The Sacrifice Trap of War

This paper explores the political economy of the sacrifice trap of war--the conflict-related version of the sunk cost fallacy, where policymakers invest additional resources in failing wars because of prior sacrifices already made. Once the initial decision to engage in war is made, democratic leaders face strong incentives to signal success to citizens. These incentives stem from the need to maintain public support, preserve their reputation as effective leaders, and establish a positive legacy. 

However, policymakers do not bear war's full costs, instead shifting significant burdens onto others. This cost-shifting allows them to ignore sunk costs with minimal personal consequence, creating a negative political externality--the overproduction of war compared to situations where policymakers internalize the full costs of their actions. These dynamics, combined with policymakers' desire to maintain their identity as a strong and effective leader, explain how societies become mired in war's sacrifice trap. 

After exploring the sacrifice trap's theoretical foundations, we examine two historical cases--U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War (1955-1975) and in the Iraq War (2003-2011).

Find the full paper here.