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Casey B. Mulligan

Casey B. Mulligan, Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago in 1993 and has also served as a visiting professor teaching public economics at Harvard University, Clemson University, and the Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies at the University of Chicago. He is affiliated with the National Bureau of Economic Research, the George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, and the Population Research Center. He has received awards and fellowships from the Manhattan Institute, the National Science Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the Smith-Richardson Foundation, and the John M. Olin Foundation. His research covers capital and labor taxation, the gender wage gap, health economics, Social Security, voting and the economics of aging. 

Mulligan has written widely on discrepancies between economic analysis and conventional wisdom. Before Side Effects, he wrote The Redistribution Recession andParental Priorities and Economic Inequality. He has also written numerous opeds and blog entries for the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Post, theChicago Tribune, blogsupplyanddemand.com, and other blogs and periodicals.

Publications & Appearances

The Impact of Health Reform on Employment and Work Schedules

According to the model presented in this paper, the ACA’s incentives and ultimately its behavioral effects will vary substantially across groups, with the elderly experiencing hardly any new incentives and female workers being most likely to cut their work schedules to 29 hours per week.

The Affordable Care Act and the New Economics of Part-Time Work

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) imposes several types of incentives that will affect work schedules. The largest of them are (1) an explicit penalty on employers who do not offer coverage to their full-time employees; (2) an implicit tax on full-time employment, stemming from the fact that full-time employees at employers that offer affordable coverage are ineligible to receive subsidies on the law’s new health insurance exchanges; and (3) an implicit tax on earnings, stemming from the provisions of the law that give lower subsidies to those with higher incomes.