course. Then they were lucky with the timing as well.
Beckworth: Sure, sure. Luck plays a role as much as good policy.
Wigglesworth: Yes. No, annoyingly so, yes.
The Rise of the US Treasury Market
Beckworth: Alright. For the sake of time, we’re going to have to fly through some of the other chapters, but I encourage listeners to check out Robin’s discussion on the emergence of really international bond market in London, and the Rothschilds and Barings play an important part. But I’m going to jump ahead because we don’t have a lot of time left to the US Treasury market.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: And I’m going to just read a quote from actually an FT article you wrote, just to summarize. You word it beautifully here, Robin, so I think it’s a nice summary, and then we can jump to some questions I have. But you say:
It was the bond market that bound the colonies together politically after the American Revolution. It was the bond market that financed the Louisiana Purchase. It was the bond market that bankrolled the Union’s victory in the Civil War. It was the bond market that then knitted the country together physically by financing the vast network of railroads that transformed America into the world’s industrial powerhouse. Bonds were the essential financial fuel that helped the US triumph in both world wars.
Even today, it is the bond market that pays for the homes that Americans live in, the cars they drive, the hulking data centers that now power artificial intelligence. At its heart is the Treasury market, the bills and bonds the US government itself sells to investors.
This comes from an FT article titled The Treasury Market’s Toxic Codependency. The US Government Bond Market Has Become a Hedge Fund Playground. I’ll come back to that in a minute, but just for reference, that’s where I got that.But I want to jump ahead. Again, there’s so much we could talk about.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: But I want to jump to World War II in this story, because during World War II, we actually had, I think, true unquestionable fiscal dominance. The Federal Reserve is subservient to the Treasury. Obviously, they’re fighting a war. We had actual yield curve control, and you talk about that in your book.
Here’s my question to you, since you studied bond markets so thoroughly and so closely. Is it even possible to do yield curve control today given the—you mention in your book, bond markets are bigger than credit from banks. It’s so big. Could we even do that if we wanted to do that?
Wigglesworth: Unquestionably, yes. This is not something I think is probable, but if you ask me stuff that most people say is impossible but I think is certainly more possible than most, I’d say yield curve control. We know that it was discussed. We saw earlier today minutes released from 2022. It was under discussion at the FOMC in 2022. Ben Bernanke discussed it several times as well. We know this has been talked about, mostly in the context of, is this a more optimal form of QE, essentially?
Beckworth: Yes.
Wigglesworth: Every policy comes with intended and unintended consequences, positive and negative. The idea, for me, it flows from the fact that yield curve control by the Fed in World War II was a classic, every sinew of the American government, of America, is subservient to this one effort: the winning of the war. Everything was under support of that. Even in a world where the bond market’s so big, where over half of all global credit is being extended in the bond market, I think that if we continue to think of central banks as the temperature regulators, it is not just necessary, it’s inescapable, that they start having a heavy hand on the bond market, as much as sometimes it might make us feel uncomfortable.
The question is then: Is the least distortive way to do this by just buying lots of Treasurys, unlimited, or buying $100 billion, $200 billion, or having a number that sounds really big and impressive in a press release or saying unlimited, as the Fed did in March 2020? Or is it less distortive to literally dictate a target, like the Bank of Japan eventually did? I don’t actually know what I think is the best way, but I definitely think that yield curve control is not as unthinkable in the US—
Beckworth: OK.
Wigglesworth: —or Europe or the other countries, although those financial systems are very different from Japan. I don’t think it would be smooth sailing, to put it that way, if we ever did yield curve.
Beckworth: Do you think it would be harder today? Do you think it would be harder today than back then because market was much smaller?
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: Less globalized? OK.
Wigglesworth: Well,I’d say that back then, yes, it’s just a smaller market to control, and the government controlled both the supply, and it could enforce a lot of the purchases as well. Then there were marketing and propaganda schemes that first started during the American Civil War and got supercharged during World War I with the Liberty Loan program and copied in World War II. The market is far more international now.
