Score: 21 / 60
RULE SUMMARY
The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) proposed regulation changes to the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund (Fund) and the Abandoned Mine Land (AML) program. This proposed rule revises regulations to be consistent with the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, which included the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act Amendments of 2006 (the 2006 amendments). The proposed rule reflects the extension of OSM’s statutory authority to collect reclamation fees for an additional fourteen years and to reduce the fee rates. This proposal also updates the regulations in light of the statutory amendments that change the activities State and Tribal reclamation programs may perform under the AML program, funding for reclamation grants to States and Indian tribes, and transfers to the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) Combined Benefit Fund (CBF), the UMWA 1992 Benefit Plan, and the UMWA Multiemployer Health Benefit Plan (1993 Benefit Plan). Finally, the proposed rule extends incentives reauthorized by the 2006 amendments pertaining to the remaining of certain lands and water adversely affected by past mining.
METHODOLOGY
There are twelve criteria within our evaluation within three broad categories: Openness, Analysis and Use. For each criterion, the evaluators assign a score ranging from 0 (no useful content) to 5 (comprehensive analysis with potential best practices). Thus, each analysis has the opportunity to earn between 0 and 60 points.
| Criterion | Score |
|---|---|
Openness | |
| 1. How easily were the RIA , the proposed rule, and any supplementary materials found online? The RIA, which is located within the proposed rule, can be found easily on regulations.gov by typing in the RIN and then clicking on the docket ID and accessing DOI's "Semi-annual Regulatory Agenda—Fall 2008." Detailed description and links for related documents are available there. Additionally, the same documents are easily accessible using the keyword search option on regulations.gov (four clicks). DOI's website contains info on the program and a link to regulations.gov, but not the actual rule/RIA. | 4/5 |
| 2. How verifiable are the data used in the analysis? Data is used, but not verifiable in most if not all cases. When sources are given (which is rare), the source is still obscure and probably not verifiable. | 1/5 |
| 3. How verifiable are the models and assumptions used in the analysis? The models are simply assertions. For example, under the proposed alternative, the costs would be greater but the funds would be sufficient to reclaim all priority 1 and 2 land. That is not a model but a hypothesis. Similar with other claims of benefits—no model is referred to that motivates the claims. | 1/5 |
| 4. Was the analysis comprehensible to an informed layperson? An economist would understand it all. The analysis may lack content but not clarity and simple, direct language. | 4/5 |
Analysis | |
| 5. How well does the analysis identify the desired outcomes and demonstrate that the regulation will achieve them? | 1/5 |
| Does the analysis clearly identify ultimate outcomes that affect citizens’ quality of life? Some benefits such as higher employment, higher reclaimed land use opportunities, and other "unquantifiable" benefits are mentioned. E.g., the reduction or elimination of health and safety problems and adverse environmental effects such as acid mine drainage and erosion, the improved habitat for fish and wildlife, increased employment opportunities for those employed by reclamation projects, and an increase in the number of potential land uses at these sites are all said to generally "increase the quality of life in nearby communities" (35246). However, some of those benefits may have been achieved under SMRCRA prior to expiration of statutory authority (i.e., before this rule was proposed). Therefore, a description of more specific quality-of-life improvements contributed on the margin by this proposal would improve the RIA. | 3/5 |
| Does the analysis identify how these outcomes are to be measured? No, the unquantifiable benefits may actually be quantifiable (e.g. employment, reduction of health and safety hazards). Even if they are not quantifiable, RIA could cite relevant studies bolstering the argument that these benefits could be achieved even if unquantified. Other obviously quantifiable measures (acres reclaimed) are addressed only by naming them, but not by proposing measures. | 1/5 |
| Does the analysis provide a coherent and testable theory showing how the regulation will produce the desired outcomes? The RIA claims that its quantifiable (acreage reclaimed) and unquantifiable benefits will" increase the quality of life in nearby communities.” While it seems plausible that reclaimed land is more desirable compared to abandoned mine lands, the analysis takes this as a given. The RIA states that the higher fees to coal operators will lead to benefits from “environmental problems” that are reclaimed; however, it also relies on the assumption that funding to states/tribes will be used for reclamation and other projects for the public good. | 2/5 |
| Does the analysis present credible empirical support for the theory? The analysis gives no credible empirical support for why quantifiable and unquantifiable benefits will improve the quality of life of those in nearby communities. | 0/5 |
| Does the analysis adequately assess uncertainty about the outcomes? The RIA makes no effort to account for adverse shocks that would reduce or even augment the amount of benefit that is realized. The RIA should account for the complexity of environmental factors that could affect "acres of high priority," the various economic factors that also affect local job markets and the additional monetary considerations that could change fee rates by utilizing credible citations. While the RIA does mention that the "President's priorities" could impose legal mandates that affect their statutory authority, no explanation on the size of this (environmental and/or fiscal) risk or any mention of the change in the size of the outcome that it would cause is given. | 0/5 |
| 6. How well does the analysis identify and demonstrate the existence of a market failure or other systemic problem the regulation is supposed to solve? | 0/5 |
