Institutional Economics: Property, Competition, and Policies, 2nd ed

Mired in the imaginary world of long run equilibrium, mainstream neoclassical economics is oblivious to the obstacles that stand in the way of successful social cooperation. Its arid mathematical models, engaged in an in-depth analysis of a world where the economic problem has already been successfully resolved, simply assume away the problems that any economy faces in achieving an optimal coordination of means and ends. In Institutional Economics: Property, Competition, and Policies, Professors Kasper, Streit, and Boettke provide a refreshing alternative to this prevailing neoclassical economic paradigm. The authors, in their model of the economy, do not focus solely on the end state of long run equilibrium. Instead, drawing inspiration from the works of F. A. Hayek and Israel Kirzner, they emphasize the process by which the economic problem is solved; the process by which, the underlying data remaining unchanged, the interactions of the various individual participants ultimately yields an optimal allocation of resources.

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