But I also think the Fed is far more credible than it is during World War II, that if the Federal Reserve decided that, “Actually, we think yield curve control is less distortive somehow. We’re going to say the 10-year Treasury—we’ll load rates to zero. We’re not going to go below zero because that definitely does seem to be something that most central banks have decided is not worth experimenting with. But we’re going to target a 10-year yield of 3 percent, and we will buy an unlimited amount of Treasurys to do that.”
Now, people will test them, but I think the Fed has an immense amount of credibility that it would be able to do so. I do think politically it would be toxic in America.
Beckworth: Yes, yes.
Wigglesworth: It is not difficult to see how people would, extremely quickly, scream about socialism and things like that, but I don’t think that should detract from whether this is a useful policy or not. But I’d love to see more debates. I’d love to hear what you think about—
Beckworth: Well, I would—
Wigglesworth: —yield curve control—
Beckworth: —it’s kind of—
Wigglesworth: —versus QE.
Beckworth: [chuckles]No, no. I think there’s a place for QE or any tool you need in the right circumstance, right?
Wigglesworth: Yes.
The Least Dirty Shirt
Beckworth: Fighting a war, zero lower bound, definitely. I guess one could argue, 2021, that was maybe a form of fiscal dominance briefly then as well, so maybe I need to be careful. What I was going to say, I was hoping, Robin, you would give me some hope that the markets will impose more discipline and get the US government’s finances in line. We can’t tinker as much as we used to, but you’re saying, “No. Sorry, David.”
Wigglesworth: No. No. Actually, look, this is definitely one of my stronger-held opinions.
Beckworth: OK.
Wigglesworth: I think Americans are massively over-afraid of the near-term prospects of any major bond market disruption or “debt crisis.” But, arguably, a lot of the same symptoms—or the advantages that the US has that inoculate the US against that classic acute kind of debt crisis. What we think of as in emerging markets: a sudden stop of capital flows, interest rates and bond yields spike higher, the currency collapses, and austerity has to come. Finally, the government wakes up, or there’s a new government comes in.
Beckworth: Yes.
Wigglesworth: I think that is crystallized very much by our experience of developing countries that are not monetarily sovereign. I think in a country like even France or the UK, this plays out very differently, and in a country as unique as America, I think the advantage of that basically makes America virtually immune—I say “virtually” because there is always a possibility for some horrifically stupid accident, of some economic mismanagement or financial mismanagement—but makes that kind of classic acute debt crisis almost impossible.
It makes a chronic debt crisis that slowly builds up over a generation or two—that makes it more likely because there will never be that firm discipline of the bond market—that actually this—we’ll continue to worry about this for the next 10, 20, 30 years, but over time, no politician wants to raise taxes. Nobody wants to cut spending; the budget deficit stays high; there’s no countervailing force.
Beckworth: Yes.
Wigglesworth: There’s enough demand for Treasurys in the US financial system, the global financial system, that over time, debt servicing as a percentage of American GDP or the budget just keeps rising and rising and rising and rising. It’s a chronic crisis that just manifests in a very different way and in a slow-moving way. That’s my 10 cents—
Beckworth: No, I mean—
Wigglesworth: —or my 35 trillion cents.
Beckworth: [chuckles] No, I’m sympathetic to most of that. There is no alternative to the US dollar system.
Wigglesworth: No.
Beckworth: Whether it’s public bonds, Treasurys, or private, that’s the thing. If you’re going to run on a bank, there’s got to be another bank to run to that has balance-sheet capacity the same, and there is no other balance-sheet capacity.
Wigglesworth: Nothing.
Beckworth: I’ve mentioned this before many times. I’ll do it one more time because it fits well here. Mark Carney’s proposal in 2019 for this synthetic hegemonic currency, the SHC, it was this crazy idea that each central bank would have a CBDC, and then would have a synthetic currency on top of that, that would displace the dollar. There was simply not enough balance-sheet capacity around the world to displace the dollar, even if you wanted to follow through on that plan.
