Peter T. Calcagno

Peter T. Calcagno is a professor of economics and Director of the Center for Public Choice & Market Process at the College of Charleston.
Publications & Appearances
- | Corporate Welfare Corporate Welfare
- | Working Papers Working Papers
Targeted Economic Incentives
State and local governments often seek to attract firms with targeted economic incentives, such as loan guarantees and tax
- | Academic & Student Programs Academic & Student Programs
- | Government Spending Government Spending
- | Data Visualizations Data Visualizations
Tracing the Roots of Today’s Fiscal Policy
Whether today’s policymakers intend or realize it, the evolution of informal and formal fiscal rules continues to shape today’s fiscal policy outcomes. This has led to chronic deficits, mounting debt, a dizzying complexity of tax and budget procedures, and unsustainably large unfunded obligations—all leading toward an overall bad and worsening fiscal outlook. Any serious discussion of reform must start by recognizing the current incentive structure embedded in the budget process. Piling on more formal constraints, without addressing the shifts in the informal rules, will be futile.

- | Academic & Student Programs Academic & Student Programs
- | Government Spending Government Spending
- | Working Papers Working Papers
The Evolution of Federal Budget Rules and the Effects on Fiscal Policy
A new study published by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University argues that, beginning late in the 19th century, the informal rules that govern fiscal policy began to reward policymakers for increasing spending—even for increasing it beyond the capacity of federal revenues, and therefore at the cost of chronic deficits. Despite numerous legislative attempts to constrain spending over the past 40 years, these informal rules have trumped formal constraints, and the deficit problem has marched steadily on.

- | Academic & Student Programs Academic & Student Programs
- | Journal Articles Journal Articles
Divided We Vote
Divided government is known to correlate with limited government, but less is understood about the empirical conditions that lead to divided government. This paper estimates the determinants of continuous and categorical measures of divided government in an empirical macro political economy model using 30 years of data from the American states.
