Refuge Alternatives for Underground Coal Mines

The RIA notes that, in general, the proposed rule would improve mine operators’ preparedness for mine emergencies. More specifically, this proposed rule would require the availability of refuge alternatives in the event that escape is delayed or not possible. MSHA suggests that the proposal would therefore improve mine operators’ preparedness for mine emergencies and increase miners’ safety by requiring refuge alternatives underground to protect and sustain miners trapped when a life-threatening event occurs that prevents escape. The refuge alternatives proposed in the rule may also assist miners in escaping from the mine.

MSHA measures these outcomes by looking retrospectively at how many lives could have been saved if this proposed rule had been enacted earlier. MSHA evaluates its accident and injury data from 1900 through 2006. During that period, 264 miners who were alive after a mine accident died later during rescue or escape. If refuge alternatives had been available, MSHA estimates that the range of lives saved would be between a low of 55 and a high of 166 lives. This part of the analysis would be improved if MSHA considered the effects on current miner safety and made projections about the amount of lives saved in the future as well.

The analysis assumes that compliance would have saved 25–75% of lives that would otherwise have been lost. It does not posit a theory to justify this estimate.

Two strong points: The analysis ensures that the regulation can't save more lives than were actually lost in coal mines, and it adjusts this figure for lives presumed saved by other regulations.

The analysis acknowledges big uncertainty in range of estimated lives saved but does not justify the range. The RIA does not assess the likelihood that mining emergencies like explosions, fires, or inundations, will occur in underground coal mines, but the analysis does mention that from 1900–2006, 264 miners who were alive after a mine accident died later during rescue or escape.

Not specifically. The RIA assumes that the likelihood of a mining emergency occurring is the same for all 613 underground coal mines. Since this is highly unlikely, the RIA could be improved if MSHA assessed the likelihood of an emergency occurring on a more specific or regional basis. Assuming that the problem is systemic is not enough. For instance, the 264 miners who died during rescue or escape could have been from a handful of the 613 underground coal mines, a finding that would undermine the systemic nature underlying the proposed rule.

Extensive data explain the size and scope of coal mining, but none of the data demonstrate why this is an industry-wide problem.

The proposed rule cites several examples of underground coal mine accidents in Kentucky, Utah, Pennsylvania and West Virginia within the "Discussion of the Hazard" section of its introduction.

The analysis does not address this topic.

MSHA considered certain breathable air options within the RIA that could be used to meet the requirements of the refuge alternatives proposal: (1) existing boreholes; (2) provisions for 48 hours of breathable air plus borehole pre-arrangements; and (3) compressed air stations.

These three alternatives are adequate in addressing alternatives to breathable air options. However, since other aspects of the proposed rule, such as its requirements for the use, transport, maintenance and inspection of refuge alternatives, are not addressed, the range of options considered is narrow. Further, no alternative action to federal regulation is described.

The RIA estimates costs of some of the refuge alternatives but does not measure outcomes.

The RIA would be improved if the state of the mining industry in the absence of federal intervention was outlined clearly given the questionable cost effectiveness of the proposed rule and the RIA's narrow treatment of alternatives. Also, though the RIA does contextualize the rule in accordance to section 13 of MINER Act of 2006, a discussion of what miner safety would look like in the absence of this act and/ or any amendments to it would help readers assess the effectiveness of regulations such as the proposed rule. One strong point is that the analysis avoids counting lives that are assumed saved by other regulations.

The analysis identifies additional expenditures to comply with the regulation and considers some costs of alternatives. MSHA has developed a range of costs for these breathable air options. The agency estimates that for most mines, alternative 1 would cost between $100,000 and $500,000. MSHA estimates that the difference in cost between 48 hours worth of provisions and 96 hours worth of provisions is $5,000 for 10-person refuge alternatives and $10,000 for 20-person refuge alternatives for alternative 2. Finally, the cost of one piped compressed-air system (alternative 3) is estimated to be in excess of $120,000.

In the "Derivation of Proposed Rule Compliance Costs" section, MSHA estimates the unit and component costs for each aspect of refuge alternative, and that information is summarized in different tables. An exhaustive breakdown and description of the expenditures facing manufacturers and mine operators of $43.3 million is given. Approval Costs amount to 2.1 million, requirements for Refuge Alternatives; Purchase, Installation, Transportation, Maintenance and Repair of Refuge Alternatives comes to 21.8 million, Roof Control Plans, Pre-Shift Examinations, Map Revisions, and Emergency Response Plans average $6.6 million and training comes to12.8 million. Table IV-3 also provides a thorough breakdown of the first-year costs of the proposed rule, which amount to $102.6 million.

While the RIA does give a thorough treatment of the average price of coal in underground mines in 2007 ($40.37 per ton) and the price of other factors that influence sections IV A-D of the proposed rule, there is no analysis of how the proposed rule will affect the prices of goods and services is evident.

The analysis assumes no change in miner, industry, or consumer behavior.

The analysis considers the possibility that split between prefab units and prepositioning of supplies to build units will differ from 60/40 to 40/60.

There is no explicit discussion; some more costly alternatives are ruled out. It is not directly apparent that the proposed rule maximizes net benefits. In its "Economic Feasibility" section, MSHA concludes that the proposed rule would be economically feasible for these mines because the total yearly compliance cost ($41.2 million) is below 1% (0.3%) of the estimated annual revenue for all underground coal mines ($14.1 billion). However, the costliness of the proposed rule (total yearly cost of $41.2 million, total amortized value of first-year cost of $102.6 million) does not seem to justify the benefits. Although highly controversial, paying $102.6 for the first year and $41.2 million annually after that to save approximately one-half life per year under the lower estimate or one and one-half lives per year under the higher estimate means that the regulation's cost per statistical life saved exceed most values of a statistical life used by other agencies. Since the benefit estimates were performed retrospectively and the alternatives considered are narrow in scope, the RIA could be improved if MSHA used estimates of the value of a statistical life and broadened its scope of alternatives considered.

Although mine operators may use the three alternatives, MSHA has not included them in the agency’s cost estimates because their costs are more speculative. Nonetheless, MSHA does develop a range of costs for these breathable air options. Cost-effectiveness is not explicitly calculated.

The analysis includes an extensive discussion of incidence across different types of mines. There is no discussion of passing costs back to workers or forward to customers.

The analysis pesumes that miners receive benefits, but there is no discussion of whether miners in different types of mines have different risks. MSHA evaluates its accident and injury data from 1900 through 2006. MSHA estimates that 55 lives could have been saved under the lower estimate, and that 166 lives could have been saved under the higher estimate. Even though the information is likely available in its accident and injury data, MSHA does not give any further breakdown describing which mines would have been helped the most.