Wigglesworth: No. The cliché that gets bandied around a lot is that America is the least dirty shirt.
Beckworth: Yes.
Wigglesworth: And it’s a pretty dirty shirt, but you should see some of the others. They are stinky. And they’re just—
Beckworth: [laughs] Yes.
Wigglesworth: —not big enough. We’re—
Beckworth: Fair point, yes, yes.
Wigglesworth: —too big, right? Yes. If you just think about the—I can’t remember what the current estimates are for how much of the Treasury market that just Europe holds—but several trillions of dollars. Where’s that money going to go? Into Italy?
Beckworth: Right.
Wigglesworth: France? Japan?
Beckworth: Yes.
Wigglesworth: China? As much as the coherence and competency of American policymaking is being severely questioned at the moment, do we really feel safer lending money to Beijing than we do DC? I don’t think so.
So, I think the Trump administration has engineered, deliberately and by accident, a massive stress test of the world’s ability and willingness to stick to the dollar and the Treasury market, and lo and behold, money is still going into the Treasury market all the time. There are a few months here and there where the TIC data indicates there’s some outflows, and journalists like me will write, “Oh, this is worrisome.” In practice, I just see zero real evidence of that changing. It’s not for want of wanting an alternative, but it’s for a lack of anything that looks remotely—
Beckworth: Right.
Wigglesworth: —plausible.
Beckworth: Well, we’ll have to wait for the aliens and disclosure day to maybe provide a true alternative. [chuckles]
Wigglesworth: Yes. No, Mars bonds. Mars bunds. I don’t know what we’d call Mars bonds. [laughter] Maybe that’s what we’ll have to wait for.
Liquidity Demand, Codependency, and Hedge Fund Bogeymen
Beckworth: They’ll be the only alternative.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: Let me conclude with this question and this idea here. You mentioned there’s still this appetite for Treasurys, and I want to bring up one in particular. It’s the Treasury basis trade that you wrote about in the FT article. Again, the title was The Treasury Market’s Toxic Codependency. The US Government Bond Market Has Become a Hedge Fund Playground. We know, look, there are good reasons for this.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: You may not like the outcome, but post-Great Financial Crisis, we have Dodd–Frank, which really constrains balance-sheet capacity of primary dealers and traditional banks, and yet we continue to issue all this debt. Somebody has to step in and provide liquidity support, and so, hedge funds have done that. They’re also very fickle, though. They’re not like primary—they can leave on a dime. This is the point you make.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: But they also are doing something I think really underscores the point you just said. They are effectively converting long-term Treasurys into short-term liquidity through this basis trade, through the repo market, which suggests to me—and I’ve had other people say this—that the Treasury should be issuing more Treasury bills if there’s some unmet demand, and that might solve the problem. I want you to respond to that. Is that a fair assessment?
Wigglesworth: Yes. I say chances of a debt crisis in America happening near term, I think, are preposterously overdone. Although there can be ructions, there’ll be bad headlines. I think the risk of a technical breakdown of the Treasury market, although it’s low, it’s far greater than people appreciate. Given how much of the global financial system is built on the idea of Treasury market as the solid bedrock underneath, I think that’s a scary thing.
I sometimes try to catch myself. I don’t want to badmouth or be mean about hedge funds because I feel that’s a classic journalistic bogeyman trope, as it were.
Beckworth: Yes.
Wigglesworth: Hedge funds are not doing this to be mean or bad. They’re actually providing a valuable service both to asset management clients—basically, this is driven by the fact that normal mutual funds and insurance companies and such, like pension funds—want a lot of duration for all sorts of annoying technical reasons I don’t know if you want to get into—but they are willing to pay up for Treasury futures. Treasury futures trade very rich to Treasury cash bonds, and hedge funds are then just arbitraging that.