| Does the analysis identify a market failure or other systemic problem? The analysis does not address this topic. | 0/5 |
| Does the analysis outline a coherent and testable theory that explains why the problem (associated with the outcome above) is systemic rather than anecdotal? No; the regulation comes about to comply with a law, and it does not seem to address any normal economic concerns like market failure or systemic problems. | 0/5 |
| Does the analysis present credible empirical support for the theory? The “theory” is simply that funds can be used by states/tribes to reclaim mined land, and there is some support that fees can be used to reclaim lands based on DOI's experience with funding reclamation in the past. There is no empirical evidence given that federal funding to state/tribal governments for reclamation represents the best way of achieving reclamation. | 1/5 |
| Does the analysis adequately assess uncertainty about the existence or size of the problem? The analysis does not address this topic. | 0/5 |
| 7. How well does the analysis assess the effectiveness of alternative approaches? | 1/5 |
| Does the analysis enumerate other alternatives to address the problem? Two options are considered: status quo or the proposed regulation. No other alternatives or options are mentioned. | 1/5 |
| Is the range of alternatives considered narrow (e.g., some exemptions to a regulation) or broad (e.g., performance-based regulation vs. command and control, market mechanisms, nonbinding guidance, information disclosure, addressing any government failures that caused the original problem)? Almost as narrow as can be done. | 1/5 |
| Does the analysis evaluate how alternative approaches would affect the amount of the outcome achieved? The analysis does not address this topic. | 0/5 |
| Does the analysis adequately address the baseline? That is, what the state of the world is likely to be in the absence of federal intervention not just now but in the future? The baseline is evaluated with the same rigor as the proposed regulation, which is inadequate due to lacking models/sources. | 3/5 |
| 8. How well does the analysis assess costs and benefits? | 2/5 |
| Does the analysis identify and quantify incremental costs of all alternatives considered? Incremental costs of options considered are detailed in a chart. | 3/5 |
| Does the analysis identify all expenditures likely to arise as a result of the regulation? Costs to industry and government are given in Table 1. | 3/5 |
| Does the analysis identify how the regulation would likely affect the prices of goods and services? Only through an assertion that it would not have an effect | 1/5 |
| Does the analysis examine costs that stem from changes in human behavior as consumers and producers respond to the regulation? The analysis does not address this topic. | 0/5 |
| If costs are uncertain, does the analysis present a range of estimates and/or perform a sensitivity analysis? The analysis does not address this topic. | 0/5 |
| Does the analysis identify the alternative that maximizes net benefits? Given its options considered, the proposed rule maximized net benefits. But not enough options considered, uncertainty evaluated, other relevant costs considered to give it higher than a 3. | 3/5 |
| Does the analysis identify the cost-effectiveness of each alternative considered? The analysis does not address this topic. | 0/5 |
| Does the analysis identify all parties who would bear costs and assess the incidence of costs? If its assertions are correct, then probably it does. However, too much relies on assertions, such as the assertion that there will be no price effect. | 3/5 |
| Does the analysis identify all parties who would receive benefits and assess the incidence of benefits? The unquantifiable benefits are weakly attributed to parties, and they could be better broken down. | 2/5 |
Use | |
| 9. Does the proposed rule or the RIA present evidence that the agency used the analysis? Considering the narrow range of options considered and lack of supporting models/sources, it seems like the RIA was done after the rule was written. However, this could also be due to mandated legislation limiting the options of the rule. | 0/5 |
| 10. Did the agency maximize net benefits or explain why it chose another alternative? Yes, but a narrow range. Both the RIA and the rule address net benefits of the "old law" and "2006 amendment" alternatives but neither address an adequate number of alternatives inside and outside the scope of legal mandate to show that the option that it chose maximizes net benefits. | 3/5 |
| 11. Does the proposed rule establish measures and goals that can be used to track the regulation's results in the future? This RIA was written to be consistent with legislation that extends the statutory authority of the OSM to collect reclamation fees and reduce the fee rates until 2010. As such, goals to rearrange funds and reduce fees (however arbitrary) serve as benchmarks for future performance. It is important to note, however, that making sure that actual results mirror these projected goals may still not maximize net benefits. | 2/5 |
| 12. Did the agency indicate what data it will use to assess the regulation's performance in the future and establish provisions for doing so? Though not explicitly indicated, it seems obvious. The unquantifiable benefits could be measured, however, and this is not mentioned. Certain data found in the 2006 amendments can be used to assess the regulation's performance in the future. For instance, since the 2006 amendments both extend the reclamation fee for 14 years and provided for a two-step reduction in the amount of the fee rate from the rate established in 1977, thereby providing a benchmark until the year 2010, comparing the actual fees with those projected in charts throughout the RIA will serve as a guide to their progress (35244). Also, since states and Indian tribes must use prior balance replacement funds for purposes established by the state legislature or tribal council in the future, with priority given for addressing the impacts of mineral development, the OSM has more leverage to decide what happens with the money (35245). | 2/5 |
| Total | 21 / 60 |
Additional details
- Agency
- Department of Interior
- Regulatory Identification Number
- 1029-AC56
- Agency Name
- Department of Interior
- Rule Publication Date
- 06/20/2008