They’re buying Treasury bonds and selling Treasury futures. They are providing a service and then also helping, in some way, intermediate demand and making sure that demand filters into the ordinary American taxpayers. The reason why they don’t, it isn’t just that they are more price sensitive than a boring pension plan, but it’s also they use massive amounts of leverage. And as much as this is supposedly perfectly hedged, we know the financial system is very bad at stress testing these things.
We’ve seen times when this has come undone. The basis trade is the one that gets the most attention after March 2020, when it almost blew up, but there are many other hedge fund strategies. All we know is that now the Fed has released data that shows that hedge funds in total own more of the Treasury market than Japan and China and Saudi Arabia put together.
Beckworth: Wow.
Wigglesworth: We are talking 8 percent of the entire Treasury market, overwhelmingly leveraged, many, many multiples. In some cases, it’s insane that multiples because it’s all based on the fact the Treasury market has so little volatility. But I do think the real solution is not less, more bills, because the Treasury is issuing more bills now mostly to keep bond borrowing costs capped, and I think that actually introduces another potential fragility in that the average 10-year yield, the American debt stack is shortening and shortening.
I guess there are two solutions I’ve seen. I’ve seen many people talk about this, but the two solutions that I’ve really loved. One is Anil Kashyap, Josh Younger, and a few others came out with a Brookings paper. I’ve got it here: “The Treasury Market Dysfunction and the Role of the Central Bank.” It’s sort of a palliative, where they said that the Fed should introduce a basis trade bailout facility in practice, where they lift both sides if that trade hits a hard patch and the hedge funds have to liquidate it.
The Fed can buy both sides at the same time, because obviously the Fed has zero funding worries. It can literally create money. It would essentially be bailing out the hedge funds, but it would probably make money doing so because it would only be doing this at times of stress. It would encourage moral hazard because obviously anybody doing the basis trade would know that you could sell out to the Fed if you hit a bad patch, but it strikes me as an elegant way of taking it out, minimizing funding stresses or how technical problems it can cause, and also potentially even making a bit of money for the Treasury itself.
The second one is a guy called Steven Williams, who’s proposed on Alphaville, the blog I run at the FT, where he said essentially the Treasury itself can just sell Treasury bonds forward. They can sell a 10-year Treasury bond that you only settle, you only receive in five years’ time, because in practice, that is delivering the synthetic duration that mutual funds are buying through Treasury futures.
Why can’t the Treasury itself essentially sell Treasury futures or something that walks, talks, and quacks like a Treasury future with synthetic duration, thereby satisfying that demand and just lessening the incentive for hedge funds to do all these very complicated trades, but also fund itself that way? I think that’s also a simple, quite elegant way that could potentially help or certainly ameliorate this issue, at least on the basis trade.
Beckworth: Yes.On these proposals, have you heard any feedback from policymakers or anyone, whether there’s receptivity to this?
Wigglesworth: No, I haven’t. The first one, Steven Williams, he’s a relative value bond trader. He had an idea, and I think he ran it. It was very much a speculative thing, but I’ve talked to people. Is this technically feasible? It is, but I haven’t heard whether that’s going to happen.
Beckworth: OK.
Wigglesworth: I think in the administration today, there are many other priorities. I think it might appeal to somebody like a Bessent, who has more of a trading mentality that I think understands these issues. Despite what it sometimes might appear, I think Bessent does have a fine-tuned understanding of these issues. And then the Kashyap et al. suggestion, I think I have talked to policymakers or people in those circles about this. Everybody agrees they just think it’s politically toxic to set it up as a standard permanent facility, but in practice, this is what happens when the Fed sprays money—
Beckworth: Anyways.
Wigglesworth: —at the problem. Yes, exactly.
Beckworth: Right, right.
Wigglesworth: Is it better to just do it ad hoc and maybe introduce a certain amount of worry that, “Would the Fed do this and thereby keep things under control?” I think so, but I think the Fed has shown its hand so many times that nobody doing these trades—
Beckworth: Oh, certainly.
Wigglesworth: —is ever worried about the Fed not doing what it takes to save the Treasury market from a meltdown.
Beckworth: Yes, and for that same reason, I think if push comes to shove in the stablecoin market, we’ll see something similar happen there.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
A Great Idea That Will Never, Ever Happen?
Beckworth: One last related question, then we’ll wrap the show up. But I know you’re familiar with John Cochrane’s proposal to revamp the entire debt structure. Just briefly, he wants to see, on the short end, a fixed-value, floating-rate debt instrument, electronic Treasurys you can buy and sell on demand, but basically, a perpetual—in fact, all of these would be perpetual—but the short end would effectively be a substitute for reserves from the Federal Reserve. Longer end, you’d have nominal perpetuals, Treasurys, with consols paying a fixed dollar coupon forever, and then also index perpetuities. He has some other ideas as well, but what are your thoughts on this? Is this too radical? Great idea? Somewhere in between?
Wigglesworth: Oh, it’s a great idea that will never, ever happen, is my view.
Beckworth: [chuckles]OK.
Wigglesworth: I think it is conceptually brilliant and elegant. I love it. There are technical issues with some of the short-end stuff, but I think it’s fascinating. I think there are advantages. That homogeneous debt stack of perpetual bonds that you can buy and sell and trade, I think there are liquidity benefits to that. With the current setup with a sliding auction, different maturities, there are a lot of games around that. I just think it is impossible, absent an apocalyptic crisis, that we are ever going to have something like this.
We joke a lot about trying to fix a Boeing 747 whilst midair. I don’t know what it would be the equivalent. We couldn’t do it. There is no way we’d be able to swap the American debt stack. What you could maybe see is some countries—and this has been under discussion, I think, by certain debt management officers—reissuing perpetuals, starting a perpetual market again. Over time, over, let’s say, 50 years, if we do think this is optimal, that this is a cheaper way of funding the government in whatever country it is, that the perpetual market just broadly starts taking over and at various stages there are buybacks and exchange options and things like that.
DMOs are not known for their radicalism. By their nature, they’re supposed to be very predictable and sober.
Beckworth: Yes.
Wigglesworth: I think even in a small country, like a Norway, this would be very hard to do operationally and logistically and politically. In a country like the United States, I just think it’s never, ever going to happen. But I think it’s a fascinating idea, and I’m glad you raised it.
I think ideas should be discussed because even if they’re not going to happen, they can still sharpen our understanding about some of these issues. Something that is like the current short-end US money market—you’re far better on this than I am, but I do think it is—as a journalist-observer and a complete rube when it comes to these things, the hodgepodge of Fed funds and repo and different rates and bills, it just does look suboptimal, so maybe there could be some finessing there.
Beckworth: One of the key things I like about this is that this would be on demand. If the market wanted more liquidity, like right now they want more short-end liquidity, it would be less demand for the basis trade, arguably, if these were available, but as you said, this is a long journey, if one at all, marketing, political appetite, and such.
With that, our time is up. Our guest today has been Robin Wigglesworth. His book is A Fabulous Debt. Be sure you get your copy. Thank you, Robin, for coming on the show.
Wigglesworth: Thanks for having me, David. It’s been lots of fun, and even talking about everything from basis and bond yields to perpetuals and whether we can bring them back. I have a soft spot for perpetuals. I’d like to see them brought back, but I think the direction of travel is pretty clear. England finally repaid that Bank of England bond a few years ago, signaling the final end of the British consol market. But maybe we’ll bring it back to the future at some point.
Beckworth: All right. Let’s make perpetuals great again.
Wigglesworth: Yes.
Beckworth: Thank you so much, Robin.
Wigglesworth: Thanks, David.